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4ABSTRACT
What role, if any, the concept of personal responsibility for health should play in
health policy is a burning question. Human beings have long known that their
behaviour can cause ill-health, but it is only in the last century that we have come to
understand that our behaviour is causally responsible for a substantial amount of the
global burden of disease. Partly as a result of these new findings politicians have
started to advocate “cost bearing” policies which require people who are responsible
for their ill-health to bear some of the costs of their risky health affecting choices.
In this respect, policy makers and other stakeholders have stolen a march on
philosophers because relatively little work has hitherto been carried out by these
academics to determine whether cost bearing health policies are normatively
justifiable and practically feasible. As such, the primary goals of my thesis will be to
develop a framework for analysing these questions and to provide some substantive
answers of my own.
The main conclusions that I will draw in thesis is that some forms of cost bearing
policies – namely, “risk tax” and “risk insurance” policies – are both practically
feasible and normatively reasonable and that these policies can be defended by at least
five different normative arguments – including a theory of justice known as “luckist”
luck egalitarianism. During the course of my thesis I will also defend the
supplemental claims that ill-health is, causally speaking, very much in our own hands
and that most people are substantively morally responsible for their risky health
affecting choices.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.”
– William Shakespeare
1.0 Personal responsibility for health and cost bearing
Should smokers bear the costs of their habit? Should sky divers be forced to purchase
compulsory health insurance? Should people who contract sexually transmitted
diseases be denied access to health care? Should people who eat too much saturated
fat pay a “fat tax”? Should fire fighters, policemen and health care professionals pay
for their treatment if they suffer injuries whilst on duty? Should patients waiting for
liver transplants be given lower priority if they are suffering from alcoholic liver
cirrhosis?
Philosophers, physicians and politicians are increasingly asking these kinds of
questions and many policy makers have already put policies in place which require
people who are “personally responsible” for their ill-health to bear some kind of cost.
Germany has been in the vanguard in terms of implementing such policies, but many
other countries have now followed suit (Schmidt 2009c). For example, the Danish
government recently introduced legislation which requires people who purchase food
with high levels of saturated fat to pay what has been dubbed a “fat tax” (Abend
2011). Successive British governments, meanwhile, have mooted the possibility of
doing the same and it seems very likely that some kind of responsibility-based cost
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bearing policies will be adopted in the UK in the near future. Indeed, about 10% of
Primary Care Trusts in the UK have already put in place policies which deny obese
patients access to hip and knee replacements unless they lose weight (Schmidt 2007c;
Civanar and Arda 2008).
Importantly, there is also growing evidence that a significant number of health care
professionals, patients and members of the lay public support the imposition of cost
bearing policies (Neuberger et al. 1998; Richardson et al 2002). It is not yet clear
precisely how many people support such policies. Nor can we be sure which types of
cost bearing policies people prefer or why people wish to have such policies
implemented. However, there is clearly a growing democratic mandate for such
policies in many developed world countries.
In this thesis my primary goals will be to provide a framework for answering the
question of whether cost bearing policies are normatively reasonable and practically
feasible and to provide substantive answers of my own to these questions. In the
process, however, I will draw a total of seven conclusions.
Firstly, a significant number of lay-people and health care professionals support the
imposition of cost bearing policies. Secondly, human behaviour plays a substantive
causal role in the aetiology of many common diseases which contribute significantly
to the global burden of disease. Thirdly, a substantial number of people are
substantively morally responsible for their risky health affecting behaviours. Fourthly,
five different normative arguments converge together to defend the claim that people
who are morally responsible for their ill-health should bear some of the costs of at
19
least some risky health affecting choices.1 Fifthly, of these five normative arguments,
the “luckist” version of the luck egalitarian argument is the most normatively robust.
Sixthly, people can be made to bear costs through the adoption of at least five
different heath care policies.2 Seventhly, the only responsibility-sensitive policies
which are independently justifiable and can also be defended by all five of the
normative arguments mentioned above are the “risk tax” and “risk insurance”
policies.
1.1 Why should we care about personal responsibility for health?
The importance of the concept of personal responsibility for health has waxed and
waned for over two millennia. As a consequence, it is reasonable to ask whether and,
if so, why there is an urgent need to address the issue of responsibility-based cost
bearing policies. There are a plethora of reasons, but the following four best explain
why this is so.
The first reason has to do with the fact that there is growing evidence to suggest that
human behaviour causes a significant proportion of the global burden of disease and
that this situation is getting rapidly worse.3 I will discuss this specific claim in much
more depth in chapter 4, but at this stage it will suffice to note that 6 of the 10 most
1 The five normative arguments are the “moralistic-desert”, “expected consequences”, “rights-harm”,
“luck egalitarian” and “utilitarian” arguments.
2 The five cost bearing policies that I will discuss are the “denial of access”, “payment”, “lower
priority”, “risk tax” and “risk insurance” policies.
3 As Wikler (2002) pithily puts it: “in many cases, illness is not something that just happens to a
person… We are more likely to remain healthy if we take care of ourselves. People who live prudently
tend to live longer and avoid disability”.
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common causes of death worldwide are now thought to be partially caused by human
behaviour and many of the diseases that cause the greatest burden of disease (e.g.
obesity, cardiovascular diseases and type 2 diabetes) are now known to be directly
linked to lifestyle choices (Resnik 2007; Feiring 2008; World Health Organization
2008). Moreover, all of these “lifestyle” diseases are becoming more prevalent in both
developed and developing counties and many commentators have argued that a
massive health-related crisis looms for citizens of the 21st and 22nd centuries as a
direct result of the increase in risky health affecting behaviour that seems to be
occurring worldwide (Cappelen and Norheim 2005).
The second reason is because a substantial and growing number of citizens claim that
at least some patients should bear at least some of the costs of at least some of their
risky health affecting behaviours. I will discuss the evidence for this claim in chapter
3, but for now I will simply note that a number of surveys and studies have
demonstrated that a significant number of patients, health care professionals and lay-
people believe that patients who engage in certain kinds of risky behaviours should
bear some kind of cost (Ubel 1999; Richards et al 2003; Wittenberg and Fischoff
2003). This is important because this data suggests that there is a democratic mandate,
if not a democratic imperative, to implement such policies.
The third reason is because the cost of providing health care is rising at an almost
exponential rate. When the NHS was first launched in 1948 it had a budget of £437
million (about £9 billion in terms of 2011 prices) but by 2011 the NHS budget had
risen to £106 billion (National Health Service 2011a). In the USA the relative cost of
healthcare has increased at an even more remarkable pace and it is has recently been
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estimated that health spending in the USA now accounts for around 18% of GDP (i.e.
around $2 trillion) (World Bank 2012a). In fact, Americans now spend about $75
billion on smoking related medical expenses, $75 billion on obesity, $13 billion on
HIV/AIDS and $34.5 on alcoholism and drug addiction (Resnik 2007).
These price rises are important from the perspective of the responsibility for health
debate because governments are actively looking at ways of displacing the cost of
providing health care directly on to the consumer-citizen and a number of policy
makers have realised that cost bearing policies can achieve this goal in a rather neat
way (Cappelen and Norheim 2006; Mello 2008). Resnik (2007), for example, argues
that the primary driving force behind the increased political focus on the concept of
personal responsibility for health is the fact that costs are increasing at the same time
as financial deficits are ballooning. He also argues that, from the perspective of
developed world governments, “it makes economic and medical sense to hold
individuals morally responsible for their health-related choices” (Ibid, p 444).
Just because increases in health care costs can be displaced on to citizens does not
mean that they should be. Nevertheless, the dire nature of the current financial
situation does mean that there is an especially pressing need to analyse and assess the
claim that cost bearing responsibility for health policies are normatively legitimate.
For it is only when we have done this that we can determine whether such policies can
legitimately be used to help resolve the financial problems facing heavily indebted
governments.
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The fourth reason is because policy makers, politicians, insurance companies, health
care professionals and many other stakeholders have effectively stolen a march on
philosophers and bioethicists by both deploying the language of personal
responsibility for health in day to day discourse and by implementing a range of cost
bearing policies before these policies have been properly scrutinized.
It would be false to assert that these issues have not received any philosophical or
ethical attention. The likes of Wikler (1978), Veatch (1980), Feiring (2008), Schmidt
(2008) and Segall (2010), for example, have published numerous articles about the
meaning and importance of the concept of personal responsibility for health and a
number of philosophers, including Aristotle (1984), Hume (1987), Strawson (1962),
Frankfurt (1969) and Fischer (1994) have contributed a great deal to the fundamental
debates about the meaning and existence of causal, moral and consequential
responsibility. However, there is still a dearth of academic monographs dealing
exclusively with the issue of personal responsibility for health let alone with the
specific sub-issue of cost bearing policies.
Consequently, much work still needs to be done to analyse the concept of
responsibility and to address the question of whether cost bearing policies are
justifiable and this work needs to happen urgently because millions of people are
already being affected by these policies and millions more are likely to be affect in the
near future.
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1.2. Conceptual analysis and the multiple meanings of “responsibility for health”
The assertion that individuals are responsible for their health is uttered by a wide
array of actors, in a wide array of different contexts, and with a wide variety of
different intentions. To make matters worse, those who make use of the phrase
“responsibility for health” rarely specify exactly what they mean when they use it.
Indeed, Reiser (1985) argues that “responsibility for health is in the eye of the
beholder, whose vision is filtered through the prism of existing values”.
This conceptual confusion is not, perhaps, surprising given that the concept of
responsibility is such “a richly ambiguous and complex concept” and given that
responsibility can signify very different things depending on the context in which the
concept is used (Agich 1982). Hart (1968) even invented a short story to highlight the
complexity of the concept and it is worth quoting this story in full because it neatly
demonstrates how slippery the concept of responsibility really is:
“As captain of the ship, X was responsible for the safety of the passengers and
crew. But on his last voyage he got drunk every night and was responsible for
the loss of his ship with all aboard. It was rumoured that he was insane, but
the doctors considered that he was responsible for his actions. Throughout the
voyage he behaved quite irresponsibly, and various incidents in his career
showed that he was not a responsible person. He always maintained that the
exceptional winter storms were responsible for the loss of the ship, but in the
legal proceedings brought against him he was found criminally responsible
for his negligent conduct, and in a separate civil proceedings he was held
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legally responsible for the loss of life and property. He is still alive and he is
morally responsible for the death of many women and children” (Ibid, p211).
Unfortunately, the ambiguities that abound about the use and meaning of the concept
of responsibility have led to a great deal of confusion in the everyday discourse of
physicians, patients and policy makers and in the biomedical, bioethical and
philosophical literature too. Consequently, before I delve any further into the issues
that I wish to address in this thesis I will provide a brief conceptual analysis of the
concept of responsibility for health and I will also clarify the meanings of the various
technical terms that I will make use of in this thesis.
1.2.1 Causal, moral and consequential responsibility: the key distinctions
The most important distinctions that I will draw in this thesis are the distinctions
between causal, moral and consequential responsibility. That there are distinctions
between these three concepts of responsibility will seem self-evident to many. Yet it
is surprising how often people conflate these concepts. There is also a tendency to
simply assume that if a patient is causally responsible for their ill health it necessarily
follows that he or she must also be morally and consequentially responsible too
(Yoder 2002; Cappelen and Norheim 2005). Of course, one might believe that causal
responsibility is sufficient for moral and consequential responsibility, but this
proposition needs to be argued for rather than assumed.
Given how common it is for these three concepts to be confused I will now spend
some time analysing each concept in turn. Before I do so, however, I wish to make a
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point about the terminology that is used by philosophers when discussing the concept
of responsibility. This is necessary because different philosophers use different terms
to describe a range of responsibility-concepts. For example, Scanlon (1998) draws
distinctions between what he calls “attributive” and “substantive” responsibility in his
analysis of the concept of moral responsibility, whilst Zimmerman (1988) prefers the
terms “appraisability” and “liability” and Watson (2004) prefers “attributability” and
“accountability”.4 Knight and Stemplowska (2011), on the other hand, tend use the
terms “agent responsibility” and “consequential responsibility”, whilst Dworkin
(1981) uses the language of “culpability” and “liability”.
The trouble with this divergent terminology, aside from the confusion that it naturally
engenders, is that none of the concepts as they are described and defined by the
philosophers in question map directly onto each other. Nor, for that matter, do they
map onto the more “traditional” concepts of causal and moral responsibility. For
example, Dworkin’s concept of liability-responsibility and Scanlon’s concept of
substantive-responsibility are clearly related, but they are not identical either.
This lack of consensus about which terms and concepts should be used in discussing
responsibility leaves me with something of a quandary regarding the terminology that
I should use in this thesis. However, having given the matter some thought, I have
decided to stick to the concepts of causal, moral and consequential responsibility. This
is primarily because bioethicists, health care professionals and policy makers tend to
use the language of causal, moral and consequential responsibility when discussing
personal responsibility for health.
4 Daniels (2008) generally follows Scanlon, but he also sometimes uses terms like “liability” and
“moral” responsibility too.
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As such, if I introduce “new” terms I am likely to create more confusion than clarity.
Moreover, from a philosophical point of view, the concepts which the terms casual,
moral and consequential responsibility normally latch onto are perfectly adequate for
an analysis of the issue of personal responsibility for health. Consequently, I will
eschew all other terminology in this thesis even though I will make use of the analysis
and arguments provided by the philosophers who have thought it necessary to
introduce a new set of terms to properly unpack the concept of responsibility.
1.2.1.1 Causal responsibility
To attribute causal responsibility to some object or subject is to simply claim that the
object or subject in question had some role in bringing about some event or state of
affairs (Buetow and Elwyn 2006). To put it formally, X is causally responsible for Y
when X has caused Y (Knight & Stemplowska 2011). In a sense, then, this concept is
fairly easy to understand and many will think that the concept does not raise any
troubling issues from the perspective of normative philosophers. However, matters are
not so simple because although normative values do not impact on the concept of
causal responsibility itself they do impact on the way the concept is used.
How is this possible? When we say that X is causally responsible for Y are we not
simply describing the world? The simple answer is “yes”. However, values
immediately creep in when we try to determine what “the” cause of an outcome is. In
other words, we rely on normative values when we make use of the empirical concept
of causal responsibility. For example, none of the “risky” behaviours that I will
discuss in this thesis can ever be regarded as the sole cause of any injury or illness.
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This is because an unimaginably large number of causal forces are partially
responsible for any outcome that occurs in the world (Resnik 2007). If I injure my
hand whilst idly playing with a sharp knife my risky behaviour may certainly be
described as one of the causes of my injury, but it is not the only cause. The
vulnerability of my skin to lacerations by sharp metallic objects is another cause of
my injury as is the person who sold me the knife in the first place. A physicist might
even insist that the existence of carbon in the universe is also a cause of my injury.
When we talk about the causes of some event in the world we usually concentrate on
proximal rather than distal causes and we also tend to ignore “background” causes.
For example, a doctor would never explain the cause of a burns injury by referring to
the evolution of Homo sapiens or the presence of oxygen in the atmosphere.
However, the causal explanations that people give is context specific and different
experts will, for perfectly reasonable reasons, concentrate on different causal elements
when they describe the causes of an event.5
When writing a death certificate doctors tend to concentrate on (relatively) proximal
causes of death. For example, they might note that death was caused by an infection
which was caused by a depleted immune system which was caused by the use of
chemotherapy to treat breast cancer. Physiologists, meanwhile, would analyse the
cause of death in biochemical terms and would argue that the cause of death was the
deprivation of oxygen and other nutrients to core tissues. Public health specialists,
meanwhile, would analyse the cause of death in terms of wider social and medical
5 As Yoder (2002) argues: “determining causality for any state of affairs involves a decision – a
selection process in which we highlight certain causal factors and relegate others to the background.”
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risk factors for breast cancer such as use of the contraceptive pill, socio economic
status and the social pressures which lead women to have children later in life.6
The legitimacy of these various different approaches to describing the causes of ill-
health makes it very difficult to identify “the” cause of a disease or even to argue that
a given causal factor is a substantial cause of disease. This is where normative
concepts become relevant because we largely determine which causes to focus on by
reference to values and practical considerations. For example, when describing what
we take to be the substantive causes of an event we tend to concentrate on causal
factors that we can, in theory, control rather than factors that we cannot control. We
also focus on factors that are relatively proximal. In the health context we tend to
concentrate on such causes as risky behaviours, genes and, to an extent, psycho-social
forces – all of which may be described as relatively proximal causes of ill-health.7
It would, therefore, be a mistake to think of the way in which we make use of the
concept of causal responsibility as devoid of all normative aspects even if the concept
itself is strictly descriptive in nature. This may be regarded as somewhat troubling.
After all, why should we concentrate on reasonably proximal and non-background
causes when describing the substantive cause of an outcome? Are we not sneaking
value judgments in by the back door when we do so? In response, all I think that we
can say about this issue is that using values to determine which causes we regard as
substantive is legitimate as long as we do so openly and as long as we have no
reasonable grounds for rejecting such a practice.
6 All of these factors are thought to be partially causally responsible for breast cancer.
7 Wider psycho-social factors are sometimes described as the “causes of the causes”, but they are
increasingly regarded as proximal causes of ill-health (Krieger 1994; Venkatapuram 2011).
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It is conceivable – and certainly logically possible – for human societies to operate in
such a way that substantive causes are always associated with very distal and
background causes of events instead of the proximal and non-background causes.
However, this is not how most societies operate and I do not think that people can
reasonably reject that we focus on proximal and non-background causes when trying
to identify the substantial causes of outcomes.
As such, I will simply assume for the rest of this thesis that when we discuss “the”
cause – or the substantive cause – of ill-health is it perfectly legitimate to specifically
focus on the role that genes, behaviour and wider social forces play in causing disease
and I will also assume that is equally legitimate to make normative decisions about
moral and consequential responsibility on the basis of the claim that it is the proximal
and non-background causes that are the relevant substantive causes of ill-health.8
1.2.1.2 Moral responsibility
The concept of moral responsibility raises a whole set of complex issues and two of
these generate much heated debate. The first relates to the relationship between the
concept of moral responsibility and reactive attitudes like praise and blame and the
8 The normative issue inherent in the use of the empirical concept of causation has been much
discussed in the legal context. This is because it is necessary to identify “the” cause of an event in order
to determine criminal and civil liability (Hart and Honore 1985). Many different theories have been put
forward with regard to how “the” cause ought to be determined. However, there is widespread
consensus that it is legitimate to concentrate on what have been called “necessary”, “proximal”,
“direct”, “effective” or “operative” – as opposed to “remote” or “indirect” causes when determining
whether an individual is, legally speaking, causally responsible for an outcome (Honore 2005). Clearly,
the decision to concentrate on necessary and proximal causes is value-laden, but the necessity of taking
such an approach is widely recognised and accepted by lawyers and lay people alike.
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second relates to the conditions that must obtain if people are to be correctly regarded
as morally responsible for their actions. I do not have the space to delve into these
problems in a great deal of depth here, but I will say a brief word about them in order
to clarify what I mean when I say that people are morally responsible for their risky
health affecting choices.
Many philosophers argue that an ascription of moral responsibility is intimately
related to reactive attitudes. They point out that in everyday life we are generally
reluctant to praise or blame someone if we think that they are not morally responsible,
but we are quick to do so if we think that they are morally responsible (Glover 1970).
However, though there does seem to be a close relationship between the concept of
moral responsibility and reactive attitudes like praise and blame, the exact nature of
the relationship is rather obscure.
Strawson (1962) argues that being morally responsible for an action or a disposition
just is being worthy of some kind of reaction for performing the act or cultivating the
disposition. The reactive attitudes do not derive from judgments of responsibility.
Rather they are constituted by them (Eshleman 2009). Other philosophers demur.
Glannon (2002) argues that people who are morally responsible are “open” to reactive
attitudes but the existence of moral responsibility needs to be established prior to, and
independently of, any reactive attitudes that we may have. Praise or blame, in other
words, do not constitute moral responsibility, rather they “track” moral responsibility.
As I see it, Strawsons’ approach goes awry in this case and I agree with the general
thrust of Glannon’s argument in the sense that I think that the existence of moral
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responsibility can be established independently of our reactive attitudes. Indeed, I
would actually go further than Glannon in the instance because I think that it is
logically possible for an individual to be morally responsible without being “open” to
any reactive attitudes at all.
However, whether this latter claim is true or not is unimportant from the perspective
of my thesis because what I am concerned with here is not the relationship between
moral responsibility and reactive attitudes, but rather the relationship between moral
responsibility and cost bearing. It might be thought that cost bearing and reactive
attitudes are necessarily linked, but this is not the case because it is possible for
people who are morally responsible to bear costs without being the subject of reactive
attitudes and visa versa. Thus, the question of whether people should be blamed and
the question of whether people should bear costs are separate issues. Moreover,
because I am only interested in the latter question in this thesis I will ignore the issue
of reactive attitudes for the rest of the thesis.
The other issue is much more relevant to my thesis and during the course of chapter 5
I will spend much time discussing the conditions that must obtain if people are to be
correctly regarded as morally responsible for their choices. As it happens, the debate
about the necessary and sufficient conditions of moral responsibility has been ongoing
for over two millennia. In the Western philosophical tradition, for example, the debate
originates with Aristotle’s (1984) analysis of voluntary action and his claims that
people must be free in some sense – and must posses some amount of knowledge – if
they are to be morally responsible.
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Most contemporary philosophers agree that three conditions, in particular, are
necessary – and possibly sufficient – for moral responsibility. These are the mental
capacity condition, the freedom condition and the epistemological condition (Fischer
and Ravizza 1998; Glannon 2002; Kelley 2005). However, though there is something
of a consensus about the importance of these conditions there remains great
disagreement about the nature and meaning of these conditions and even more
disagreement about whether these conditions actually obtain in the real world.
In chapter 5 I will explain how I conceive of these conditions and explore whether
people are morally responsible for their risky health affecting choices. In particular, I
will claim that people are morally responsible when they have a range of conative,
cognitive, affective and volitional capacities, when they are free from coercive
influences and when they have easy access to relevant and readily comprehensible
health information about the risky behaviours that they choose to engage in. I will
also argue that in the context of risky choices, all three conditions of moral
responsibility usually obtain which means that we have good reason to think that most
people are substantively morally responsible for their health affecting choices.
1.2.1.3 Consequential responsibility
Consequential responsibility is, in effect, the responsibility to bear the costs of our
choices. Knight and Stemplowska (2011) argue that to say that a person is
consequentially responsible for X is to say “that the burdens and benefits that come
with or constitute X are justly his or hers to bear”. Like the concept of casual
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responsibility this concept is easy to understand and there is little debate about the
actual meaning of this form of responsibility amongst normative philosophers.
This does not mean that there is a lack of controversy about this concept. In fact, a
great deal of disagreement exists about the relationship between this concept of
responsibility and the concepts of causal and moral responsibility analysed above. In
the context of risky health affecting choices specifically, there is much disagreement
about whether people who are morally responsible for their risky health affecting
behaviours and causally responsible for their ill-health should bear health costs
pursuant to these forms of responsibility.
As I noted earlier, many health care professionals, politicians and policy makers talk,
or write, in such a vein that we must assume that they think that moral responsibility
is sufficient for consequential responsibility – and some talk, or write, in such a way
that they must think that causal responsibility is sufficient for moral responsibility.
However, most philosophers believe that consequential responsibility does not simply
follow, by necessity, from the existence of either causal or moral responsibility
(Glover 1970; Scanlon 1998; Glannon 2002). Veatch (1980), for example, argues that
even if patients are morally responsible for taking risks it does not follow that they are
“culpable” in any sense or that they should necessarily bear costs.
The primary reason why most philosophers baulk at the idea that causal and/or moral
responsibility is sufficient for consequential responsibility is because they think that
we need further normative justifications for making leaps between the different forms
of responsibility. For example, most philosophers would argue that if a pedestrian
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runs into a burning building to save the life of a child, the costs of treating the
pedestrian’s burns injuries should be borne by the state even if the pedestrian was
entirely causally responsible for his injuries and entirely morally responsible for
taking risks with his health. But, if we agree with this conclusion, we necessarily
accept that neither causal nor moral forms of responsibility are sufficient for
consequential responsibility. Indeed, if we agree with the conclusion we are
committed to finding further normative premises if we wish to argue that people
ought to bear the costs of their choices.
As it happens, I think that a number of strong normative arguments can be relied upon
to achieve this goal. In particular, the luckist version of the luck egalitarian arguments
furnishes us with sufficient reason to justify some forms of cost bearing in situations
where people are morally responsible for engaging in the risky health affecting
behaviour that caused their ill-health.
However, though there are a number of normative arguments that can help to bridge
the gap between causal, moral and consequential responsibility, I accept that not
everyone agrees that this is possible and I appreciate that I will have my work cut out
in chapter 6 to convince people that this is true.9 Nevertheless, as I noted earlier, this
9 Most of the normative arguments that I will discuss in this thesis will treat moral responsibility as a
necessary condition for consequential responsibility. However, there is one exception to the rule: the
utilitarian argument. I will explain why this is case in more detail in chapter 6, but the key issue is that
utilitarians can defend cost bearing as long as people are causally responsible for their ill-health. This
may seem like a strange claim, but the point is that some people will change their behaviour if costs are
imposed even though they are not morally responsible for their choices. Young children, for example,
will respond to costs (and rewards) even though they are often not morally responsible for the decisions
that they make. Thus, in theory at least, people could be held consequentially responsible even when
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is one of the primary goals of my thesis and I think that there is good reason to believe
that this conclusion can be drawn.
1.2.2 Responsibility for acts and responsibility for omissions
Another key distinction which is often thought to be relevant to notion of
responsibility for health is the distinction between acts and omissions. Many
philosophers hold that there is a significant difference, from a moral point of view,
between what we do and what we fail to do (Stauch 2000). Moreover, those who think
that this is the case usually claim that immoral actions are morally worse than
immoral omissions. On the other hand, a number of philosophers – especially those of
a consequentialist bent – argue that there is no moral difference between acts and
omissions (Rachels 1975). They claim that we are as responsible for what we fail to
prevent from happening as we are for what we actively bring about.
If we think that the distinction between an act and an omission is morally important
then it has direct bearing on the issue of responsibility for health because it implies
that there is an important normative difference between risky health affecting which
takes the form of acts and risky health affecting behaviour which takes the form of
omissions. For example, it would imply that there is a normatively important
difference between patients who actively bring about an illness by consuming too
much red meat or by drinking too much alcohol and patients who become ill because
they failed to take their medication as prescribed or failed to exercise regularly.
they are not morally responsible for their risky health affecting behaviour from the utilitarian
perspective.
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Philosophers have spilt much ink discussing the alleged moral difference between an
act and an omission and I do not have the space to delve into these arguments here.
However, my sympathies lie with those who claim that there is no significant
normative difference between acts and omissions and so, for the purposes of my
thesis, I will simply assume that the distinction is of no moral importance. In this
respect I follow Yoder (2002) who argues that we should “assign blame not only for
behaviours that cause or increase the risk of illness and injury but also for failing to
act in ways that might prevent illness or injury” and so I will assume that people who
fall ill because they omit to take care of their health should be judged in exactly the
same way as those people who fall ill because they have actively engaged in
behaviours that harm them.
1.2.3 Moral and legal responsibility
Few people would deny that a relationship exists between the concepts of moral and
legal responsibility and many scholars have argued that the latter concept both reflects
and derives its normative significance from the former concept (Corlett 2006).
Nonetheless, moral and legal forms of responsibility do not march in lockstep and an
important distinction exists between them. Indeed, in most jurisdictions there are
plenty of situations where people can be held legally responsible even though they are
not morally responsible – and visa versa. 10
10 In cases of strict liability individuals can be held legally responsible for any damage and loss caused
by their actions or omissions even when they are not morally responsible in any way (Epstein 1973).
Likewise, in many societies people can be deemed morally responsible for an action considered to be
immoral (e.g. adultery) without facing any legal sanctions or any claims of legal responsibility in
relation to that action.
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In this thesis I will occasionally refer to the concept of legal responsibility, but my
primary concern will be with the concept of moral responsibility. That said, much can
be learnt about the necessary conditions of moral responsibility from an analysis of
legal responsibility and my discussion of moral responsibility for health in chapter 5 –
and my discussion of consequential responsibility in chapter 6 – will, at least in part,
be derived from jurisprudential analysis about the meaning of legal responsibility and
the conditions that must obtain if people are to be treated as legally responsible.11
1.2.4 Prospective and retrospective responsibility
Another key distinction that has been mooted in the literature is the distinction
between forward looking (prospective) and backward looking (retrospective) notions
of responsibility (Kelley 2005) Prospective responsibilities are responsibilities that
people have before an action or event has taken place (e.g. a smokers’ responsibility
for the lung cancer he is yet to develop) and retrospective responsibilities are
responsibilities that people have after an action or event has occurred (e.g. a smokers
responsibility for the lung cancer that he has developed as a consequence of his
smoking habit). Feiring (2008) notes that policy makers have in the past tended to rely
on prospective notions of responsibility for health when devising policies although he
also argues that the focus of their work may now be changing.
It is not entirely clear why policy makers have tended to concentrate on prospective
responsibility to the exclusion of retrospective responsibility. One possible
11 In this respect, I follow Corlett (2006) who argues that the relationship between law and morality is
“symbiotic” in the sense that legal concepts of responsibility can help us to conceptualise the moral
concept of responsibility and visa versa.
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explanation for this is the general concern that people may be non-culpably ignorant
of the risky nature of the behaviours they engage in and thus they should not be
regarded as morally or consequentially responsible for their choices until they have
had the opportunity to learn about these risks. In other words, we must wait until
people have developed a disease and had contact with health care professionals before
arguing that they have had access to sufficient information to be morally responsible
for their choices.
It is worth noticing that this objection does not turn on the basis that retrospective
responsibility is backward looking, but on the empirical claim that people do not have
sufficient access to sufficient health information to justify policies based on
retrospective responsibility. This is important because, as I will argue in chapter 5,
there is little evidence to suggest that this empirical claim is true and so there are good
reasons to think that those who have previously opposed retrospective responsibility
on the basis of this claim ought to change their minds.
Since I think that most people do have access to sufficient information to be morally
responsible before they take risks it would be unfair for policy makers to concentrate
their fire on prospective forms of health responsibility. If we are going to hold people
to account failing to be morally responsible in the future we should also hold people
to account if they were equally morally responsible in the past – otherwise we will be
guilty of treating people who are in normatively similar positions in different ways for
arbitrary reasons. For these reasons, I will make use of both retrospective and
prospective concepts in my thesis and I will assume that there is no relevant
normative difference between them.
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1.2.5 Personal and collective responsibility
Another distinction which is often referred to in debates about responsibility for
health is the distinction between personal and collective responsibility. Collective
responsibility refers to the responsibility of organisations or groups whilst personal
responsibility refers to the responsibility of individuals (Agich 1982).12
In this thesis I will concentrate overwhelmingly on the issue of personal responsibility
for health. In so doing, I do not mean to imply that collective responsibility is
irrelevant to issue of responsibility for health. Governments, corporations, civil
society and families have responsibilities in relation to health which are both vast and
complex. For example, governments have a responsibility to regulate the production,
sale and marketing of certain substances (e.g. tobacco) and they have a responsibility
to ensure that people actually have opportunities to engage in healthy behaviour.
In this respect, I agree with Forde and Raine (2005) who argue that “responsibility for
better health should be shared between society and the individual”. I also accept that
if we concentrate on personal responsibility to the exclusion of collective
responsibility there is a danger that we will be distracted from other sources of ill-
health, such as environmental health hazards, which have nothing to do with risky
behaviours (Wikler 1976).
12 Individual agents may have responsibilities as members of various groups as well as responsibilities
qua individuals, but when I talk of personal responsibility I simply mean those responsibilities that
individuals have qua individuals.
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For these reasons, I will not entirely ignore the issue of collective responsibility in this
thesis and in chapter 5 I will discuss the responsibility of the state to ensure that
people have enough information about the associations between behaviour and ill-
health to make informed decisions. However, although the issue of collective
responsibility for health is extremely important I have opted to concentrate my
energies on the concept of personal responsibility for health. I have explained earlier
why there is a pressing need to do this, but I want to reiterate here that nothing I say in
this thesis about the issue of personal responsibility is intended to suggest that other
entities (such as corporations and governments) have no responsibilities in relation to
health or that the concept of collective responsibility is normatively unimportant.
1.2.6 Role and non-role responsibility
When discussing responsibility for health many scholars distinguish between what has
been called role and non-role responsibility (Hart 1968; Buetow and Elwyn 2006).
Different social and legal roles carry with them specific responsibilities. Most
notably, people in office have specific responsibilities to fulfil the duties attached to
those offices. Hence politicians, judges and health care professionals all have specific
duties and responsibilities as a consequence of their positions. Beyond these
responsibilities of office, people in various social roles also have specific
responsibilities in virtue of being in these social roles. Thus parents, siblings and
friends might have responsibilities to other people which have nothing to do with their
jobs or the requirements of the law.
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Non-role responsibilities are responsibilities incumbent on us independently of any
given role that we might have. For example, we all have a responsibility not to harm
other people without good reason just in virtue of the fact that they are people. This
has nothing to do with any social role that any of us have. Likewise, it could be
argued that people have a responsibility to look after their health because failing to do
so might reduce the amount of resources available to others. Again, such
responsibilities have nothing to do with any social or official role that we might have.
For the purposes of this thesis I will stick to the concept of non-role responsibility for
health. This is not to deny that role responsibilities are important, but the concept is
neither necessary nor helpful in terms of explicating people’s personal responsibilities
for their health. Perhaps there is some scope for the notion of role responsibility
where we speak of people who have adopted the “role” of a patient. The Scottish NHS
Patients’ Charter talks in this vein when it mentions the rights and responsibilities of
patients (Department of Health Scotland 2006). However, to claim that a patient has
adopted a kind of social “role” is a somewhat dubious one and even if we were to
adopt such an approach, it would not help us to delineate or explain the health
responsibilities of people who are not yet patients.
1.2.7 Complete and partial responsibility
The last distinction that I wish to draw attention to is the distinction between complete
and partial responsibility for health. There is a natural tendency to think of causal,
moral and consequential responsibility in absolute terms. In particular, there is a
tendency for some health care professionals to describe their patients as either being
morally responsible or not being morally responsible for their risky behaviour.
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However, matters are usually much more complicated than this and we must resist the
temptation of thinking in “all or nothing” terms.
The need for a gradualist approach in relation to causal, moral and consequential
responsibility will become more apparent when I discuss these concepts in chapters 4,
5, 6 and 7. In chapter 4 I will note that the aetiology of most diseases is multi-factorial
and in chapter 5 I will argue that people’s degree of moral responsibility is often a
matter of degree. I will also argue in chapters 6 and 7 that an awareness of the
partiality of causal and moral responsibility is crucial from the point of view of
consequential responsibility because it would be unjust (from most points of view) to
put in place cost bearing policies which required people to bear full costs when their
degree of causal and moral responsibility is limited.13
However, although I accept that health care policies must be alive to the fact that
causal and moral responsibility for health is usually a matter of degree, I also concede
that it is difficult to devise public policies that ensure that the cost that patients
actually bear maps directly onto the costs that they should bear. This is primarily
because it is so hard to determine exactly how causally and morally responsible
people are.
Nonetheless, because it is very important to ensure that people are not made to bear
more costs than they ought to bear I will only discuss cost bearing policies in this
thesis that can accommodate the fact that causal and moral responsibility is usually a
13 A gradualist approach to legal responsibility is also adopted in many jurisdictions. For example, in
the UK and the USA the concept of “diminished” responsibility it widely accepted (Glover 1970).
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matter of degree. This will make the cost bearing policies that I analyse more complex
than they would otherwise need to be, but this is a bullet that we simply have to bite.
1.3 The structure of the thesis
This thesis will effectively proceed through six main “phases”. The first phase will
involve a brief historical analysis of the concept of personal responsibility for health
through the ages – with a particular focus on the way in which the concept has been
used by politicians and policy makers since the 1970s. The second phase will involve
a discussion of the popularity of the idea that people who take risks with their health
should bear some kind of health cost amongst the lay public, health care professionals
and patients.
The third phase will involve an analysis of the claim that people are causally
responsible for a significant portion of the global burden of disease. The fourth phase
will explore some of the necessary conditions of moral responsibility and will aim to
demonstrate that a significant number of people are substantively morally responsible
for their risky health affecting behaviour. The fifth phase will address the issue of
consequential responsibility and will aim to explain why people who are causally and
morally responsible should also be consequentially responsible for their ill-health.
The sixth phase will involve a review of the various ways in which the concept of
consequential responsibility can be cashed out in terms of health care policies which
place cost bearing at their heart.
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To conclude this introductory chapter I will flesh out these phases in a little more
detail by briefly outlining the content of each of the eight chapters that will constitute
this thesis.
1.3.1 Chapter 1
In this chapter I have explained why it is important to address the issue of
responsibility-sensitive cost bearing as a matter of some urgency and I have provided
a brief analysis of the concept of responsibility. I have also summarised the main
“phases” of my thesis and I am now going to end this chapter by outlining the content
of each of the remaining chapters.
1.3.2 Chapter 2
In the second chapter I will provide a brief synopsis of the history of the concept of
personal responsibility for health. I will begin by noting that for most of human
history an accurate understanding of the association between human behaviour and
ill-health was probably confined to the relationship between overtly risky behaviours
and the physical injuries that they could cause. I will then discuss how Hippocrates,
Galen and other Ancient physicians understood the concept of personal responsibility
for health before providing a brief account of the development of this concept through
to the middle of the 20th century. At this point my discussion will become much more
detailed and I will provide an in-depth analysis of the way in which the concept of
personal responsibility for health was developed and deployed by policy makers and
politicians from the 1970s to the early 21st century.
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I will not attempt to provide an exhaustive historical analysis of the use (and abuse) of
the concept of personal responsibility in this thesis. As a non-historian such a task is
beyond my ken and, in any case, the way in which the concept developed through
human history does not affect the arguments that I will later mount in defence of cost
bearing in relation to risky health affecting behaviours.
Nonetheless, it is important to begin this thesis with a general overview of the history
of the concept of personal responsibility for health for three main reasons. Firstly, it is
salutary for anyone interested in a concept to learn how it was understood in the past
because this will help them think about the way in which the history of a concept
influences our current use of the concept. Secondly, it is important for philosophers
who analyse the issue of responsibility for health to understand that, although the
concept of personal responsibility for health has been with us for many millennia, it is
only now beginning to dominate discussions of health care policy. This is important
because it serves to reinforce the need to address the issue of cost bearing as a matter
of urgency. Thirdly, if we are interested in devising health care policies it is important
to have an understanding of the historical context in which the concept of personal
responsibility developed because public policies which operate in a historical vacuum
are more likely to be rejected by citizens who are, consciously or otherwise, affected
by the impact that this conceptual development has had on their social values.
1.3.3 Chapter 3
In the third chapter I will present and analyse the views of the lay-public, health care
professionals and patients about cost-bearing in relation to risky health affecting
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behaviours. My primary reason for discussing the views of the lay-public is to
demonstrate that there is a groundswell of support for responsibility-sensitive cost
bearing policies both in the UK and in other developed countries. Needless to say, the
popularity of a concept should not automatically determine that it should form the
basis of public policies. However, in democratic societies, policy makers and
politicians must take some account of the views of the lay public and must try to
accommodate their beliefs and values to a considerable extent. Legislators must also
pay special heed to those people who will be most directly affected by health policies
(i.e. patients) and those who best understand the provision of healthcare (i.e. health
care professionals).
As we shall see, the initial surveys, which were conducted in the last decades of the
20th century, were fairly basic in their approach, but they gave clear hints that many
lay people believed that patients should sometimes bear at least some of the costs of
their risky health affecting choices. More recent studies have tried to unpack these
beliefs in more detail and although very detailed surveys are still lacking we now have
a much better understanding of the democratic credentials of responsibility for health
policies in general and cost bearing policies in particular. Far less is known about the
views of health care professionals and patients, but a small number of surveys have
attempted to glean information about what these important groups think about these
issues and I will review and discuss this data in chapter 3 too.
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1.3.4 Chapter 4
In the fourth chapter I will discuss the issue of causal responsibility for health and ill-
health. I will begin by providing an overview of how significant a role human
behaviour is thought to play in contributing to the global burden of disease and I will
then discuss a whole range of different behaviours and the evidence that exists to
suggest that these behaviours cause disease. In the process, I will not only discuss the
most well-known associations between behaviours and disease (e.g. the association
between smoking and lung cancer), but also the less appreciated links (e.g. the
association between Human Papilloma Virus and cervical cancer). I will also make a
point of discussing the fact that many “everyday” behaviours (such as driving a car)
and many socially acceptable behaviours (such as having unprotected sex with the
intention of getting pregnant) are themselves risky and often cause injuries and
illnesses.
I will not provide a comprehensive list of all the known causal links between human
behaviour and ill-health in chapter 4. Nor will I present all the evidence that has been
marshalled to defend the causal associations that I will discuss. This is because doing
so would take up far too much space and providing this much data will not affect the
central argument of this thesis. Nevertheless, I will devote an entire chapter to this
topic because I want to underline just how substantial a role human behaviour plays in
determining people’s health and ill-health. This is important because it is easy for
non-health care professionals to fail to appreciate just how much of our own health is,
causally speaking, in our own hands.
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1.3.5. Chapter 5
In the fifth chapter I will move on to discuss more philosophical matters. I will
elucidate the concept of moral responsibility in more detail and I will also discuss
three of the necessary conditions that must obtain if people are to be morally
responsible for their risky health affecting behaviour. The chapter will be divided into
three main sections. The first section will deal with the mental capacity condition, the
second section will deal with the freedom condition and the third section will deal
with the epistemological condition.
In the first section, I will argue that people need a range of conative, cognitive,
affective and volitional capacities to be morally responsible for their risky health
affecting choices. These will include the capacity to respond to reasons and act on the
basis of reasons rather than desires. In the second section, I will argue that people
must be free in order to be morally responsible for their risky behaviour and I will
explore what this condition really amounts to. My key conclusion in this section will
be that freedom should be understood in a compatibilist sense and that the best
understanding of compatibilist freedom is the “no coercion” conception of freedom.
In the third section, I will argue that people need access to relevant, easily accessible
and readily comprehensible information about risky health affecting behaviours if
they are to be morally responsible for choosing to engage in these behaviours. I will
also argue that people can avoid the charge of moral responsibility, even if
information is available, if their ignorance is non-culpable.
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In the process of discussing these conditions of moral responsibility I will argue that
most people are substantially morally responsible for their risky health affecting
choices. This is because, in most cases, the mental capacity, freedom and
epistemological conditions do obtain in the real world. In other words, most people
have sufficient mental capacity to be morally responsible for their risky behaviour
from the perspective of the mental capacity condition and they are also sufficiently
free and have access to sufficient information to be morally responsible from the
perspective of the freedom and epistemological conditions. Exceptions to the rule do
exist and I will argue in this chapter that certain groups of people (e.g. young children
and people suffering from serious brain injury) lack any moral responsibility for their
risky behaviour, whilst other groups (e.g. those affected by various genetic disorders)
are less morally responsible than other people. However, my general conclusion in
this chapter will be that, in most cases, moral responsibility for risky health affecting
behaviour exists to a relatively high degree.
1.3.6 Chapter 6
The sixth chapter will focus on the normative question of whether people who are
causally and/or morally responsible should also be regarded as consequentially
responsible for their ill-health. During the course of the chapter I will present, discuss
and analyse five different normative arguments which provide grounds for thinking
that some people should bear some of the costs of their risky choices. These
arguments, as I noted above, will be dubbed the “moralistic desert”, “expected
consequences”, “rights-harm”, “luck egalitarian” and “utilitarian” arguments.
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My primary conclusion in this chapter will be that these five arguments converge
together to defend the idea that people should bear costs when they engage in what I
shall call “core” risky health affecting behaviours. I will also argue that the luck
egalitarian argument is the most robust of the five arguments and that there are
serious, though perhaps not fatal, problems with the other four arguments. In
particular, I will argue that the moralistic desert argument has trouble dealing with the
objection that self harming behaviour is not really intrinsically immoral and that, even
if it is, there are many reasons to think that the state should not intervene to penalise
such behaviour. I will also argue that the expected consequences argument is very
vulnerable to the claim that it cannot independently ground claims of cost bearing and
that the rights-harm argument has implications which few rights-theorists are likely to
find palatable. Finally, I will argue that the utilitarian argument rests on empirical
claims which are difficult to prove.
This is not to say that adequate rejoinders to these objections cannot be formulated.
Nor do I suggest that the luck egalitarian argument is devoid of problems. However,
defenders of the moralistic desert, expected consequences, rights-harm and utilitarian
arguments have much work to do to defend their various approaches to the issue of
cost bearing and, as I see it, the luck egalitarian argument is the most normatively
compelling argument by far.
1.3.7 Chapter 7
In seventh chapter I will discuss five policy options that would, if they were
implemented, ensure that people would bear some of the costs of their choices. As I
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noted earlier, the five policy options that I will analyse are the “denial of access to
health care”, “payment”, “reduced priority”, “risk tax” and “risk insurance” policies.
In the process of outlining and discussing these policies I will seek to explain their
strengths and weaknesses and I will offer my own views as to which of these policies
is most normatively legitimate and practically feasible. In particular, I will claim that
the risk tax and the risk insurance policies are the most defensible of all the cost
bearing policies and they are the only policies which can be defended by all five of
the normative arguments that I will discuss in chapter 7. Moreover, I will argue that
there is a particularly good “fit” between the strongest of the normative arguments
that I will discuss in chapter 7 (i.e. the luck egalitarian argument) and the risk tax and
risk insurance policies.
My general conclusion in this chapter will be that if governments wish to implement
cost bearing policies they should do so by requiring people to pay risk taxes and/or
risk insurance premiums. I will also strongly suggest that other forms of cost bearing
policies – many of which have already been utilised by governments around the
developed world – should be avoided.
1.3.8 Chapter 8
In the eighth and final chapter I will sum up my arguments, suggest avenues for
further research and bring my thesis to a close. In terms of future research I will,
amongst other things, argue that further work is urgently needed to find out more
about the views of the public, health care professionals and patients regarding the
concept of personal responsibility for health in general and the concept of
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consequential responsibility in particular. This is because we still have very little
understanding of what these groups really think about cost bearing policies and even
less understanding of why so many people think that cost bearing is legitimate.
I will also argue that further research is needed to determine the impact that recent
developments in genetic screening and treatment will have on the issue of
responsibility for health. This is because there is good prima facia reason to think that
these developments will radically increase the number of people who can be
responsible for their health. Finally, I will argue that more work needs to be done to
explore the relevance of the arguments that I have discussed in this thesis to the world
of bio-medical research. This is important because it is possible that we could modify
the way this kind of research is carried out in order to make people bear the costs of
their choices in an entirely novel way.
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Chapter 2
Responsibility for Health: A Brief History of an Idea
“Walking is man's best medicine.”
– Hippocrates
2.0 Introduction
The debate about the importance of personal responsibility for health has waxed and
waned throughout human history. In this chapter I will provide a brief overview of the
history of this concept with a special emphasis on the way in which the concept has
been deployed in the public health arena between the middle of the 20th century and
the beginning of the 21st century. My primary goal is to contextualise the modern
debate about personal responsibility but I am also keen to explain why the concept of
consequential responsibility is only now beginning to find itself at the heart of policy
discussions. Providing this historical synopsis will also enable me to demonstrate how
many of the cost-bearing policies that I will analyse in the penultimate chapter of this
thesis have already been implemented across the developed world.
2.1 From early man to the mid 20th century
We know very little about the values and beliefs of early Homo sapiens and we know
even less about their understanding of health, illness and the concept of personal
responsibility for health. It is likely that human beings have always had a sound grasp
of the causal association between trauma and injury for it does not take much
imagination to understand that the human body can be easily damaged by physical
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objects in the world. It is also possible that early man understood that less overtly
dangerous behaviours could causes disease.
Contemporary anthropologists, for example, point out that in many “primitive”
societies so called “medicine men” have a surprisingly good grasp of the causes of
some diseases and an even better understanding of the natural remedies that can be
used to treat these diseases (Halifax 1988). Moreover, a number of anthropologists
have also observed that people living in these societies often perceive ill-health to be a
form of divine punishment (Galvin 2002).
Nonetheless, although these anthropological findings give us tantalising clues about
how our ancestors might have understood the concepts of causal, moral and
consequential responsibility we can only really speculate about the health beliefs of
early man. We must wait until recorded history begins in order to make well founded
claims about how people understood these concepts.
In the Western world the first extant evidence that we possess about how earlier
generations understood the concept of personal responsibility for health is to be found
in the writings of Ancient Greek and Roman physicians (Veatch 1980; Leichter
1981). From what little remains of their written work we can infer that very many
Ancient physicians were extremely interested in the idea that human beings were
causally responsible for some aspects of their own health and ill-health and this
awareness of the causal role of human behaviour in the aetiology of disease seems to
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have encouraged a number of Ancient physicians to develop the medical discipline
that we now call “preventative medicine” (Minkler 1999). 14
Many of the Ancient beliefs about the causes of disease were erroneous and some of
their prescriptions for a healthy life were downright dangerous (Porter 2003).
Nonetheless, many Ancient physicians, including Hippocrates and Galen, were
committed to the idea that a judicious mixture of physical exercise and the
consumption of a balanced diet would lead to a healthier and longer life – claims
which have now been validated by modern epidemiologists (Reiser 1985).
A number of these Ancient physicians also “moralised” the issue of personal
responsibility for health in a way that has become familiar to us at the beginning of
the 21st century. For example, in his text on Hygeine, Galen (1951) asks:
“Is it not shameful that a man with a perfect constitution should have to be
carried by others on account of gout, or should be tortured with the pains of
calculus, or suffer pain in the colon or have an ulcer in the bladder from
indigestion?”
Galen here is giving voice to the oft repeated claim that there is something morally
amiss about someone who could have been healthy but has developed some kind of
illness or injury as a result of their own risky behaviour. Unfortunately, it is unclear
from this passage why Galen thought it was “shameful” for a man to suffer from an
illness he could have avoided. Perhaps he believed that patients had a duty to
14 Reiser (1985) also argues that Ancient physicians also understood that social class influenced
people’s ability to control their own health.
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themselves to take steps to remain healthy. Alternatively, he might have thought that
people had a duty to the state to achieve and maintain good health. Reiser (1985)
argues that such beliefs were prevalent in the Ancient world and it may be that in this
extract Galen is giving voice to these values.
Even if we accept the popularity of these views, it is far from clear whether many
Ancient physicians and citizens would also have believed that those who were
“guilty” of such moral infractions should also be regarded as consequentially
responsible for their ill-health. It is possible to detect a hint of such beliefs in some of
the Ancient physician’s writings on these matters, but the sources that remain simply
do not provide us with enough evidence to prove this one way or another.
Consequently, it is difficult for us to know how many people in the Greco-Roman
world believed that some people who took risks with their health should bear the costs
of their choices.
Whatever the truth of the matter, we can be sure that the concepts of causal, moral and
consequential responsibility survived the fall of the Ancient world. Gouret, writing in
the 16th century argued that diseases were caused by, amongst other things, an excess
of “meat and drink” and the “immoderate use of lechery” and he argues that such
views were very common in what we now call the “Dark” and “Middle” Ages (Slack
1979). However, it seems that the Ancient emphasis on preventative health was
somewhat diluted during these eras. Moreover, Reiser (1985) contends that there was
a greater willingness amongst medieval apothecaries, physicians and theologians to
attribute diseases to lack of moral virtue than was the case in the Ancient world.
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It has also been argued that, throughout the Dark and Middle Ages, many people saw
God’s wrathful hand in the aetiology of health and disease and there is good evidence
that many people believed that ill-health death was a punishment for some kind of
trespass against God whilst good health was a reward for a life of virtue (Slack 1979).
Moreover, people came to regard their bodies as the “houses” of their souls during
this time which meant that many people believed that looking after their health was a
duty owed to God – rather than a prudential or moral duty to oneself or other people
(Reiser 1985).
However, although it is tempting to believe that the whole concept of personal
responsibility for health became highly moralised in the Dark and Middle Ages we
should recall that Galen and many other Ancient physicians conceived of personal
responsibility for health in moralised terms too. Furthermore, there is plenty of
evidence to suggest that many apothecaries and physicians in the Dark and Middle
ages were entirely aware of the some of the casual associations between behaviours
and disease.
As such, we should be somewhat wary of the claim that the Ancients had a sound,
non-moralised, grasp of the aetiology of many diseases whilst physicians in the
medieval world were more interested in a moralised conception of ill-health. There
may be some truth to this claim, but we lack the evidence to be sure that this was the
case.
What we can be sure about is that, during the Renaissance and the early modern
period, the concept of personal responsibility for health continued to influence
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people’s beliefs and that more systematic attempts were made to decipher the
aetiology of disease from a physical, rather than a spiritual, perspective (Porter 2003).
For example, during the Renaissance Corato published a popular treatise which
advocated a lifestyle of moderation and he also set about trying to explain the
“humanistic” rather than the divine origin of disease and many other Renaissance
scholars – including the polymath Leonardo da Vinci – also began to conduct basic
medical experiments at this time to try and uncover the physical causes of some
common diseases (Sigerist 1956; Nicholl 2005).15
Nonetheless, it was not until the advent of modern biology, medicine and
epidemiology in the 18th and 19th centuries that a scientific and statistical study of the
physical causes of disease was begun in earnest. Consequently, it was not until the
advent of the modern era that humanities’ understanding of the causal role of human
behaviour in the aetiology of disease was finally placed on a solid foundation
(Minkler 1999). The first real breakthrough did not occur until the 19th century when
the microbiological work of Pasteur and Koch, the clinical work of Semmelweis and
Lister and the epidemiological work of Snow and his colleagues unearthed the
existence of microbes and the way in which human behaviour could either retard or
encourage the spread of infectious disease (Porter 2003).
These discoveries and others like them seem to have fired the popular imagination of
Europeans and helped to launch a new “personal responsibility” drive in many
developed countries at this time. The Victorians, in particular, were very influenced
by these discoveries and many Victorian scholars openly defended the idea that good
15 Amongst many other suggestions Corato argued that people should only drink and eat enough “to
keep the body and soul together” (Sigerist 1956).
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hygiene and other behavioural traits could diminish the probability of developing
diseases (Minkler 1999). Moreover, Reiser (1985) argues that European and
American literature during this time was replete with information about how to
remain healthy and with advertisements for institutions “designed to keep the body fit,
such as spas and gymnasiums”.
Many Victorians were also quick to draw moral conclusions from the growing
empirical evidence that human behaviour was causally implicated in the aetiology of
many diseases. A number of Victorian physicians argued that living a long and
healthy life was some kind of moral “reward” for a life of self control and careful
prudence (Minkler 1999). Butler even wrote a novel, Erewhon, in 1872 about a world
in which people who were ill were not only regarded as morally culpable but were
also punished (Galvin 2002). The relative popularity of this book indicates that the
concept of consequential responsibility was very much in vogue during this time and
there is much evidence to suggest that physicians and lay people alike advocated cost
bearing policies during this era (Reiser 1985).
2.2 From the middle of the 20th century to the beginning of the 21st century
For all the discoveries made during the scientific revolution in biology during the 18th
and 19th century, a thoroughgoing understanding of the aetiology of disease had to
wait until the late 20th century and it was not until near the beginning of the 21st
century that the causal importance of personal behaviour in the aetiology of disease
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was grasped in its full magnitude.16 Interestingly, the growing empirical evidence
about the importance of human behaviour did not immediately affect health policy.
More than twenty years elapsed between the discovery that smoking was a major
cause of lung cancer and the publication of the first policy document which made
direct reference to the concept of personal responsibility for health.
However, as the evidence began to accumulate the importance of the concept of
personal responsibility did begin to percolate from the medical to the political world
and, in 1974, one of the seminal moments in the history of the concept of personal
responsibility for health occurred when the Lalonde Report was published in Canada
(Lalonde 1974). The Lalonde Report was decisive because it was the first major
health policy document to directly refer to the causal role of human behaviour in the
aetiology of disease and it was also the first policy report to place any real emphasis
on the importance of personal responsibility for health from the perspective of
improving human health in the future (Galvin 2002).
The Lalonde report was not centred on the issue of personal responsibility for health.
It was rather a broad policy document which covered many aspects of health policy
and it explicitly stated that “lifestyle” was only one of four major factors that
influenced health (Leichter 1981).17 However, because this report was the first to
place any real weight on the role of human behaviour in the aetiology of disease it
16 Veatch (1980) argues that even in the middle of the 20th century, ill-health was largely attributed to
“mysterious, uncontrollable micro-organisms or the random process of genetic fate” and he also
suggests that the concept of personal responsibility for health did not take centre stage until the latter
stages of the 20th century when evidence began to accumulate which suggested that many non-
communicable diseases were linked to human behaviour.
17 The other factors were human biology, health care organisation and the environment.
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assumed a significance that it probably would not otherwise have had.18 In fact, once
the Lalonde report was published, the floodgates opened and within a decade many
governments around the developed world had published health policy reports which
made specific reference to the role of human behaviour in causing ill-health and tried
to suggest ways of tackling this problem.
Of these, perhaps the most important and influential was the American report entitled
“Healthy People” (United States Public Health Service 1979). As with the Lalonde
report the Healthy People report had a broad scope, but it unequivocally stated that
risky behaviour played a key causal role in the aetiology of many diseases and it also
made a number of startling claims that seemed to act as a serious wake up call in the
medical and health policy communities. Among these was the factual claim that “half
of US mortality in 1976 was due to unhealthy behaviour or lifestyle” and the rather
emotive claim that the people of the US were “killing [themselves]…by [their] own
careless habits”.
The British response to the Lalonde report was delineated in a policy document called
“Prevention and Health: Everybody’s Business” (Leichter 1981). This document
stated that society and government had a responsibility to improve people’s health,
but it also made clear that “the weight of responsibility for [people’s] health lies on
the shoulders of the individual himself. Smoking related diseases, alcoholism and
other drug dependencies, obesity and its consequences, and the sexually transmitted
disease are among the preventable diseases of our time and in relation to all these the
18 Galvin (2002) argues that the report was responsible for the birth of the term “health promotion” and
that much subsequent health policy and legislation relating to responsibility for health derives from this
report.
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individual must choose for himself” (Department of Health 1976). The Conservative
government at the time formally responded to the report in a White Paper which was
called “Prevention and Health” which affirmed that the greatest scope for improving
health now lay with “seeking to modify attitudes and behaviour in relation to health”
(Department of Health 1977).
Importantly, none of reports and policy documents published in the 1970s and 1980s
moralised the issue of personal responsibility for health (Wikler 2002). Thus,
although the reports made many empirical claims about the associations between
human behaviour and ill-health, they did not discuss the issue of moral responsibility
for health, nor did they mention the idea that people who take risks with their health
should bear the costs of their choices.19 Instead, the reports tended to emphasise the
positive aspects of the new knowledge about the link between human behaviour and
ill-health. For example, the “Healthy People” report argued that this new
understanding meant that human beings now had more control over their own health
than they had previously imagined and it noted that this knowledge would help to
increase people’s health and welfare in the future.
These reports also placed great emphasis on the environmental and social causes of
disease and made it clear that harmful social conditions played a key role in causing
disease. Nonetheless, they did help to trigger a debate about the issue of moral
responsibility for health and many argue that they paved the way for the incorporation
of the concept of consequential responsibility in public health policies because they
19 None of the 23 recommendations set out in the Lalonde report recommended any form of sanction or
cost bearing in relation to risky health affecting behaviour (Leichter 1981).
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placed more weight on personal, rather than collective, responsibility for health
(Minkler 1999).
Physicians were also quick to seize upon the epidemiological and biological data that
began to emerge in the middle of the last century which demonstrated that there was a
causal link between a variety of behaviours and a number of common diseases. Some
of these physicians were much less reticent to moralise the issue and to demand cost
bearing as a response to risky behaviour than their policy making peers.
One of the first doctors to sink his teeth into this issue was Knowles (1977) who
forcefully argued in a much quoted article that “the idea of a right to healthcare
should be replaced by the idea of an individual moral obligation to preserve one’s
own health – a public duty if you will”.20 Knowles went on to argue that “one man’s
freedom in health is anther man’s shackles in taxes and insurance premiums” and he
made it very clear in his article that he viewed irresponsible behaviour as a “vicious”
and that people who engaged in such behaviour should bear the costs of doing so.
More specifically, he decried the “cost of sloth, gluttony, alcoholic intemperance,
reckless driving, sexual frenzy and smoking” and suggested that people should be
consequentially responsible for engaging in these activities.
Knowles’ infamous article was as seminal for the medical community as the Lalonde
report was for the health policy community. This was partly because it was one of the
first papers published in a major medical journal to specifically address the question
20 Kass (1975) had earlier argued that “health is a duty…one has an obligation to preserve one’s own
health” and Charrette (1976) has also claimed that “if people choose to commit suicide in slow and
costly ways, perhaps they should share the financial burden that they impose upon society”.
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of personal responsibly for health, but it was also because it addressed the issue in a
particularly frank and robust fashion. The article quickly became notorious and
inspired a torrent of responses. Some commentators lambasted Knowles for his ideas
– Crawford (1977) argued that Knowles was adopting the ideology of “victim
blaming” and was trying to reinvent the idea that “sickness was a sin” – whilst others
were more sympathetic.
A number of philosophers, most notably Wikler (1978, 1985, 1987) and Veatch
(1980), also responded to the article and their work may be fairly described as the first
philosophical attempt to analyse the concept of personal responsibility as it applies to
health.
After a short lull in the mid to late 1980s, the debate about the role of personal
responsibility for health in the medical and bioethical world was rekindled in 1991
with the publication of two papers in the same volume of the Journal of the American
Medical Association. In their paper, Moss and Siegler (1991) defended the claim that
patients suffering from liver disease caused by alcohol should receive lower priority
for liver transplants than patients who suffered from other causes of liver disease.
Cohen and Benjamin (1991) opposed these arguments and warned of the moral
danger of making allocation decisions on the basis of responsibility for health.
Two years later the debate was reignited on the other side of the Atlantic when two
doctors, Underwood and Bailey (1993) published a paper in the British Medical
Journal arguing that coronary bypass surgery should not be offered to smokers. This
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paper was published alongside a dissenting paper by Shiu (1993) who argued that
such a refusal of treatment was unethical and set a “dangerous precedent”.
These four articles sparked ferocious debate about the role of responsibility in the
allocation of scarce health care resources and both journals were inundated with
letters and comments – many of which were published in other editions of the journals
(Sharkey & Gillam 2010). Whilst physicians and a small number of bioethicists were
still debating these issues, however, politicians, policy makers and legislators took
action.
The legislative response began in Germany where, in 1988, the German parliament
amended the German Social Security Code (Sozialgesetzbuch) and became the first
government in the world to devise legislation which made direct reference to the
concept of personal responsibility for health. Article 1 of the new “Book V” of the
German Social Security Code made it clear that German nationals had “co-
responsibility” for their health and that they had a duty to “lead a health-conscious
lifestyle, take part in appropriately timed preventative measures [and] play an active
role in treatment and rehabilitation, [in order to] avoid sickness and disability, and
overcome the respective consequences.” (Schmidt 2007b).
Article 1 also stated that co-payments could be demanded when treatment was
required as a consequence of criminal activity, deliberate self-harm, or where
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treatment was needed because of problems associated with piercing, cosmetic surgery
or tattoos (Schmidt 2008).21
The new law also allowed German statutory health insurance schemes to offer
incentives to people to try and improve their health. Article 65a of the Social Security
Code allowed insurance organisations to offer a “bonus” for patients who agreed to
attend screening or routine check-ups. These bonuses could take the form of
reductions in insurance premiums, cash payments or “payments in kind” (e.g. in the
form of free sports equipment). Article 62 stated that patients who were willing to
attend counselling services for breast, cervical and bowel cancer could ask for their
treatment co-payment fees to be reduced if they developed any of these diseases
(Schmidt 2009c).
Once the legislation came into force at the end of the 1980s, German health insurance
schemes (or “sickness funds”) invented a whole array of novel incentive schemes.
One of the biggest sickness funds, Barmer Ersatzkasse, used the new legislation to
offer incentives to those who purchased health insurance. This included a bonus
points scheme for a range of different health activities (Schmidt 2009c). A selection
of the health activities that warrant bonus points in the Barmer Ersatzkasse scheme
can be found in Figure 1.0 below.
21 Not long after the legislation came into force some patients were denied free treatment for
complications that arose as a result of bungled cosmetic surgery or body piercing and so Germany
became the first country to require some of its citizens to become consequentially responsible for some
of their risky health affecting behaviour (Schmidt 2007b).
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Figure 1.0 Barmer Ersatzkasse Bonus Programme – adapted from Schmidt
(2009c).
Intervention Bonus Reward Points
Annual screening for chronic disease and
measures for primary prevention from
age 35
200 per check-up
Prenatal Care 200 per pregnancy
Smoking Cessation 150
Nutrition Classes 150
Male and Female Cancer Screening 200
Recommended Vaccinations 100 a year
Licensed Exercise Classes 100-150 per programme
Active membership in a licensed sports
club or fitness studio
150 a year
Relaxation Classes 100-150
The way that the Barmer Ersatzkasse system works is a follows. Every “client” of the
company receives a “bonus card” and credits are added to this card when they engage
in certain types of health-benefiting activities. The reward points are converted to
“real” rewards if clients reach a certain points threshold within a specified period of
time. The rewards can either be a cash payment or a payment in kind. For example,
500 points may be exchanged for cash or it may be exchanged for sports watches,
cycle helmets and even short “wellness” holidays.
Germany, then, can stake a fair claim to having been the first country to implement
cost bearing (and non-cost bearing) policies based on the concept of responsibility for
health. However, a number of other countries quickly followed suit. For example, in
the 1990s a number of states in the USA devised and implemented health care policies
which were designed to encourage personal responsibility for health, and not long
afterwards, similar policies were put in place in countries as culturally different as
Japan and Denmark (Schmidt 2007a).
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In the USA, West Virginia took the lead when the West Virginia Health Plan was
enacted just before the turn of the century (Steinbrook 2006). The West Virginia
Health Plan was designed to provide incentives for people to become healthier.
Recipients of publicly funded health care were given a “basic” health insurance plan
unless they agreed to abide by certain provisions of a “membership agreement”
which enabled them to have access to an “enhanced” health insurance plan (Schmidt
2007a). Patients who signed up to the enhanced plan would be demoted to the basic
plan if they failed to adhere to the agreements. The enhanced plan offered a range of
health services – such as smoking cessation, obesity management and nutritional
advice programmes – not available on the basic plan. Those who signed up to the
advanced plan were required, amongst other things, to “make best efforts to stay
healthy”, “take prescribed medicines” and “attend special health classes as ordered”
(Steinbrook 2006).
Around the same time, many private American insurance companies adopted aspects
of the social German insurance model and many of them now routinely offer bonuses
to both individuals and companies if insured patients take steps to improve or manage
their health (Schmidt et al. 2010). For example, many American insurers soon
required employers or employees to pay higher premiums if they smoked of if they
were obese (Morreim 1995; Yoder 2002).22 Blue Cross-Blue Shield Michigan, for
example, provided discounts of up to 20% on deductibles and co-payments if
employees agreed to adopt a healthy lifestyle (Mello 2008). Moreover, in a recent
22 The chief executive of one insurance company which offers insurance reimbursements if people
achieve certain blood pressure, weight, cholesterol and tobacco avoidance targets argues that this
approach is similar to driving insurance which for many years has taken risky driving behaviour into
account and translated different behaviour into “premium differences for drivers” (Schmidt et al 2010).
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study, 40% of all employers supported higher insurance premiums for employees who
were obese and who refused to take part in weight loss programmes and another study
found that 44% of insurance companies reported that they would charge higher
premiums to people who engaged in risky behaviours (Ibid, p1919).23
It is also worth noting that the concepts of causal, moral and consequential
responsibility for health have begun to have an impact on a wide range of different
aspects of American life.24 For example, a few decades ago it was reported that a
town in Virginia refused to employ smokers as fire fighters because smokers
increased the costs of health and disability insurance (Veatch 1980). An increasing
number of judges also take account of the role that people play in the aetiology of
their own ill-health when determining the degree of damages that should be awarded
in civil negligence claims (Morreim 1995). Indeed, legal scholars in the US have
noted that non-compliance with a prescribed medication regimen and other such
factors can be used to reduce damages in negligence cases on the basis of the concept
of “contributory negligence” (Barry et al 1991).25
23 In the former of these studies, 37% of employers also supported the idea of requiring obese
employees to take part in weight loss programmes as a condition of being insured at all.
24 The owner of a health food chain in the USA also recently praised the Erewhon novel written by
Butler in the 19th century and argued that this novel which, it will be remembered, involved punishing
people who were morally responsible for their ill-health, was now “more appropriate than ever”
(McKasky 1998).
25 In one such legal case the family of a recently deceased patient sued a doctor for failing to
adequately manage the patient’s heart condition. The physician argued in court that the patient had
effectively committed suicide because he had, for years on end, not taken his medications as prescribed
and had failed to change his lifestyle – in particular, he had continued to smoke, eat unhealthy foods
and had refused to exercise much. The judge in this case dismissed this argument because he argued
that these causes were too remote to be “proximate” causes of death. However, the judge did accept
that the patient’s refusal to attend medical services once his chest pain got worse – as he had been
explicitly told to do – was a proximal contributing factor (Morreim 1995).
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The Japanese government has also recently started to take the issue of personal
responsibility for health seriously. In 2008 the government introduced legislation
requiring all citizens over the age of 40 to have their waists measured annually. The
new rules state that if a woman’s waist measured more than 35.5 inches or if a man’s
waist measured more than 33.5 inches they would be referred to see a nutrition
specialist for counselling and monitoring (Singer 2008).
The new legislation also enabled the Japanese government to penalise companies and
local governments if more than a certain number of their employees’ waists were
above these thresholds. The penalty took the form of higher insurance premiums
(Onishi 2008). Unsurprisingly, many Japanese companies responded to the threat of a
financial penalty by introducing bonus schemes similar to the schemes introduced by
the German and American health insurance organisations.26
New immigration rules recently issued by the New Zealand government state that
“applicants for visas and permits for New Zealand must have an acceptable standard
of health” because the government is concerned that admitting people with
unacceptable standards of ill-health will impose significant costs on the health service
of the country (Department of Labour 2008). Following the implementation of these
rules, the New Zealand Immigration Service requires all applicants to undergo a
thorough medical examination and, in some cases, people attempting to migrate to
New Zealand have been barred from obtaining a visa on the basis of their weight
(First Migration 2008).
26 Sunstar, a well known Japanese company, now sends overweight employees to a boot camp for the
obese – also dubbed a “fat farm” – where employees learn, amongst other things, about the causes of
obesity, good nutrition and a range of different exercise regimens (Singer 2008).
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With regard to the specific issue of unhealthy food, Denmark and Hungary have led
the way in trying to use legislation to change people’s diets and to make people who
choose to eat unhealthy food bear the costs of their choices. In 2003 Denmark became
the first country to prohibit the sale of trans-fats and in 2009 the Danish government
increased tax rates on unhealthy foods and drinks such as chocolate, sweets and soft
drinks (Nestle 2011). Then, in 2011, the Danish government introduced a new “fat
tax” on all foods containing more than 2.3% saturated fat (BBC News 2011). The
burden of calculating the required tax (product by product) is actually placed on the
shoulders of food producers, but the cost of paying the tax ultimately falls on
consumers.27
Hungary also introduced its own food taxes on a range of unhealthy food products –
such as soda, chocolate and crisps – in 2011. The Hungarian scheme requires people
to pay a small tax of 10 forint (€ 0.037) on products that contain a “high” amount of
fat, sugar or salt (Euractive 2011) Tellingly, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor
Orban, defended the new tax on the grounds that “those who live unhealthily have to
contribute more” (Cheney 2011).
The situation in the UK is rather complex. Though Thatcher may stake a claim to
have led the right wing revolution in the Anglo-Saxon world in the 1980s, her
government did not implement cost bearing health policies. Nor, for that matter, did
the Conservative government of Major or the Labour government under Blair and
Brown. Like Thatcher, Blair championed the general importance of individual
responsibility. In one speech he argued that he wished to create a society where
27 It is also worth noting that although these policies are very modern in some ways, Denmark has
taxed sweets since 1922 (Euractive 2011).
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“more opportunities, and more choices, are matched by greater responsibility on the
part of individuals to help themselves” (Brown 2009). Nonetheless, there was no
attempt during Blair or Brown’s time in power to alter the nature of the NHS by
requiring patients to keep healthy or by penalising them for failing to do so.
Likewise, although Cameron, the current Conservative Prime Minister, agrees with
the idea that personal responsibility is critical, he has shied away from allowing cost-
bearing policies to change the nature of the NHS. That said, in a much quoted speech,
Cameron has argued that “refusing to use these words – right and wrong – means a
denial of personal responsibility and the concept of moral choice. We talk about
people being “at risk of obesity” instead of talking about people who eat too much
and take too little exercise… Of course, circumstances…have a huge impact. But
social problems are often the consequences of the choices that people make” (Brown
1999). This suggests that the current Prime Minister is both aware of, and interested
in, the concept of causal and moral responsibility for health and it is possible that he
will attempt to put in place policies which require people to take consequential
responsibility for their health in the near future.
It is also important to realise that although there was no overt attempt to change the
NHS under the most recent Labour government, Blair did publish a number of policy
documents which gave a central role to the idea of personal responsibility for health.
These included a Department for Health report entitled “Choosing health: making
healthy choices easier” and a Cabinet Offices’ report entitled “Personal responsibility
and changing behaviour: the state of knowledge and its implications for public
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policies” (Schmidt 2007b). Both of these were published in 2004 and caused quite a
stir at the time.
Moreover, since the early 1990s, a number of Primary Care Trusts have operated what
may fairly be described as cost bearing policies. As I noted in the previous chapter, a
number of these Trusts refuse to carry out certain orthopaedic operations on patients
who are obese whilst others stipulate that smokers will only receive elective surgical
treatment (i.e. non emergency treatment) if they stop smoking for 3 months prior to
the operation day (Schmidt 2007c).
The 2005 Scottish NHS Charter – entitled The NHS and You – also openly proclaims
that patients should “look after [their] own health and have a healthy lifestyle” and
the charter goes on to list a whole series of patient responsibilities which include the
following: “keep your appointments”, “follow advice and treatment”, and “use
health services appropriately”. Moreover, in England and Wales, the NHS
Constitution states that patients should “recognise that you can make a significant
contribution to your own, and your family’s, good health, and take some personal
responsibility for it” (Department of Health 2012). The most recent Public Health
White Paper 2010 also bluntly states that “many premature deaths and illnesses could
be avoided by improving lifestyles” and that the public should take a more
responsibility for their own health (Department of Health 2010).
Importantly, the Scottish NHS charter does not require health care professionals to
ensure compliance with the charter, nor does it require patients to bear any costs if
they fail to live up to their responsibilities. Likewise, the NHS Constitution lacks teeth
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in the sense that patients who fail to abide by the Constitutions provisions face no
penalty. However, these documents indicate rather nicely how the concept of personal
responsibility is beginning to take hold in the UK.
2.3. Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that the concept of personal responsibility for health has
a long history. I have also argued that it is only in the last century that the claim that
people are causally responsible for their own ill-health has been based on a solid
foundation. Moreover, I have suggested that although the notion that people are
morally responsible for their ill-health has been with us for many millennia, it is only
in the last few decades that politicians and legislators have begun to deploy the
concept in health policies and started to require some people to bear the costs of their
risky health affecting choices.
Where does this leave us now? I think that the trend is clear and, as the 21st century
progresses, all manner of “responsibility for health” policies will become ubiquitous
in both the developing and the developed world. These policies are also increasingly
likely to involve sticks as well as carrots – meaning that cost bearing health policies
are likely to come to the fore as the problems associated with risky behaviours
become more common and more expensive to treat. Indeed, as I noted in the previous
chapter, it is partly for this reason that a thorough analysis of cost bearing policies
needs to be provided and I hope that I have now set the scene for this analysis by
placing the debate about personal responsibility for health in some kind of historical
context.
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Chapter 3
Public, Patient and Professional Opinion
“I bloody well deserve it because I knew what the outcome was.”
– Quoted by Richardson et al (2002)
3.0 Introduction
As we have seen in the last chapter, policy makers, politicians and legislators are
increasingly enamoured with the concept of personal responsibility for health and
they are increasingly implementing cost bearing measures too. But what do patients,
health care professionals and the general public think about consequential
responsibility in the health care context? Do they think that scarce livers should be
allocated to patients suffering from alcoholic liver disease? Do they think that
smokers should be denied access to health care? Do they think that people who
consume too much saturated fat should pay some kind of risk tax?
Until very recently no one had any real idea what patients, the lay-public and most
health care professionals thought about these issues.28 However, over the last few
decades a number of surveys and studies have been conducted to try and unearth the
views of the public about these issues and a small number of studies have also
explored the views of health care professionals and patients. Most of this research has
been carried out in the developed world – especially in the UK, USA and Australia –
28 The views of a small handful of prominent health care professionals, like Knowles (1977) and Kass
(1975), had been made abundantly clear in a series of journal articles, but the beliefs of the “silent”
majority of health care professionals was not known – or sought.
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and in this chapter I will discuss a small sample of the more informative studies and
surveys that have thus far been conducted in these countries. However, before I
launch into a discussion of the data, I will begin by saying a few words about the
reasons why exploring the views of the public, patients and health care professionals
is important.
3.1 Why bother with public, professional and patient opinion?
Moral and political philosophers who wish to influence public policy have good
reason to pay careful attention to public surveys. Politicians and policy makers have
no choice but to do so. The latter must take heed because their careers often depend
upon their ability to both understand and respond to public opinion. Philosophers
interested in public policy must do likewise because if they fail to provide advice
which is at least palatable to the lay public their counsel will be ignored and even
derided by those with the power to actually create policies.
This is not to say that politicians, policy makers and philosophers must rely entirely
on the pre-reflective views of the general public. As Mill (1998) argued very
eloquently over a century ago, the “tyranny of the majority” is an ever present threat
and, in many cases, public attitudes may not be a morally defensible basis for policy
because they are based on prejudicial beliefs and ignorance (Attenbury 1996; Batey
1997). For this reason it is sometimes right and proper for political leaders and their
philosophical advisors to challenge the views of the general public. Nonetheless,
though it is important that experts and leaders do not feel entirely stymied by public
opinion, it remains the case that those who devise policy – and those who seek to
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influence this process – must reflect the views of the citizenry to some extent. For, if
they do not, their policies will lack a proper democratic mandate and will probably be
rejected by the demos.
There are also good reasons for philosophers, politicians and policy makers to pay
particular heed to the views of health care professionals qua professionals. This is
because these individuals are uniquely placed to provide information about the
feasibility of implementing health care policies. Health care professionals have an
excellent understanding of how health care services work, how easy or difficult it
would be to implement new policies and the likely impact that policies will have on
patients, staff and the health care system as a whole. It would be very unwise,
therefore, to try and devise and implement health policies without listening carefully
to the people who effectively run the system.
Moreover, without the support of health care professionals no health care policy is
likely to be implemented successfully. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, health
care professionals represent a powerful lobby group and they can do much to derail
health care policies by either directly influencing government ministers or by
appealing to the media and the general public. Secondly, if a health care policy is
pushed through in the teeth of serious opposition from health care professionals, these
same health care professionals will be in a powerful position to sabotage the policy
once it is implemented. Health care professionals rarely put down the tools of their
trade and take direct industrial action. This is because of the deleterious impact this
would have on patients. Nevertheless, they can easily take more subversive actions
and thus undermine a policy in a more in-direct way.
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Patients qua patients do not have any special knowledge about philosophical concepts
or special skills in the health care policy arena. Moreover, their knowledge of the
health care system is usually less systematic and thorough than the knowledge of
health care professionals. Consequently, it might not seem obvious why the views of
patients should be sought when heath policy is being decided.
However, there is at least one reason why this would be a very good idea. This is
because patients have a deeper understanding of the likely effects that health care
policies actually have on other patients. People who have never been seriously or
chronically ill can have little understanding of the degree of physical, psychological
and financial damage that serious and or chronic illness can have. Admittedly, health
care professionals and relatives often have some degree of insight into these matters,
but it is patients who ultimately bear the brunt of ill-health and it is they who will be
most affected when health policies change. Thus, I would argue that patients –
especially those who are either chronically ill or who have recently recovered from a
serious acute illness – can provide a particularly clear insight into the effects that
various health care policies might have and should be consulted for this reason.
3.2 The public’s views of responsibility for health and cost bearing
Editors and columnists have been venting their frustration for many decades about the
burden placed on tax payers by people who “wantonly” fail to take care of their health
and politicians have been advocating responsibility-sensitive cost bearing policies for
many years now (Cappelen and Norheim 2005). This very much suggests that a
significant number of lay-people living in developed countries support the idea that
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some people should be made to bear costs if they choose to engage in risky health
affecting behaviour. After all, journalists and politicians would not have spent so
much ink and political capital on a subject that only a small minority care about.
However, though we can infer from all these editorial pages and political speeches
that many lay-people support the concept of consequential responsibility these sources
do not tell us exactly how popular this concept really is. Nor do they tell us why
people believe that people who take risks with their health should bear costs or what
form most people think cost bearing polices should take. Fortunately, a number of
researchers have recently made a concerted effort to elicit the views of the general
public about the role that responsibility should play in the allocation of scarce health
care resources and, to a lesser extent, about their views on cost bearing in relation to
health care. Most of this research has taken the form of basic public surveys, but a
number of more detailed research studies have also now been carried out and we now
have a reasonably detailed picture of what people think about these issues.
The first set of surveys designed to elicit the view of the lay public about health care
policies were rather simplistic. Most of them simply asked respondent’s one highly
specific responsibility-related question: whether people who took certain risks with
their health should bear a cost by receiving lower priority if they subsequently needed
health care. Nonetheless, the results of these surveys demonstrated that a significant
number of people answered this question in the affirmative. For example, a Swedish
study reported that 50% of respondents thought that people who take care of
themselves should receive priority for their health over those who did not take such
care, whilst a study in Wales found that 41% of respondents thought that people who
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fail to what they can do remain healthy should be given a lower priority for treatment
(Braakenheilm 1990; Edwards et al. 2003).29
The results of these surveys were not especially informative because they did not
explore people’s reasons for making people bear costs in much depth. However, they
did give researchers an indication that about half of all lay respondents believed that
people should bear some sort of cost (i.e. lower priority for health care) if they
engaged in certain types of risky health affecting behaviours. This encouraged other
researchers to design more complex surveys and studies which enabled more in-depth
data to be gleaned about the lay public’s beliefs, values and preferences in relation to
the issue of consequential responsibility for health.
One of the first detailed studies conducted in this area was carried out by Ubel et al
(1999). Ubel and his colleagues randomly allocated one of five different “patient
scenarios” to 283 prospective jurors in the state of Pennsylvania. In each of the five
scenarios the respondents were asked to decide how they would distribute 100 hearts
for transplantation between two different groups of 100 hypothetical patients who
either had or had not engaged in a risky health affecting behaviour in the past. The
five scenarios differed from each other on the basis of the prognosis of the patients,
29 A more sophisticated survey carried out by Bowling (1996) discovered that 42% of respondents
agreed or strongly agreed with the claim that “people who contribute to their own illness – for example
through smoking, obesity, or excessive drinking – should have lower priority for their health care than
others”. The Oregon Health Services Commission also uncovered some interesting information about
people’s attitudes towards personal responsibility for health. The Oregon legislature asked the citizens
of Oregon to rank 714 condition-treatment pairs in order of priority and when the results were analysed
it was found that the people of Oregon had ranked “transplantation for alcoholic liver disease” at
number 695, whereas “transplantation for liver disease not related to alcohol” was ranked at number
364 (Dixon and Welch 1991).
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the nature of the risky health affecting behaviour that the patients engaged in and
whether the risky health affecting behaviour caused the patient’s organ failure. At the
end of the study respondents were also asked to justify their allocation decisions.
The results of the study were very revealing. The majority of respondents were less
willing to give organs to people who had engaged in a risky health affecting
behaviour than those who had not (Ibid, p 62). For example, respondents were less
willing to allocate organs to smokers than non-smokers and they were also less
willing to allocate organs to patients with a history of intravenous drug abuse than to
patients who had not taken intravenous drugs in the past. They were also less willing
to allocate organs to patients who ate high fat diets than to patients who did not.
However, it was also discovered that respondents were significantly less willing to
give organs to patients who were intravenous drug users than to patients who were
smokers or to people who had a high fat diet. This was true even when the patients
who were intravenous drug abusers had a better prognosis than patients who were
smokers or had a diet which was high in fat. Respondents were also statistically just
as unlikely to give organs to patients whose risky behaviour had caused their heart
failure as they were to patients whose risky behaviour had not caused their heart
failure.
The justifications given by those respondents who gave less than 50% of the organs to
patients who engaged in risky health affecting behaviours were later organised and
classified (Ibid, p 63). The most common rationale proffered by the respondents who
had allocated decisions in this way was simply that “people who cause their own
82
illness should not receive equal priority for treatment”.30 21% made this claim where
the risky behaviour was a high fat diet, 31% made the claim where the risky
behaviour was smoking, and 28% made the claim where the risky behaviour was
intravenous drug use. 15% also claimed that the reason why they gave less than 50%
of the organs to who had taken was because the risky behaviour was “socially
unacceptable”. 7% made this claim in relation to a high fat diet, 9% in relation to
smoking and 21% in relation to intravenous drug use.
What are we to make of these results? The most obvious point is that a substantial
number of respondents in this study made (hypothetical) allocation decisions on the
basis of some notion of personal responsibility for health and they were also willing to
make some patients bear the costs of their risky health affecting behaviour. This
confirms the results of the earlier surveys which suggest that a significant number of
people believe that the concept of consequential responsibility should apply in the
case of risky health affecting behaviours.
The second important point is that the results show that many respondents treated
smokers, intravenous drugs abusers and people who ate a high fat diet differently.
Ubel et al (Ibid, p 65) claim that this could be explained by the fact that certain risky
behaviours are less socially unacceptable than others. But multiple explanations are
possible. For example, respondents may have regarded all three types of risky health
affecting behaviour as immoral and deserving of some kind of penalty, but regarded
30 This classification included people who claimed that patients should “suffer the consequences of
freely made choices” and also people who claimed that “patients had a personal responsibility to avoid
these behaviours” (Ibid, p 63).
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drug abuse as intrinsically morally worse than either smoking or eating a diet high in
fat.
On the other hand, it is possible that respondents perceived drug abuse to be more
dangerous than smoking or eating a diet high in fat and thus wished to penalise drug
abusers more for reasons relating to deterrence. In reality, it is likely that different
respondents based their decisions on the basis of different values, but it is difficult to
know for sure because the questions asked by the researchers did not unpick these
issues.
The third thing to note is that the data proves that some respondents were not making
allocation decisions purely on the basis of future outcomes. This is because at least
some respondents were less willing to give organs to patients who were intravenous
drug users than to smokers or patients who consumed too much saturated fat – even in
scenarios where the drug users had a better prognosis. This is important because it is
sometimes suggested that the reason why people don’t allocate organs to those who
are responsible for their ill-health is because they assume that people who are ill for
this reason have a worse prognosis.
The fourth and final point to note is this. A number of respondents claimed that
people should receive lower priority just because they caused their own ill-health.
However, as Ubel et al (Ibid, p 63) note, some of those who made this claim treated
smokers, drugs addicts and people who consumed too much fat differently. Moreover,
it was found that causality was not a statistically significant factor in patient’s
allocation decisions even though 27% of people justified their decisions on the basis
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of causal claims alone. This means that there was some contradiction between the
rationale people gave and the actual choices that they made.
Quite why this happened is not clear. One possibility is that respondents wanted to
believe that they were making allocation judgments on some kind of “empirical”
rather than “moral” basis, but were influenced by moral considerations when they
actually had to make choices. Indeed, Ubel et al (Ibid, p58) argue that these results
give us good reason to be very wary of relying on what people say when we try to
determine people’s true motivations for defending cost bearing policies. They also
add, on the basis of this evidence, that arguments in favour of personal responsibility
for health may be a convenient way to hide judgements based on social desirability.
However, we should bear in mind that people may simply have made mistakes when
describing their reasons for making judgments. In other words, many people may
have been quite willing to own up to their moralistic judgments but lacked the
vocabulary to do so and so plumped for the “causal” rationale instead.
The other major study conducted by Ubel et al. (2001) on the issue of personal
responsibility for health also involved prospective jurors in the United States. In this
study prospective jurors were asked to read four different scenarios and complete a
written questionnaire about them. In each scenario the respondents were required to
allocate 100 organs between two groups of 100 patients. In each of the four scenarios
patients in one of the groups were always described as having a history of unhealthy
behaviour (either smoking or alcohol consumption) that was linked with worse
transplant outcomes. In two of the scenarios the behaviour was described as being the
cause of the organ failure that necessitated the transplantation whereas in the other
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two scenarios the behaviour had no causal role. Respondents were also asked at the
end of the study to justify their allocation decisions.
400 of the prospective jurors completed the questionnaire. On average 66% of
respondents distributed organs to patients who had no history of unhealthy behaviours
and 44% distributed organs to patients who did have a history of unhealthy
behaviours (Ibid, p 603). Respondents also allocated fewer organs to patients whose
behaviour had caused their ill-health as opposed to people who had engaged in similar
behaviour but whose behaviour had not caused their ill-health. For example, patients
who needed a liver transplant because of their alcohol consumption and patients who
needed lung transplants because of their smoking habit were allocated fewer organs
than patients who drank alcohol or smoked but whose risky behaviour did not cause
their organ failure.31
In justifying their various allocation decisions a significant number of people who
gave more organs to those who did not take risks claimed that they did this on the
basis that patients in these groups were “personally responsible for their health”
(Ibid, p604). A significant number of people who refused to distinguish between
people in this way argued that they did not do this because “people should not be
punished for past wrongdoings” (Ibid, p605).
31 Interestingly, it was also discovered that respondents who had never smoked were less willing to
distribute lungs to patients who had a history of smoking than respondents who had smoked in the past.
Respondents who had previously smoked, meanwhile, were less willing to distribute lungs to patients
who had a history of smoking than respondents who currently smoked.
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The results of this study demonstrate once again that some people are willing to make
people bear costs if they engage in risky health affecting behaviours in certain
situations. The study also suggests that whether patients actually cause their ill-health
seems to matter to some people when they make resource allocation decisions on the
basis of responsibility considerations. This contradicts the finding in the previous
study which suggested that people were just as likely to give people lower priority to
patients whether their risky behaviour caused their ill-health or not. Some of the
reasons given by the respondents for their allocation decisions also suggest that some
people view some risky health affecting behaviours as immoral in some sense. For
example, many of the people who actually opposed the idea of consequential
responsibility were quite happy to argue that engaging in some forms of risky
behaviour involved some kind of “wrongdoing” – it’s just that they did not want to
penalise them for this wrongdoing.
The next major study that I wish to discuss was carried out by Neuberger et al (1998).
In this study 1000 members of the general public, 200 family doctors and 100
gastroenterologists were asked about how they wanted scarce livers to be allocated.
These medical and lay respondents were each given case histories detailing eight
potential donor recipients. These eight potential donor recipients differed from each
other on a number of counts, but three were causally responsible for their ill-health
whilst the other five were not. The respondents were then asked to decide which four
of these eight recipients should receive the four donor livers which were available for
transplantation. They were also asked to indicate which case was the least deserving
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case and which of seven possible factors should be used to determine which patients
already waiting for transplantation should get a transplant.32
The key results of this study are as follows. Firstly, a majority of the lay public gave
the (hypothetical) patients who were causally responsible for their ill-health (i.e. the
ex-drug abuser, the alcoholic and the patient who overdosed on paracetamol) lower
priority in the allocation of scarce organs than all the other patients bar the patient
who was a prisoner (Ibid, p 173). This was true even when the prognosis of some of
these patients was worse than the prognosis of patients who were not causally
responsible for their ill-health. Indeed, only 16% of the general public gave one of the
four available livers to the alcoholic, only 17% gave a liver to the ex drug abuser and
only 47% gave a liver to the patient who had taken an overdose. Family doctors and
gastroenterologists also gave the patient who was an alcoholic lower priority than all
the other patients (other than the prisoner), but they were far more willing to give
livers to the drug abuser and the patient who had taken an overdose – probably
because these patients had a much better prognosis than some of the other patients.
The patient with liver disease was also selected as the “least deserving” of all eight
patients by 33% of the general public, 40% of family doctors and 33% of
gastroenterologists (Ibid, p 173). Only the prisoner fared worse. The results were
more mixed in relation to the other patients who had caused their own ill-health
although the general public regarded the drug abuser as less deserving than any of the
patients other than the alcoholic and the prisoner.
32 The seven factors were: outcome, time on waiting list, value to society, previous use of illicit drugs,
age, return to work, and involvement of alcohol in their liver damage (Ibid, p 173).
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Finally, 28% of the general public, 41% of family doctors and fully 68% of
gastroenterologists claimed that alcohol consumption was one of seven factors that
should be used to help determine how donor livers should be allocated (Ibid, p 174).
This reflected their view that patients whose liver disease was unrelated to alcohol
should be given a higher priority than those who had alcohol related disease. 30% of
the general public, 36% of family doctors and 36% of gastroenterologists also argued
that they would regard drug taking or overdose as a factor that should be used to
determine how donor livers should be allocated. This reflected their view that patients
whose liver disease was unrelated to drug taking and overdose should receive higher
priority than those whose liver disease was related to these behaviours.
The results of this study are interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, they once
again demonstrate that the lay public (and health care professionals) are sometimes
willing to take considerations of responsibility into account when determining the
allocation of scarce resources. Secondly, the results suggest that doctors and the lay
public are equally likely to argue that patients who are causally responsible should
bear costs at least in cases where prognosis is not an over-riding issue. But, when
prognosis is poor, doctors tend to ignore responsibility issues whilst the lay public
take a different view – suggesting that responsibility should still be a major factor in
determining the allocation of scarce organs. This suggests, though it does not prove,
that doctors make judgments about responsibility and cost bearing on the basis of a
more utilitarian calculation than the lay public who may be more willing to make
judgments on the basis of moralistic-desert claims.
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Thirdly, although a majority of respondents regarded people with alcohol induced
liver disease as less deserving than other patients they did not think the same about
people who had developed liver disease as a consequence of taking an overdose or
from having taken drugs – though the general public were still quite likely to regard
drug users as less deserving. This is curious because people who damage their livers
by taking an overdose or by taking drugs are just as causally responsible as people
who damage their livers by consuming too much alcohol. It may be that the
explanation in this case has something to do with people’s perceptions of moral
responsibility.33
Another explanation is that some people think that being an alcoholic is morally
worse than being an ex-drug user and morally worse that trying to commit suicide.
Alternatively, people might think that the deterrent effect of denying treatment to
alcoholics will be more effective than in the other cases. However, this last
explanation is somewhat undermined by the fact that people used the language or
“desert” in this instance.
Wittenberg and Fischoff (2003) also conducted a major study looking at lay people’s
rationing allocation choices in situations where patients are regarded as responsible
for their ill-health. Their study is especially interesting because, having recorded
people’s original opinions, they explored the effect that different ethical arguments
had on people’s choices. The study was conducted in the United States and 310
people completed the questionnaire.
33 It is possible that people regard alcoholics as more morally responsible than ex-drugs users and
people who take an overdose.
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The study centred on two scenarios involving groups of patients who were competing
for scarce resources. The groups differed in the sense that patients in some of the
groups suffered from diseases that they were causally responsible for whilst people in
other groups suffered from diseases they were not causally responsible for. In one
scenario, patients with liver disease caused by alcohol consumption were contrasted
with patients with liver disease caused by an inherited condition and in the other
scenario patients suffering from asthma caused by “in-the-home” air pollution were
contrasted with patients suffering from asthma caused by “outdoor” air pollution
(Ibid, p 195). Respondents were required to allocate scarce health care resources
between the group of patients with liver disease caused by alcohol and the group of
patients with liver disease caused by an inherited factor. They were then asked to do
the same with the two asthma groups.
Once they had made their decisions the respondents were asked to read a number of
statements about different ethical arguments relating to resource allocation. They
were then asked to repeat the allocation process for the four groups of patients in
order to determine whether reading about the arguments affected the way they
allocated resources between the groups. Finally, the respondents were asked to
explain their decision making reasoning “in their own words” (Ibid, p196).
In both the alcohol and the asthma scenarios respondents allocated fewer resources to
the groups of patients who were deemed responsible for their health. Interestingly,
however, reading and discussing statements about various ethical arguments did not
change most people’s opinions. Before reading about these arguments 35% of
respondents did not allocate any livers to the patients with alcoholic liver disease,
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36% allocated fewer livers to this group and 27% allocated the livers equally. The
respective results after reading about the ethical arguments were as follows: 33%,
40% and 27% (Ibid, p200).34
Similar results were found in the asthma scenario, although respondents were more
willing to allocate resources to patients who had developed asthma as a result of their
own behaviour. 17% of respondents did not allocate any asthma treatment to patients
with asthma caused by “in-home pollutants”, 21% allocated fewer resources to
patients with asthma caused by “in home” pollutants and 52% allocated treatment
equally. After reading and discussing the ethical arguments the respective results were
as follows: 21%, 23%, 47% (Ibid, p198).35
Wittenberg and Fischoff (Ibid, p 200) classified respondent’s rationales for their
allocation decisions into 14 different reasons in the case of asthma treatments and 17
different reasons in the case of liver treatments. The primary reason why people
decided to allocate fewer resources to patients with asthma caused by indoor pollution
was because these patients could “control” this form of pollution. The main reasons
people gave for allocating fewer resources to people with alcohol induced liver
disease was because “alcohol consumption is voluntary” and because “alcoholics are
responsible for their ill-health” (Ibid, p 200).
34 None of the respondents allocated more livers to the patients with alcohol liver disease than to the
patients with inherited liver disease either before or after reading the ethical arguments.
35 In this case 10% allocated more resources to those with asthma caused by “in home” pollution and
2% allocated all the resources to those with asthma caused by “in home” pollution. These figures did
not change much after respondents had read the ethical arguments.
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Three things stand out about these results. Firstly, a significant number of people were
more willing to allocate resources to people who had diseases which were (in some
way) caused by their own behaviour. Again, this confirms the results of previous
studies. Secondly, respondents were much more likely to make use of the concept of
consequential responsibility in the case of alcohol induced liver disease than in the
case of asthma caused by in door pollutants. This may reflect the fact that drinking
alcohol is seen by many to be an intrinsically immoral behaviour whereas the
behaviours that are responsible for “indoor” pollution (whatever they might be) may
be not be regarded in the same light. Alternatively, it may be that utilitarian
considerations were once again playing a role.36
Thirdly, people’s decisions about how to allocate resources hardly changed at all after
they had been asked to read and deliberate about a range of ethical rationales as to
why and how resources should be allocated. Wittenberg and Fischoff (Ibid, p 201)
responded to this latter finding by claiming that “rationing preferences may be
sufficiently formed that others opinions have little influence over them”. However, we
should bear in mind that other studies have suggested that people’s rationing
preferences can be modified if they are given further information. There is also
evidence to suggest that people are less likely to hold people consequentially
responsible once they have analysed these ethical arguments in more depth (Nord et al
1995).
36 In other words, people may well have believed that alcohol consumption is more dangerous than in-
door pollutants and thus wanted to penalise alcohol consumers more heavily in order to create a
stronger deterrent effect.
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3.3 Health care professional’s views of responsibility for health and cost bearing
A very small number of health care professionals have made their views about
consequential responsibility very clear. Knowles (1977), as we have seen, helped to
start this trend over four decades ago and hundreds of short articles have now been
published by health care professionals either opposing or defending health policies
which are centred on the concept of personal responsibility for health. However,
health care professionals who have written articles about this issue are not a very
representative sample of health care professionals as a whole and there is a real
shortage of data about what most health care professionals think about the concept of
responsibility-sensitive cost bearing policies.
To an extent we can infer something about what many health care professionals
believe from the official positions adopted by organisations that represent these
professionals. This is because many of these organisations try to adopt positions that
are based on the views of the majority of their members. Interestingly, if we look at
what most of these health care organisations officially have to say about the issue of
consequential responsibility for health we find a pretty robust set of statements
claiming that patients should not be made to bear costs by being denied treatment or
by being given lower priority for treatment on the ground that they are responsible for
their ill-health.
The General Medical Council (2006) in the UK explicitly informs doctors that “you
must not refuse or delay treatment because you believe that patients’ actions have
contributed to their condition”. The UK Nursing and Midwifery Council (2004)
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concurs and, in its guidance, it notes that nurses and midwives must promote and
protect the interests and dignity of patients “irrespective of gender, age, race, ability,
sexuality, economic status, lifestyle, culture and religious or cultural beliefs”. The
Health and Care Professions Council (2012) – an umbrella body which regulates
physiotherapists, radiographers and a whole array of other health care professionals –
also states unequivocally that “lifestyle” factors should not affect the way patients are
treated.
The American Medical Association (1997) takes a similar line in relation to organ
transplants and reminds American doctors that “the contribution of the patient to his
or her medical treatment” should not be used a selection criteria for organ
transplantation decisions. Moreover, the World Health Organization (1991) adamantly
proclaims that considerations of personal responsibility for health should not play a
role in determining how scarce organs are allocated.
However, a number of health care organisations do agree that the concept of personal
responsibility should play a much more dominant role in healthcare than it currently
does. The British Medical Association (2007) recently called for an NHS charter that
would set out the rights and responsibilities of patients.37 The American Medical
Association (1993) has also put forward a list of what it called “patient
responsibilities” – which included the responsibility of patients to ensure that they
37 A large majority of delegates at the British Medical Association’s annual representative meeting in
2007 also voted in favour of a charter that “focuses on the individuals responsibility both in health and
illness” (Schmidt 2007a).
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attend appointments, adhere to medical regimens, and take measures to improve and
maintain their health.38
Importantly, neither the British Medical Association nor the American Medical
Association defended the idea that people should bear costs for their choices by being
denied treatment, but there can be no doubt that these organisations take the concept
of personal responsibility very seriously and they clearly think that patients need to do
more to help themselves. Furthermore, many health care organisations strongly
advocate placing higher levels of commodity taxes on alcohol and cigarettes and some
of them also defend the idea of placing taxes on other products too. Consequently,
there is some agreement that some forms of cost bearing are both reasonable and
defensible.39
In order to get a better grasp of what most health care professionals think about these
issues what is needed is a series of in-depth surveys. Unfortunately, few such surveys
have ever been carried out. The study carried out by Neuberger et al (1998) did try to
find out what a small sample of gastroenterologists and general practitioners thought
about these issues, but the only major survey which focused entirely on eliciting the
views of health care professionals is the one carried out by Brinegal and Feiring
38 Importantly, the rationale provided for these recommendations refer to the benefits that taking such
steps would have in maintaining health. At no point does the American Medical Association
recommend taking sanctions against patients who fail to live up to their responsibilities (Kelley 2005).
39 We must also remember that although these health care organisations try to represent the views of
the majority of the professionals it is difficult for them to be sure what the rank and file really think
about these issues.
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(2008) which collected data from 1072 respondents who replied to a Norwegian
Doctors Survey.
This survey was very wide ranging and covered many issues unrelated to the topic of
responsibility for health. However, the survey did ask participants to answer two
questions relating to the concept of personal responsibility for health. The first
question asked doctors about the strength of their agreement and disagreement with
five statements each of which related to the issue of personal responsibility for health.
The second question asked doctors whether they thought that any (of a list of nine)
risky health affecting behaviours should influence priority for health care. The five
statements and the nine risky behaviours can be found, along with the results of the
study, in Figures 2.0 and 3.0 below.
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Figure 2.0. Agreement with Statements about Personal Responsibility – adapted
from Brinegal and Feiring (2008, p 359).
Disagree
Completely
Disagree
Partly
Neutral Agree
Partly
Agree
Completely
Health care
priority
should
depend on
the patient’s
personal
responsibility
24.1% 33.0% 25.9% 15.9% 1.2%
Access to
expensive
treatment
should
depend on
the patient’s
personal
responsibility
23% 32.6% 25.3% 22.7% 2.8%
Access to
scarce organ
transplants
should
depend on
the patient’s
responsibility
20.8% 28.6% 23.8% 22.7% 4.2%
Lower
priority
should be
allocated to
patients who
violate a
contract of
changes in
lifestyle
18.4% 31.3% 26.3% 21.1% 2.9%
A patient
who is
responsible
for the
disease
should pay
additional
co-payments
43.0% 30.9% 18.6% 6.5% 1.0%
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Figure 3.0. Types of Risk Behaviour that Should Count in a Priority Situation –
adapted from Brinegal and Feiring (2008, p 359).
Yes Don’t Know No
Poor Quality
Nutrition
14.9% 14.9% 70.2%
Lack of Physical
Exercise
20.8% 16.4% 62.8%
Combination of the
factors
25% 21.6% 53.4%
Overweight/obesity 26.7% 16.3% 56.9%
Violation of
contract leading to
injury/disease
27.1% 17.9% 55%
Drug Abuse 34.4% 14.7% 50.9%
High risk sports
leading to
injury/disease
35.3% 16.2% 48.5%
Excessive alcohol
consumption
37.7% 13.8% 48.5%
Smoking 44.0% 10.9% 45.1%
The first thing to note about the results is that the majority of Norwegian doctors who
responded to the survey did not agree that the issue of personal responsibility for
health should influence resource allocation decisions. However, the study does show
that a significant number of doctors believed that some patients should bear the costs
of their risky health affecting choices. For example, 17.2% doctors partly or strongly
agreed with the statement that “healthcare priority should depend on the patient’s
personal responsibility for the disease” and 26.9% partly or strongly agreed with the
claim that “access to scarce organ transplants should depend on the patient’s
personal responsibility for the disease” (Ibid, p 359). 25% of the respondents also
considered that information about various risk factors is relevant when it comes to
considering how priority decisions should be made and this figure rises to 37.7% and
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44% in the case of excessive alcohol consumption and smoking respectively (Ibid, p
359).
The study also tells us that some doctors, just like the members of the general public
in other studies, tend to treat people who take different kinds of risks in a different
ways. For example, in this survey many Norwegian doctors were more likely to
defend the idea that people who caused their own ill-health as a consequence of
smoking, drinking alcohol or abusing drugs should bear costs than they were to
defend cost bearing in relation to patients who did not exercise regularly or were
overweight (Ibid, p 360). The results also demonstrate that the respondents were far
more comfortable with the idea of making patients bear costs by receiving lower
priority for treatment than they were with patients being made to bear costs by
providing additional payments (Ibid, p 360).
Unfortunately, this survey did not explore why so many doctors believed that patients
should bear the costs of their health affecting choices. Nor did the survey explore the
reason why these doctors wanted to treat people who engaged in different kinds of
risks differently. Feiring and Bringeal (Ibid, p 360) postulate that one reason why the
doctors in the study wanted people to bear the costs of their choices is because they
believed that some risky health affecting behaviours are, in some sense, immoral.
They also suggest that the reason why some risky health affecting behaviours (e.g.
drug addiction) were more likely to be targeted was because these kinds of behaviours
“trigger moralistic reactions” whereas other risky behaviours, such as the decision
not to exercise regularly, do not (Ibid, p 360).
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This, however, is a matter of speculation and since all the results could be explained
by utilitarian reasoning rather than any kind of appeal to some concept of desert it is
impossible to be sure what the real explanation for these results is.40
At this point in time, then, we cannot be sure what most health care professionals
think about the concept of personal responsibility or what they think about cost
bearing in relation to risky health affecting behaviours. Moreover, though we do now
have some limited evidence to suggest that some doctors think that patients should
bear some costs we have very little information about the form that these doctors
think cost bearing should take. We are equally in the dark about the normative reasons
that health care professionals rely upon to defend claims about consequential
responsibility. However, we do now know that some health care professionals believe
that some patients should bear costs and we have some reason to think that the
number of health care professionals who believe that this should happen is relatively
large.41
40 This study is of particular interest because Norway is characterised by an extremely egalitarian
distribution of income and the Norwegian Patient’s Rights Act explicitly notes that considerations of
responsibility should not be considered when doctors or health care managers decide how to prioritise
the allocation of health care resources (Ibid, p 360). If about a quarter of doctors in a country as
committed to egalitarian principles as Norway support some notion of consequential responsibility it
seems quite likely that doctors working in less egalitarian countries will be even more supportive of
such ideas.
41 There is a particular shortage of information about what health care professionals who are not
doctors think about these issues.
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3.4 Patients views about responsibility for health and cost bearing
We know very little about what most lay people and health care professionals think
about the concepts of causal, moral and consequential responsibility for health, but we
know even less about patients views on these matters. Given that responsibility for
health policies are likely to impact this group more than any other this is somewhat
surprising, but the voice of the patient is often lost in health policy discourse and it
seems that the same thing has happened in relation to the debate about responsibility
for health. Indeed, the only study that has successful elicited patient’s views about
responsibility for health is the study carried out by Richards et al. (20003) – and even
this study was not intended to deal with the issues of moral and consequential
responsibility as such.
This study consisted of a series of qualitative interviews with patients who had
experienced chest pain and the primary goal of the research was to determine patients’
perceived causes of their chest pain and their responses to their symptoms. The
interviews were semi structured and patients views about the concept of personal
responsibility and self-blame were explored if they were raised by the patients
themselves.
The results of this study showed that a majority of respondents had a basic
understanding of the causal associations between risky health affecting behaviours
and cardiac disease. In fact, “risky behaviour” was also cited as one of the most
common reasons why patients felt that they were at risk of developing cardiac disease
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(Ibid, p712).42 The study also revealed some other interesting data about patient’s
views of the concepts of moral and consequential responsibility. For example, a
substantial number of patients during the course of their interview alluded to the fact
that people were “personally responsible” for their cardiac conditions and that people
should “blame themselves” for developing these diseases (Ibid, p 713).
Two men in the study who had been diagnosed with coronary heart disease and
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) made very explicit reference to
these ideas in relation to their own health.43 This first of these men, when asked
whether he had been “unlucky” with his health, replied: “I don’t know about that. You
only get what you deserve” (Ibid, p173). The second man responded to the same
question as follows: “Well, I have probably abused myself and I am paying for it
now” (Ibid, p173). Another woman suffering from COPD also noted that although she
had realised that her disease was caused by smoking she had continued to smoke and
she went on to say of her condition that “I bloody well deserve it because I knew what
the outcome was” (Ibid, p173).
Some patients also believed that because they were responsible for their ill-health
physicians would be unwilling to help them. A number even claimed that they had
been made to feel guilty by physicians in the past because of their risky behaviours.
Still others argued that they were reluctant to present with symptoms because they
feared being reminded about their responsibilities and their unhealthy behaviours.
42 The risky behaviours most frequently cited were, in order of frequency, smoking, diet, being
overweight and lack of exercise (Ibid, p712).
43 As I will explain in the next chapter both of these diseases are caused by smoking in most cases.
103
Quite a few respondents also observed that health care professionals had threatened to
withdraw care unless they changed their behaviours. One of these patients said that
once he had explained to his doctor that he was still smoking the doctor responded as
follows: “There is your medication. The prescription’s made out to you. But if you’re
smoking next month don’t bother comin’, you’ll get nothing from me” (Ibid, p 174). A
few patients even argued that their physicians were quite justified in giving up on
them since doctors did not have a duty to help those who would not help themselves
(Ibid, p 174).
These results suggest that a significant number of the patients realise that certain
behaviours are risky and can cause disease. They also show that many patients believe
that the concept of personal responsibility for health is already being used by heath
care professionals in the UK to determine if care is going to be provided. It is also
salutary to note that some patients agree that this is both right and proper.
The study also suggests that many patients couch the concept of responsibility for
health in the moralistic language of blame and desert and believe that people should
bear costs because they deserve to do so. Moreover, as Richardson et al. (Ibid, p 715)
argue, patient’s beliefs about personal responsibility, desert and self blame were, at
least in some cases, either reinforced or created by health care professionals. This
provides us with in-direct evidence that at least some health care professionals allow
the concept of responsibility for health to influence their practice even though the
General Medical Council and many other similar organizations explicitly forbids
doctors from treating their patients differently on the basis of their lifestyle choices.
104
Further work is needed to determine what most patients actually think about the
concepts of causal, moral and consequential responsibility. We cannot rely on the
results of one study – especially one that was not even focused on the concept of
responsibility for health – to draw conclusions about what patients qua patients think
about these matters. In particular, further research is needed to determine whether
patients make exceptions for certain kinds of activities (e.g. unprotected sex with the
purpose of having children) and why they think people should bear costs if they take
risks with their health. Nonetheless, the study does give us limited reason to believe
that some patients defend the idea of cost bearing and that some would be willing to
abide by such a policy even when they would have to bear the costs themselves.
3.5 Conclusion
The data discussed in this chapter suggests that a number of patients, health care
professionals and lay people believe that considerations of personal responsibility for
health are important and that a significant number also believe that some patients
should be made to bear the costs of their risky health affecting choices.
Far more research needs to be carried out in this area to determine people’s real
attitudes and to explore the reasoning behind their beliefs so that we can get a better
idea about whether there exists a democratic mandate for cost bearing policies. In
particular, it would be useful to know what people think about the nature and
existence of moral responsibility for ill-health and exactly which normative rationales
are being appealed to when people claim that those who are causally and/or morally
responsible should bear some kind of health costs. It would also be very useful to find
out whether health care professionals, patients and lay-people would be more or less
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likely to defend cost bearing if the nature of the cost took the from of a risk tax or risk
insurance premium rather than a lower priority for healthcare or some other cost
which would actually cause physical harm. I suspect that this would be the case, but
there is no data to actually prove this claim as things stand.
It is also worth bearing in mind that in most of the studies carried out thus far, those
who think that people ought to be held responsible for their health are often in a
minority (Wikler 2002).44 Indeed, by searching the data so carefully for evidence of
beliefs that support consequential responsibility I may have inadvertently played
down the fact that a significant number of people – and in some cases a majority – do
not think that personal responsibility should play a role in allocation health. However,
there is sufficient data available to suggest that the concept of consequential
responsibility is growing in popularity and that many patients, health care
professionals and lay-people would now support some form of responsibility-sensitive
cost bearing policy in relation to risky health affecting behaviour.
44 For example, in the Norwegian study described above most doctors disagreed with the idea that
people who take risks should be made to bear costs.
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Chapter 4
Causal Responsibility for Health
“It is now a truism that actions which individuals could take on their own could be
vastly more effective in combating illness than all that doctors can do.”
– Daniel Wikler
4.0 Introduction: Is health within our causal grasp?
In order to defend the idea that people should be made to bear the costs of their risky
health affecting choices it first needs to be established that human behaviour does, in
fact, play a causal role in the aetiology of some illnesses and injuries. We also need to
establish that a reasonably significant amount of the global burden of disease is
caused by human behaviour. This is because the whole debate about consequential
responsibility will become something of an “academic” exercise if only a small
amount of ill-health is caused by human behaviour.
My goals in this chapter, then, will be two twofold. Firstly, I will try to demonstrate
that there is good reason to believe that human behaviour can cause ill-health and
secondly I will try to demonstrate that human behaviour causes a significant amount
of ill-health. As I noted in the first chapter, I will not attempt to analyse all the causal
associations that may exist between human behaviour and ill-health here. Nor will I
discuss all the evidence that has been mustered to prove that the associations that I
will discuss in this chapter are casual in nature. Instead, I will provide an overview of
what most health care professionals, biomedical scientists and epidemiologists think
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are the most important behavioural causes of ill-health and I will provide an overview
of some of the most important empirical evidence that has been marshalled to defend
these claims.
4.1 Correlation, causation, confounding variables, multiple-causation and proofs
Before launching into an analysis of the causal role that human behaviour plays in the
aetiology of disease a few words of caution are needed. The first word of caution
relates to the issue of how sure we can be certain behaviours cause ill-health. It is
sometimes very obvious that a causal association exists between some behaviour and
ill-health. For example, we can confidently claim that handling very hot objects will
cause burn injuries. However, most of the causal associations between human
behaviour and ill-heath are not easy to determine because the number of confounding
variables as so high and, in these situations, we are ultimately reliant on intricate
statistical analysis of complex data to make causal claims.
Nonetheless, most of the associations between behaviours and ill-health that I will
discuss in this chapter are associations for which there is significant amount of
evidence of causality and a widespread consensus amongst experts about the causal
nature of the associations in question. Thus, although I will not discuss the issue of
probability here, I want to make it clear at this stage that we have good reason to
believe that the behaviours that I will discuss below cause the diseases that they are
associated with.
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The second word of caution relates to the question of whether behavioural factors are
a substantive cause of ill-health. I have already argued in the first chapter that it is
legitimate to concentrate on proximal and non-background causes when trying to
identify the substantive causes of ill-health. However, even if we accept that this
approach is legitimate, we still need to establish that human behaviour is, in fact, a
substantive cause of ill-health.
In some cases this is easy to do. In the case of most traumatic injuries the causal role
of human behaviour is rather obvious. However, geneticists and epidemiologists have
recently discovered that a whole range of (relatively proximal and non-background)
factors play a much more important role in the aetiology of many diseases than
anyone had previously realised. For example, there is good evidence to suggest that
women who inherit the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes are much more likely to develop
breast cancer than women who do not (Gage et al 2012). There is also growing
evidence to suggest that psycho-social factors like socio-economic status and
educational achievement play a direct causal role in the aetiology of many diseases
(Wilkinson 1996; Marmot 2004).
My response to these claims is not to dispute them. Indeed, I agree with Golan (2010)
that the development of most diseases “is caused by interactions among genetic and
environmental risk factors, including those of lifestyle” and that the “patient’s
behaviour in the relevant cases may thus be only part of the cause of his or her
condition”. However, even if we take these other factors into account there remains
plenty of scope for claiming that human behaviour plays a major causal role in the
aetiology of disease. Indeed, even the most powerful advocates of the “social
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determinants of health” approach to disease causation concede that human behaviour
is still an important cause of ill-health and may account for more than 30% of all ill-
health (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Moreover, in some cases, there can be no doubt
at all that human behaviour is the key cause of ill-health.45
4.2 The role of human behaviour in the aetiology of disease
The role of smoking, sugar, saturated fat, salt, sedentary lifestyles, sporting injuries,
unsafe sexual practices, lack of dietary fibre, excessive UV light exposure, unsafe
tattooing, alcohol, cocaine, heroin, cannabis, pregnancy, occupational hazards and a
whole host of other factors in the development of diseases has been increasingly well
documented over the last half century. Such is the scale of behavioural involvement in
the causation of ill-health that Callahan (1986) has argued that “nothing is more
evident in the statistics of public health than the role played by individual health
behaviour in contributing to accidents, illness and disease”.
The most recent Public Health White Paper (Department of Health 2010) also states
unequivocally that a significant amount of illness and premature death could be
avoided if people improved their lifestyles and it suggests that “a substantial
proportion of cancers – and over 30% of deaths from circulatory disease – could be
avoided, mainly through a combination of stopping smoking, improved diet and
increasing physical activity”. Furthermore, a recent study indicates that if people
changed their lifestyles by adopting four simple health-behaviour goals they would
45 Unprotected sexual intercourse, for example, is clearly a substantial cause of sexually transmitted
diseases.
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cut their risk of developing diabetes, myocardial infarction, stroke and cancer by a
staggering 80% (Ford et al 2009).46
These figures give us some indication of scale of the involvement of human behaviour
in the aetiology of ill-health as well as some indication about how much modification
of risk is possible through behavioural intervention. However, it is important to
explore in more detail which behaviours are most responsible for contributing to the
global burden of disease before moving onto a discussion about moral and
consequential responsibility and so I will now discuss some of the more important
causes of ill-health beginning with the scourge of the 20th century: tobacco.
4.2.1 Smoking
Smoking is probably the most studied behavioural causes of human ill-health. For
many centuries’ people have worried that smoking was dangerous. King James I of
England (1604) argued in his treatise, A Counterblaste to Tobacco, that “smoking is a
custom loathsome to the eye, hateful to the nose, harmful to the brain, dangerous to
the lungs, and in the black, stinking fume thereof nearest resembling the horrible
Stygian smoke of the pit that is bottomless”. He even placed a heavy levy on tobacco
in an attempt to stop people from smoking (Smokers News 2011). However, it was
not until the 1950s that proper scientific evidence began to emerge that smoking
caused lung cancer and it took another two or three decades for most scientists to
agree that smoking was the primary cause of most forms of lung cancer (Doll et al.
1950; Doll et al. 1994).
46 The four goals were: regular exercise, healthy diet, avoidance of smoking and avoidance of obesity.
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Would that smoking only cased lung cancer. Unfortunately, we now have good reason
to believe that this is not the case because there is considerable evidence to suggest
that smoking plays a key causal role in the aetiology of many of the most prevalent
and deadly diseases known to humankind, including ischemic heart disease,
cerebrovascular disease and Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (Gorden and
Kannel 1972; Anderson et al 1991; Kawachi et al 1993; Jamrozik et al 1994; Ockene
and Houston 1997; Forey et al 2011; Kurth et al 2003; Shavell et al 2008).
Smoking is also now regarded as a key cause of a number of different non-lung
cancers. For example, Secretan et al. (2009) claim that there is sufficient evidence to
claim that smoking plays a major causal role in the aetiology of 14 different types of
non-lung cancers including cancer of the stomach, pharynx, pancreas, ovaries,
oesophagus, nose, mouth, liver, larynx, kidney, colon, rectum, bone marrow and
bladder.47 There is also some evidence to suggest that smoking plays a causal role in
the aetiology of diseases like macular degeneration and some forms of inflammatory
bowel disease (Calkins 1989; Vingerling et al 1996).
In terms of its overall effect on the global burden of disease smoking is thought to be
responsible for about 25% all cancer deaths worldwide (Secretan et al 2009). This
means that smoking is probably the single biggest cause of cancer in the world (Doll
and Peto 2003; Sasco et al 2004). The primary reason for this is because lung cancer
is one of the most common causes of cancer deaths in the world and 90% of all
47 Admittedly, smoking is a much more potent cause of some of these cancers than others. For example,
it is believed that the risk of dying from laryngeal cancer is about 20-30 times higher for smokers than
non-smokers whereas smoking “only” doubles the risk of dying from kidney cancer (Johnson 2001;
Cancer Research UK 2010). However, the evidence for the causal role of smoking in all of these
diseases is strong.
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primary lung cancer cases are caused by smoking (Doll et al. 2004; Ozlu T and Bulbul
Y 2005; Peto et al 2005; Vollset et al 2006).48 Smoking is also thought to be
responsible for about 90% of cases of Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease and
about 30% of coronary heart disease deaths (Centres for Disease Control 1990; Young
et al 2009).49
Smoking is now considered to be the primary preventable cause of illness and
premature death in the UK (Department for Health 2010) and the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention (1989) in America has called smoking “the most devastating
cause of disease and premature death this country has even seen”. The World Health
Organization (2012a), meanwhile, estimates that 100 million deaths were caused by
tobacco in the 20th century and that tobacco will kill over 1 billion people in the 21st
century.50
4.2.2 Alcohol
Alcohol ranks as a close second to smoking both in terms of its known association
with disease and its overall impact on health. Alcohol primarily affects the liver and
we now have overwhelming evidence that alcohol is causally responsible for a
significant number of liver diseases including hepatitis, cirrhosis and hepatocarcinoma
48 The lifetime risk of developing lung cancer amongst smokers is thought to be about 17% for men and
11% for women (Villeneuve and Mao 1994).
49 A number of studies also suggest that people who smoke are two or three times as likely to die from
cerebrovascular accidents than people who do not smoke (Shinton et al. 1989; Gill et al 1989; Gorelick
et al 1989; Feigin et al 1998).
50 This implies that more smoking killed more people in the 20th century than first and second world
wars combined.
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(Grant et al 1988; Corroa et al. 1993; Savolainen et al 1993; Becker et al 1996;
Bellantani et al 1997; Kamper-Jorgensen et al 2004; Shen et al. 2008; O'Shea et al
2010).
There is also substantial and growing evidence that alcohol is a leading cause of a
range of non-liver diseases including: obesity, pancreatitis, cardiomyopathy and
hypertension (MacMahon 1987; Criddle et al 1994; Klatsky 2000; Piano 2002;
Wannamethee et al 2003; Stranges et al 2004; Djousse and Gaziano 2008; Apte et al
2009; Yadav et al 2009; National Obesity Observatory 2012). A number of non-liver
cancers, including cancers of the mouth, pharynx, oesophagus, breast and bowel are
also believed to be caused by an excessive consumption of alcohol (World Health
Organization 1988; Klygis and Barch 1992; Longnecker 1992).51 Furthermore,
alcohol is a major cause of accidents and, to make matters worse, the consumption of
alcohol tends to increase the severity of injuries when accidents do occur (Fuller
1995).
In terms of the impact that alcohol has on ill-health we now have good reason to
believe that alcohol is one of the leading causes of early death and disability.52 In the
UK an estimated 33,000 people are believed to die from alcohol related diseases every
year (Academy of Medical Sciences 2004). The increased prevalence of regular and
heavy drinking has also led to a rapid rise in liver diseases and it is now estimated that
liver conditions are the fifth biggest cause of death in England (Department of Health
51 For example, one major study suggests that 75% of oesophageal cancers are attributable to alcohol
(Stinson and DeBakey 1992).
52 In Russia, one of the worst affected countries, alcohol is responsible for causing over 50% of all
deaths of working age people and is primarily responsible for the fact that the life expectancy of a
Russian male is only 60 years of age (Zaridze et al 2009)
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2010). Alcohol is also implicated in about 35-63% of deaths from falls, 12-61% deaths
from drowning, 12-61% of deaths from burns injuries and around 25% of deaths from
road traffic accidents in the European Union (Institute of Alcohol Studies 2010;
European Commission 2011).53 The World Health Organization (2011) claims that
alcohol is responsible for a greater burden of disease than all other risk factors other
than smoking and hypertension and Rehm et al (2009) argue that 3.8% of all deaths in
the world can be attributed to alcohol.54
4.2.3 Illicit recreational drugs
It is difficult to obtain reliable data on the consumption of recreational drugs – other
than tobacco and alcohol – because they are illegal in most countries. However, the
British Crime Survey (Home Office 2006) and the National Institute on Drug Abuse
(2011) suggest that the most widely consumed drugs in the UK and the USA at the
present time are barbiturates, benzodiazepines, cocaine, LSD, psychedelic
mushrooms, solvents, cannabis, amphetamines (including ecstasy) and opiates.
The UK Office of National Statistics (2010) reports that about 10% of the population
regularly admit to using illegal drugs at least once in the past year and the United
Nations (2010) estimates that 185 million people worldwide regularly use illegal
drugs. Each of these drugs has its own set of side-effects and many of them are
53 35% of all emergency admissions to hospital in the UK are also directly or indirectly related to
alcohol and 7% of all admissions to hospital in the UK are for alcohol-related disorders (Institute of
Alcohol Studies 2009).
54 Rothman (1980) also argues that alcohol is responsible for about 2-4% of all cancer deaths.
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associated with a range of different diseases.55 Some can also lead to physical and
psychological addictions.
The sheer number of different recreational drugs used means that I cannot hope to
discuss the impact that each and every one of these drugs has on human health. 56
However, the UK Office of National Statistics (2007) estimates that thousands of
deaths are caused by the use of recreational drugs every year in England and Wales
and the World Health Organization (2012b) calculates that around 0.4% of all deaths
worldwide are caused by illicit drug use.
4.2.4 Food
Of all the many factors that influence our health it is likely that it is the food that we
consume that causes us the most problems and gives us the greatest scope for control
over our own health. Indeed, a former Surgeon General of the USA once claimed that
75% all Americans were dying from diseases that were directly related to their eating
habits (United States Public Health Service 1988). In this section I will briefly list
some of the foodstuffs that are considered most dangerous to our health and give
some indication of the scale of the problems that they cause.
55 Chronic cocaine use, for example, can destroy the nasal septum, cause permanent renal damage and
doubles the risk of cerebrovascular accidents (Vilensky 1982; Fokko 2000; Westover 2007).
56 Some drug users develop infectious diseases like HIV and Hepatitis B because they share their
needles (Aceijas et al. 2004; Palamateer et al. 2010).
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4.2.4.1 Sugar: pure, white and deadly?
There is overwhelming evidence that consuming too much sugar plays a key role in
the development of dental caries (Touger-Decker and Loveren 2003).57 This is
primarily because some of the simple sugars that we eat remain in our mouths long
after we have finished eating and many of them are fermented by micro-organisms to
create acids which demineralise the enamel of our teeth (Hardie 1982; Holloway
1983).
There is also growing evidence that excessive sugar consumption plays a causal role
in the aetiology of type 2 diabetes – although this association is a matter of some
dispute. 58 On the one hand, there is a strong correlation between the rapid increase in
the consumption of sugar that occurred over the last century and the rapid increase in
the rates of type 2 diabetes. For example, a recent study by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (CSPI 2000) notes that the average American was consuming 30% more
sugar in 1999 than they did in 1983. Moreover, many studies suggest that consuming
simple sugars increases blood sugar level far more than the consumption of complex
carbohydrates (Crapo et al. 1976). Reducing the consumption of simple sugars also
helps to manage and control blood glucose levels amongst patients who suffer from
the condition (Thomas and Elliott 2009; Garg 1994).
57 Dental caries are also caused by a failure to maintain good oral hygiene and this failure can be
regarded as a “behavioural” cause of disease too.
58 Type 1 diabetes is not caused by sugar. Its aetiology is unknown and so there is no reason to think
that this form of diabetes is linked to human behaviour.
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On the other hand, there is some countervailing evidence which indicates that there
may be no direct link between the consumption of sugar and the incidence of diabetes
(Janket et al. 2003). A number of researchers claim that it is obesity, rather than the
consumption of sugar, that is the primary cause type 2 diabetes (Zimmet et al. 2001;
Maggio & Pi-Sunyer 2003). This latter theory is reinforced by the fact that 80% of
people with type 2 diabetes are overweight or obese at the time of diagnosis (Diabetes
UK 2009).
Nevertheless, even if obesity, rather that sugar consumption, is the primary proximal
cause of type 2 diabetes, there is little doubt that one of the key causes of obesity is
the over-consumption of energy dense foods and drinks – many of which contain
substantial amounts of refined and simple sugars. Hence, even if we discover that the
over-consumption of sugar does not lead directly to type 2 diabetes, it is likely that we
will still be able to claim that this behaviour is an important, in-direct, cause of this
common disease.
In terms of impact on global health dental caries and diabetes have serious
ramifications. Dental caries affect around 60-90% of all people at some stage in their
lives and this disease may well be the most common chronic disease of all amongst
children and young adults (Marthaler et al. 1996; World Health Organisation
2012c).59
59 Many argue that the reason for why children and young adults are affected more than older adults is
because young people consume large amounts of confectionary and carbonated drinks and these
products contain a great deal of acid and sugar (Cheng et al 2009; Sayegh et al 2002; Harding et al
2003).
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Type 2 diabetes is a complex disease to manage in its own right and it can also cause
a plethora of other diseases including macrovascular diseases like coronary artery
diseases, cerebrovascular and peripheral vascular diseases, and microvascular diseases
like nephropathy, neuropathy and retinopathy (World Diabetes Foundation 2012).
Given that 6.4% of all the worlds’ 7 billion citizens – including 8.3% of all Americans
and 4.5% of all British people – are now thought to be diabetic this is a very serious
issue indeed (American Diabetes Association 2011; Diabetes UK 2011; World
Diabetes Foundation 2012). In fact, type 2 diabetes is one of the most common causes
of chronic ill-health in the developed world and since the prevalence of this condition
is increasing rapidly its contribution to the global burden of disease will only increase
over the next few decades.60
4.2.4.2 Salt: equally pure, equally white, and equally deadly?
The relationship between salt and disease is complex and controversial. Many studies
have now shown that there is a strong correlation between the consumption of high
levels of salt and primary hypertension (Poulter 1990; Elliott and Stamler 2002; He
and Whelton 2002; MacGregor and Wardener 2002). There is also much evidence to
suggest that reducing salt intake leads to a reduction in hypertension (Appel et al.
1997; Sacks et al. 2001; He and MacGregor. 2005; Strazzullo et al. 2009). On the
other hand, some studies have indicated that the correlation between salt and
hypertension may not be causal and that a reduction in dietary salt has little effect on
mortality (Alderman 2002; Freeman and Petitti 2002; Dumler 2009).
60 Diabetes UK (2010) estimates that 430 million people around the world will be living with diabetes
by 2030.
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Nonetheless, the Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition (2003) states that the
evidence in favour of the claim that excessive salt consumption causes hypertension is
sufficiently robust for policy makers to take heed of this information and for
politicians to advise their citizens to reduce their salt intake as a precautionary
measure. Many governments around the developed world agree have subsequently put
in place policies which are geared to reduce the amount of salt that people eat (Perry
2003). The Food Standard Agency (2004) in the UK, for example, launched a
campaign a few years ago (“Salt – Watch It”) which was designed to warn people
about the dangers of excessive salt consumption and to encourage people reduce their
daily consumption of salt.61
The association between salt and hypertension matters because primary hypertension
is a very common disease – Bajektal et al (2003) estimate that the prevalence of
hypertension is about 41% in men and 35% in women in England – and there is much
evidence to suggest that hypertension is one of the major causes of coronary artery
disease, cerebrovascular diseases and hypertensive retinopathy (MacMahon et al
1990; Wong and Mitchell 2004; Donnan et al 2008).62
Trying to calculate the exact contribution of hypertension to the global burden of
disease is extremely difficult because this disease causes a wide array of different
conditions and many of these are caused by multiple factors. Nonetheless, we have
61 The campaign recommended that adults should reduce their consumption from the current 11g for
men and 8g for women to a maximum of 6g for men and women (Food Standard Agency 2004).
62 On the plus side it has been demonstrated that a population wide reduction in salt intake could reduce
the incidence of these diseases significantly and that people who suffer from high blood pressure who
significantly reduce the amount of salt in their diet can decrease their chances of developing
cardiovascular disease by over 25% (Stazullo et al 2009).
120
good reason to believe that hypertension plays a key causal role in the development of
three of the ten most common causes of death in the developed world and we have
good reason to believe that hypertensive heart disease accounts for 2.3% of all deaths
in high income countries (World Health Organization 2008). 63As such, we have
sufficient reason to conclude that hypertension is one of the most important causes of
ill-health worldwide.
4.2.4.3 Saturated fat
The claim that excessive consumption of saturated fat is one of the main causes of
cardiovascular diseases is, like the claim about the causal association between salt and
hypertension, rather controversial. There is an abundance of evidence to suggest that
the consumption of excessive amounts of saturated fat increases the probability of
developing cardiovascular diseases and that replacing saturated fat with other forms
of fat is effective in lowering the risk of coronary heart disease and strokes (Clark et
al. 1997; Hu et al. 1997; Hu et al 2001; Jakobsen 2009; Mozaffarian 2010).64
However, there is also some countervailing evidence to suggest that excess saturated
fats is a confounding factor and is not responsible for causing vascular disease (Mente
et al. 2009; Siri-Tarino et al. 2010).
The World Health Organization and the Food and Agricultural Organization (2003)
have recently reviewed the evidence and have come to the conclusion that there is
sufficient evidence to claim that the “intake of saturated fatty acids is directly related
63 The three are: cardiovascular, cerebrovascular disease and hypertensive heart disease.
64 The most recent systematic review concludes that reducing saturated fat in the diet reduces the risk
of having a cardiovascular event by at least 14% (Hooper et al. 2011).
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to cardiovascular risk”. Moreover, many developed world governments have
concluded that the weight of evidence is sufficient to warrant a health policy response.
For example, the UK and US governments now advise British and American citizens
to reduce the consumption of foods which contain high levels of saturated fat (Food
Standards Agency UK 2006; U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services 2010). Demark, as I noted in earlier, has even placed a
“fat tax” on products containing more than 2.3% of saturated fat in an effort to reduce
consumption (BBC News 2011).
As with salt and sugar, quantifying the degree of harm that an excessive consumption
of saturated fat actually causes is very difficult. This is because the diseases that
saturated fats cause are also caused by a range of other dietary (and non-dietary)
factors. However, cardiovascular disease is the most common cause of death
worldwide and if saturated fats really are responsible for causing around 14% of
deaths from this disease we have good grounds for claiming that the excessive
consumption of saturated fat is a serious cause of ill-health (World Health
Organization 2008).
4.2.4.4 Meat, fibre, fruit and vegetables
A diet low in fruit and vegetables is thought to cause a number of problems. In the
first instance, such a diet is likely to be low in fibre and there is much evidence to
suggest that diets which are low in fibre contribute to bowel, rectal and anal diseases
like bowel cancer, diverticulosis and haemorrhoids (Thun et al 1992; Aldoori 1997;
Cummins 2001; Petruzziello 2006). There is also little doubt that unbalanced diets
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which are low in fruits and vegetables can lead to whole host of vitamin and mineral
“deficiency diseases” such as scurvy (Ellis et al. 1984).65 Some researchers even
claim that a diet high in fibre, fruit and vegetables reduces the risks of coronary heart
disease, cerebrovascular disease, hypertension, diabetes, obesity and breast cancer –
though these claims are disputed (Liu et al 1990; Block et al 1992; Montonen 2003;
Steffen et al 2003; Lairon 2005; Whelton 2005; Anderson et al 2009).
A number of other studies have linked the consumption of red meat – especially in its
processed form – with bowel cancer (Walter et al 1990; Bingham 1999; Giovannucci
et al 1994). One study, in particular, found that people who eat two portions a day of
such meat increase their risk of bowel cancer by 35% by comparison with people who
eat one portion a week (Boffetta et al 2010). These findings are still relatively new
and controversial, but the weight of evidence is growing and the UK government
already advises British citizens to reduce the amount of processed red meat that they
eat (Department of Health 2011b).
Calculating the degree of harm caused by diets which are low in fruit, vegetables and
fibre and high in red meat is not an easy task. We know that diseases caused by
mineral and vitamin deficiencies are accountable for a significant burden of disease in
the developing world, but these diseases are now relatively rare in the developed
world because processed food is increasingly fortified with vitamins and minerals.
65 Rather worryingly, the majority of adults living in the UK do not consume even the minimum
amount of recommended fruit and vegetables every day (Department of Health 2010). For example, the
Food Standards Agency (2009) suggests that only 30% of adults eat the recommended 5 portions of
fruit and vegetables a day and 10% fail to eat even one portion of fruit or vegetables on most days of
the week.
123
However, bowel cancer is the second most common cancer in the UK (Cancer
Research 2010) and many of the other diseases which seem to be partially caused by
diets low in fruit, vegetables and fibre are extremely common too. Hence, we have
reason to believe that a diet low in fruit and vegetables – and a diet high in certain
forms of meat – causes a significant amount of the global burden of disease.
4.2.4.5 Calorie consumption, calorie use and the problem of obesity
An individual’s weight or Body Mass Index (BMI) generally depends on two main
factors: the number of calories consumed and the number of calories used in various
metabolic processes. If an individual eats more calories that his or her body “uses”
most of the remainder will be stored and if this continues over the medium to long
term the individual will gain weight and might become overweight or obese (Langlois
et al. 2009).
These casual claims are, more or less, undisputable and there is a significant amount
of evidence to suggest that the reason why rates of obesity have soared over the last
half a century is because people now consume more calories and exercise less than
they did in the past (Lin et al 1999; Salmon and Timperio 2007; World Health
Organization 2012d). The evidence for these causal claims is also heavily supported
by the fact that the key treatment for obesity and overweight is to eat fewer calories
and exercise more regularly (Wadden et al 2005; Lau et al. 2006).
The exact reason why people have started to eat more calories and exercise less often
is not entirely clear. One reason why we consume more calories than we did in the
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past is probably because there is now a greater availability of inexpensive, high-
energy, foods. It is also likely that we expend less energy than we did in previous
decades because most people are now employed in less physically undemanding work
that they used to be. We also now have access to a whole raft of labour saving
technologies (e.g. mechanized transport, television, computers and the internet) which
means that there are strong incentives to avoid regular exercise in our daily life
(Tucker and Bagwell 1991; Gortmaker 1996; Hu et al 2003; Jakes et al 2003; Dunstan
et al 2005; Mota et al 2006; Vandelanotte et al 2009).
Whatever the reason for these behavioural changes, the impact on human health has
been devastating. This is because obesity causes a great deal of disability in its own
right and it is also one of the primary causes of hypertension, hypercholesterolemia,
coronary artery disease, cerebrovascular disease, type 2 diabetes, gallstones,
osteoarthritis, cancer and a number of other common diseases (Bray 1985; Klein et al.
2002; Haslam and James 2005).
The burden created by overweight and obesity is also growing rapidly not only
because an ever increasing number of people are overweight or obese but because the
degree of obesity seems to be getting worse. In England, the prevalence of obesity has
more than doubled between 1985 and 2010 (National Obesity Observatory 2010).
This means that around 2 out of 3 adults are currently overweight or obese and if the
trend continues around 60% of Britons will be obese by 2050 (Department of Health
2010). The American figures are even more alarming: 13% were obese in 1962, 31%
were obese in 2000 and around 35% were obese in 2009 (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention 2012a). Given the amount of harm that obesity causes this almost
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certainly means that obesity will soon become the single biggest cause of ill-health in
most developed world countries. Indeed, it has been suggested that obesity may
already cause more deaths in the USA than smoking (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 2004).
4.2.5 Sex, sexually transmitted diseases and pregnancy
Human beings have long understood that unprotected sexual intercourse increases the
risk of developing certain diseases. We have also known for well over a century that
the reason why this happens is because certain micro-organisms can be transmitted
from person to person during unprotected sexual intercourse. In fact, we now know
that there are over 30 different kinds of infectious organisms that can be transmitted
this way. These range from relatively harmless infections such as Trichomonas,
Candida and Herpes, to potentially lethal infections such as Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C
and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (World Health Organization 2009a).66 There is
also overwhelming evidence to suggest that unprotected sexual intercourse increases
the probability of developing cervical cancer because certain forms of a virus which
can be transmitted sexually (i.e. the Human Papilloma Virus) causes around 90% of
all cervical cancer cases (Muñoz et al. 2004; Schiffman et al. 2007).
The prevalence of sexually transmitted infections is significant and increasing
worldwide. The World Health Organization (2001) calculates that there are in the
order of 340 million new cases of curable sexually transmitted infections every year
and the figures for “incurable” sexually transmitted infections runs into the tens of
66 HIV and some other infectious diseases can also be transmitted vertically (i.e. from mother to foetus)
and via blood products (e.g. via blood transfusions and needle sharing).
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millions. For example, around 34 million people are now infected with HIV
worldwide (World Health Organization 2010).67
Mercifully, the prevalence of serious sexually transmitted infections like HIV are
relatively low in the developed world, but the prevalence of less serious sexually
transmitted infectious diseases are relatively high and increasing rapidly. For
example, the incidence of Chlamydia in the UK doubled between 1999 and 2009 and
an estimated 75% of the reproductive-age population have now been infected with
Human Papilloma Virus (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2000; Avert
2011).
Sexually transmitted infections are not the only consequence of unprotected sexual
intercourse – at least among heterosexuals of a reproductive age. The other main
consequence is pregnancy. There has recently been much interesting debate about the
“over-medicalisation” of pregnancy. However, pregnancy remains a relatively
dangerous process – especially in the developing world where around 350,000 women
die each year as a result of the complications of pregnancy or childbirth (WHO
2009b). Moreover, though maternal mortality rates are very low in the developed
world, pregnancy and childbirth still causes a great deal of ill-health and injury. For
example, pregnancy can cause gestational forms of hypertension and diabetes and
childbirth can cause lacerations, infection and haemorrhage. Thus, unprotected sexual
intercourse can cause a significant amount of ill-heath and, at least in some countries,
it is a major cause of preventable disease.
67 It should be noted that HIV and Hepatitis B can be transmitted through blood transfusions and by
sharing needles when injecting drugs or medications.
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4.2.6 Ultra violet light: suntans and sunbeds
Over four decades ago it was claimed that excessive exposure to Ultra Violet (UV)
light could causes skin cancer. This claim was initially disputed, but there is now
plenty of evidence which suggests that exposure to UV causes a number of different
cancers including malignant melanomas, basal cell carcinomas and squamous cell
carcinomas (Urbach 1989; Brash et al. 1991). The primary source of UV radiation is
the sun, but tanning machines also make use of UV light and are another key source
of this form of radiation (Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 2012).
The rates of skin cancer in Australia, Europe and elsewhere have increased rapidly
over the last 50 years. For example, the incidence of melanoma in the UK has
increased by a factor of 4 since the early 1970s (Cancer Research 2012). There is no
real consensus as to why this has happened, but three theories predominate. Firstly,
the ozone layer – which protects the earth from UV light – has been depleted
(Diepgen and Maler 2002). Secondly, people in Europe and North America
increasingly spend more of their annual leave in tropical and sub-tropical countries
where they are exposed to high levels of sun radiation (Bentham and Aase 1996).
Thirdly, the social value of having “tanned” skin has led to people increasing their
exposure to both sunlight and artificial light in tanning salons (Cancer Research
2012).
Whatever the reason for this behaviour change, the effects have been profound. In the
UK around 100,000 cases of skin cancer are now diagnosed each year and around
10% of these cases are melanomas – the especially dangerous form of skin cancer
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(Cancer Research 2012).68 The situation in Australia is even worse and it has been
estimated that Australians now have the highest rates of skin cancer in the world
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare and Australasian Association of Cancer
Registries 2004).69 The prevalence of this disease is also very high and increasing
rapidly in many European and North American countries and so we have good reason
to claim that skin cancer contributes greatly to the burden of disease in some
countries.
4.2.7 Exercise and sports
The claims that regular exercise improves our health and that a failure to exercise
regularly tends to be deleterious for our health dates back to the days of Hippocrates.
But this long established belief is now firmly based on scientific evidence. Many
studies have shown that regular aerobic exercise reduces blood pressure, reduces
blood glucose levels and reduces dangerous forms of blood cholesterol levels
(Duncan et al. 1985; Marcia et al. 1998; Kelley et al 2001; Borer et al. 2009). Other
studies have demonstrated that a failure to exercise regularly is an independent risk
factor for cardiovascular disease and type 2 diabetes (Castelli 1984; Hu et al. 2001).
Exercise is also one of the key determinants of weight and obesity (Slentz et al. 2009).
Quantifying the impact of a failure to exercise regularly on ill-health is difficult.
However, a recent study argues that physical inactivity causes 7% of all cases of type
68 About 25% of patients diagnosed with this condition eventually die from the disease (Ibid).
69 Australians are four times as likely to develop a form of skin cancer as they are to develop any other
cancer (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare and Australasian Association of Cancer Registries
2008).
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2 diabetes, 6% of all cases of coronary heart disease, 10% of all cases of breast cancer
and 10% all of all cases of colon cancer (Lee et al. 2012). The same report concludes
that inactivity causes about 9% of premature mortality which equates to 5.3 million
deaths in 2008 (Ibid, p220). These figures are likely to get worse with time because
the prevalence of inactivity seems to be increasing both in children and in adults
(Department of Health 2011c).
We must bear in mind, however, that exercise is a double edged sword. Whether we
run or swim or cycle we expose ourselves to physical injury in the process. Moreover,
engaging in any form of exercise is dangerous in some sense (Harris 1995; Holm
2006; Golan 2010). Sprained ankles, ruptured knee ligaments and broken fingers are
just some of the more mundane consequences of leading an active life. In rare
circumstances exercise can even cause sudden death and a small number of people
also die every year whilst playing contact sports such rugby or engaging in extreme
sports such as scuba diving (Tucker and Dougas 2007).
On the balance of probabilities, however, exercising regularly (especially where the
exercise does not involve some kind of extreme sport) is far more likely to improve
health than damage it and there is increasing reason to believe that living a sedentary
life significantly increases the risks of ill-health and premature death.
4.2.8 Occupational hazards
It has long been known that occupational hazards can cause serious injuries and
various form of ill-health. Some jobs are so risky that employer’s offer a “risk bonus”
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as a form of compensation for employees who are willing to do these jobs. Many of
the most dangerous jobs involve manual labour, but jobs which do not involve manual
labour can also pose risks to people’s health. Marmot (2004), for example, has
demonstrated that civil servants working in Whitehall were at higher risk of
developing a whole range of common diseases if they were working in the middle or
lower echelons of the organisational hierarchy.
The amount of illness and injuries caused by occupational hazards are not
inconsequential either. The Bureau of Labour Statistics (2010) claims that around
5000 people die every year in the United States as a result of accidents at work and
the Health and Safety Executive (2012) in UK states that 115,000 injuries were
reported in UK in 2010-2011.70 One study even suggests that “baby boomers” in the
USA lose about 500 million days of productivity annually because of “sports related
injuries” (Glantz 2007). These are significant numbers and they suggest that people’s
occupation plays a key role in determining people’s levels of health and ill-health.71
4.2.9 “Everyday” behaviour, “everyday” risks
Sometimes people knowingly take risks with their health. This is true when people
sky dive, ski or scuba dive. But people also take risks without really thinking about it
when they engage in what I will call “everyday activities”. These activities are far too
70 The Health and Safety Executive (2012) claims that 1.2 million working people were suffering from
a work-related illness during this time too
71 Unemployment can be very bad for people’s health too, but this does not detract from the fact that
employment can be dangerous.
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numerous to enumerate, but they include such mundane things as driving to work,
preparing food with sharp instruments and crossing busy streets.
Putting actual figures on the risks posed by everyday activities is virtually impossible.
In the case of road traffic accidents data is collected and we know that around 2000
people die – and a further 23,000 people are seriously injured – on UK roads each
year (Department for Transport 2012). The World Health Organization (2002) also
estimates that around 1.26 million deaths occur worldwide as a result of road traffic
accidents.
However, data about other kinds of risky behaviour is not usually collected and thus it
is exceptionally hard to know how many people, for example, lacerate their skin with
a kitchen knife whilst preparing food. However, even if good data is lacking it is
reasonable to believe that these everyday risks do contribute a fair amount to the
global burden of ill-health and that we should not discount everyday risks when we
consider the causal role of human behaviour in the aetiology of ill-health.
4.2.10 Preventative health care
The decision whether or not to access high quality preventative health care – at least
in countries where such care is free and readily accessible – is another key
“behavioural” determinant of health. The modern medical profession is primarily
occupied with treating diseases after they have occurred, but a number of preventative
health care schemes are in operation and the concept of preventative medicine is
finally beginning to gain the attention of those who run and organise health services
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around the developed world. This means that patients increasingly have the
opportunity to take preventative measures to avoid becoming ill – especially in the
form of vaccinations and screening tests.
Of course, most vaccines are given to children and so the decision whether or not to
have a vaccine is, in the first instance, the responsibility of parents. However, people
who were not vaccinated as children sometimes have the option of being vaccinated
as adults. As such, there is scope for arguing that some adults are partially causally
responsible for developing some infectious diseases that they could have been
vaccinated against (Veatch 1980).
Screening tests also offer people the opportunity for people to use medical technology
in a preventative fashion. The primary goal of screening is to test people who are at
risk of developing a disease either in order to detect a “pre-disease state” or to detect a
disease at an early stage in its development. Doing so can either prevent a disease
from occurring or help doctors to either “cure” a disease at an early stage or prevent
long term complications. As with vaccines, people who choose not to engage with
regular screening programmes and who later develop a disease that might have been
detected by the screening test may be deemed partially causally responsible for their
ill-health.
Given the huge role that health care can play in preventing diseases we can safely
claim that a failure to make use of preventative health care – where it is offered – is a
major cause of ill-health. Indeed, it is likely that tens of thousands of people die
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prematurely each year because they decided not to make use of the screening and
vaccination programmes made available to them.
4.2.11 Post diagnosis behaviour
Once a patient has been diagnosed with a disease the progression of that disease often
depends on how the patient decides to respond. In some cases there is little that a
patient can do to change the natural progression of a disease.72 In other cases,
however, the behavioural response of patients post-diagnosis plays a critical role in
determining the success or otherwise of treatment and management. Indeed, in some
cases patients may even be able to cure the disease that afflicts them or at least ensure
that the disease goes into remission. For example, patients suffering from type 2
diabetes can usually bring their disease under control if they monitor their disease
closely, take medication regularly and modify their lifestyles (Rispin et al. 2009).
Patients who are obese can also return to a normal weight if they exercise more and
consume fewer calories.
People’s behaviour post diagnosis may also impact on disease development even
when the disease itself is not caused by human behaviour. For example, the
progression of Cystic Fibrosis is very much affected by the willingness of those
affected to receive regular physiotherapy, to take regular medication and to attend
regular appointments (Jaffe and Bush 2001). The same can be said of type 1 diabetes
and many other conditions which are not caused by human behaviour. In the case of
Cystic Fibrosis much of the responsibility for good management falls on the parents
72 Smokers who have developed end stage lung cancers cannot prevent the progression of their diseases
by giving up cigarettes
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rather than the afflicted children. However, when these children grow up the decision
to keep adhering to treatment will be made by them and the same is true of other
conditions that affect adults who are not responsible for their illnesses and injuries. Of
course, in these cases causal responsibility for health outcomes will always remain
marginal because the primary cause is not linked to human behaviour. However, we
should not forget that many diseases and injuries can be well managed and even cured
if people take appropriate actions even when the disease and injures are not
themselves caused by the behaviour of those afflicted.
4.3. Conclusion
I mentioned in the first chapter – and again at the beginning of this chapter – that I
would not attempt to provide an exhaustive list of all the causal links between human
behaviour and ill-health in this thesis. Instead, I said that I would concentrate on the
behaviours that are thought to contribute most to the global burden of disease and this
is what I have done in this chapter. Whether the people who are causally responsible
for their ill-health are also morally responsible for partaking in these behaviours and
whether they ought to bear costs are entirely separate questions. But, at this point in
my analysis, I hope that I have demonstrated that Harris’ (1995) claim that “any
serious list of people who have or share responsibility for their own adverse health
state would have to include a high proportion of the entire population” is true and
that a significant proportion of the global burden of disease is related to our life-style
choices.
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Chapter 5
Moral Responsibility for Health
“The Law acquits me, innocent, as ignorant
Of what I did.”
– Sophocles
5.0 Introduction: moral responsibility for health
The philosophical debate about the nature, existence and scope of moral responsibility
has been ongoing for millennia. The ancestry of the debate can be traced all the way
back to Aristotle’s (1984) discussion of reactive attitudes like praise and blame. The
more specific debate about the nature, existence and scope of moral responsibility for
health is equally ancient and this debate, as we can see from the following quote, can
also be traced back to Aristotle:
“Though no one blames a man for being born ugly, we censure uncomliness
that is due to neglecting exercise and the care of the person. And so with
infirmities and mutilations: though nobody would reproach, rather pity, a
person blind from birth, or owing to disease or accident, yet all would blame
one who had lost his sight from tippling or debauchery. We see then that
bodily defects for which we are ourselves responsible are blamed, whilst those
for which we are not responsible are not” (Aristotle 1984).
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In this chapter I will argue that a significant number of the people are, to a large
extent, morally responsible for choosing to engage in risky health affecting
behaviours. I will rest this claim on the ground that the mental capacity, freedom and
epistemological conditions of moral responsibility obtain in the case of most risky
health affecting behaviours. I will also, however, argue that people’s degree of moral
responsibility varies quite considerably and that, in some cases, people are either not
morally responsible at all or only marginally so.
I will divide this chapter into three sections. The first section will deal with the mental
capacity condition, the second will deal with the freedom condition and the third will
deal with the epistemological condition. In each section I will briefly discuss the
nature and relevance of the condition in question before going on to explore the extent
to which each condition actually obtains in the real world.
5.1 The mental capacity condition: introduction
It has long been argued that mental capacity is an important and necessary condition
of moral responsibility (Glannon 2002). However, mental capacity is a complex
phenomenon. One element of this complexity stems from the fact that the concept of
mental capacity does not refer to one specific mental ability or capability and that
experts cannot agree on which set of capacities is needed for moral responsibility.
Another aspect of this complexity derives from the fact that the concept of mental
capacity can be described in both a “global” and a “local” sense (Herring 2010). In
day to day life we generally speak of people as either having capacity or lacking
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capacity, but in medical practice (and at law) capacity is considered to be “task
specific” (General Medical Council 2008).
In this chapter, I will suggest that we should think of mental capacity as a set of
different capacities rather than as some singular phenomenon. This is because people
need a whole range of different mental capacities, including cognitive and conative
capacities, in order to be morally responsible for their risky health affecting choices. I
will also suggest that we should construe mental capacity as a task specific
phenomenon. This is because it makes sense to say that people have the capacity to
perform some tasks, but lack the capacity to perform other tasks. Indeed, the capacity
to be morally responsible for our risky behaviours is a good case in point because the
number of capacities that we need in order to be morally responsible far outweighs the
number of capacities we need to perform much simpler tasks.
5.1.1 Which mental capacities do we need to be morally responsible for our risky
health affecting behaviours?
The civil law in England and Wales takes a rather basic approach to the question of
mental capacity in general. According to the Mental Capacity Act (2005) people are
defined as possessing mental capacity – including the capacity to make risky health
affecting decisions such as refusing treatment – if four conditions are met. These four
conditions are as follows: the individual must be able to understand relevant
information, retain this information, deliberate using this information and
communicate the decision that they make (Herring 2010). The criminal law in
England and Wales sets up different rules for capacity in relation to criminal
138
responsibility. In particular, there is a requirement that individuals have the capacity
to understand the nature of their actions and the capacity to understand the nature of
right and wrong if they are to be regarded as criminally responsible for their actions
(Wilson 2002).
These civil and criminal rules regarding mental capacity are helpful in that they give
us a pointer about the kinds of capacities people need to have in order to be morally
responsible for their risky health affecting behaviours. However, a more systematic
and thoroughgoing account of capacity is needed in order to ground claims of moral
responsibility. In particular, I agree with Glannon (2002) that in order to be morally
responsible for their risky health affecting behaviour people need a mix of different
conative, cognitive, affective and volitional capacities.
In terms of the conative capacities people cannot be morally responsible unless they
have the general capacity to form desires as well as the more specific capacity to form
the desire to be healthy. This is because, if they lack these desires, they will lack the
capacity to be motivated to take steps to protect their health. One might think that no
human being could possibly lack either the general or the specific conative capacity
that I have just mentioned. However, people who suffer from severe forms of
depression may well lack the capacity to desire their own health and some people
sustain such serious head injuries that they are no longer capable of forming any
desires at all.
In addition to needing conative capacities, people cannot be morally responsible
unless they possess a whole array of cognitive capacities. These include the capacity
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to form health orientated intentions, the capacity to understand relevant health
information, the capacity to understand the empirical and normative consequences of
their risky choices and the capacity to understand the probability that their actions will
have certain consequences. Furthermore, they need the cognitive capacity to both
perceive reasons for actions – including moral and prudential reasons to take risks and
to avoid taking risks – and the capacity to deliberate in a reflexive manner on the basis
of these reasons.73
People also need the affective capacities to form and possess emotions in a general
sense – and the capacity to emotionally identify with the beliefs, values and reasons
that form the basis of their risky behaviours – in order to be morally responsible for
these behaviours. Possession of these capacities is vitally important for moral
responsibility because emotions positively influence people’s beliefs and desires and
play an important part in practical reasoning. Indeed, people who lack affective
capacities have problems making sensible decisions and tend to make defective long
term plans (Goldberg 2001).
The capacity to have emotions is, thus, essential because without it the other
capacities which are necessary for moral responsibility – such as the conative and
73 Not everyone will agree that people need the capacity to perceive moral reasons in order to be
morally responsible. Indeed, Aristotle argued that people can be morally responsible even if they lack
moral capacities (Glover 1970). However, most contemporary philosophers disagree with Aristotle on
this point. For example, Wolff (1998) argues that the “ability to do the right thing for the right
reasons…to choose and act in accordance with the True and the Good” is fundamental to the notion of
moral responsibility. In a similar vein, Fischer and Ravizza (1998) suggest that people must have the
ability to respond to moral reasons in order to be morally responsible and Watson (1987) argues that
individuals must have the capacity to act on the basis of desires and reasons which are themselves
based on an individuals’ values and beliefs about what is right and wrong if any form of moral
responsibility is ever going to obtain.
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cognitive capacities discussed above – will not function effectively (Sousa 1987;
Elster 1998; Greenspan 1988).74
Finally, people need a number of volitional capacities if they are to be correctly
described as possessing the capacity for moral responsibility. These include the
capacities to execute their desires, reasons and intentions. These are vital because they
enable people to convert their desires, reasons and intentions into actual behaviour
(Glannon 2002). To put it another way, people need the capacity to respond to
reasons, desires and intentions if they are to be regarded as morally responsible for
their choices. Furthermore, people need the volitional capacity to respond to reasons
in a very specific sense if they are to be morally responsible for their health affecting
choices. In particular, people must have the ability to override desires, intentions and
reasons to engage in risky health affecting behaviours if there are better (i.e. stronger
normative and/or stronger prudential) reasons not to engage in these behaviours
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998).
It is also worth bearing in mind that all the capacities that I have listed above need to
interact with each other if people are to be regarded as morally responsible. For
example, if an individual is capable of responding to reasons and feeling emotions,
but their reasons and emotions cannot interact with each other it is not unreasonable to
claim that such an individual can be morally responsible for his choices. I will not
explore the importance of this “meta” capacity in more detail here, but I hope that it is
74 It is important to emphasise this point because there is a tendency to believe that emotions cloud
judgment and negatively impact on our capacity to reason. However, although this can the case,
emotions can also improve our ability to reason, especially about normative issues, because emotions
help us to think about and imagine the impact that our choices will have on others.
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reasonably obvious that if people’s individual capacities operate entirely separately
from each other – as might happen in certain cases of mental ill-health – the
individual who experiences this disjointed medley of capacities will lack the overall
capacity to be morally responsible for the choices that they make.
5.1.2 Do most people have sufficient capacity to be morally responsible for their
risky health affecting behaviour?
The law in England and Wales requires health care professionals to presume that
everyone over the age of 16 has sufficient mental capacity to make decisions about
their own health affecting behaviours – including their decisions about whether or not
to receive life saving treatment (Mental Capacity Act 2005). The law also requires
doctors to have strong reasons for actually calling people’s capacity into question
(Jackson 2009). In other words, the presumption in favour of mental capacity is very
strong. It is also the case that there is a default assumption in the criminal law that all
adults have sufficient mental capacity to be criminally responsible for their actions.
As with mental capacity in civil law, this presumed capacity for criminal
responsibility is defeasible, but much evidence is required to prove that people lack
the capacity to be criminally responsible and it is fair to say that the presumption in
favour of capacity in the criminal law is very strong too (Wilson 2002).75
75 In most countries adults also have the legal right to purchase cigarettes, alcohol and a range of
“risky” food products as well as the legal right to engage in risky health affecting behaviours such as
scuba diving, skiing and sky diving without having to prove that they have the mental capacity to be
legally responsible for their choices.
142
One might argue that these strong presumptions in favour of capacity are simply a
matter of public policy. It would be extremely onerous to create a legal system which
required people’s capacity to be constantly assessed and, for this very practical
reason, decisions are made to make default assumptions about people’s capacity.
However, although there is some truth to this claim the law stands as it does because
it reflects the common sense intuition that most adults do have sufficient capacity to
be responsible for most of their choices in both a legal and a moral sense. Indeed, the
reason why the law recognises that most people have the legal capacity to choose
whether to attend regular medical appointments, whether to drink alcohol excessively
and whether to engage in high risk sports is precisely because we assume that in every
day life people have the capacity to be morally responsible for their behaviours
(Dietrich 2002).
Even with a strong presumption in favour of capacity, common sense intuition, like
the law, does allow that some people lack sufficient capacity to be morally (or legally)
responsible for their choices. It is routinely argued that young children and adults
suffering from serious brain injury or mental health conditions lack the mental
capacity to be morally responsible for the risky health affecting choices (Fischer and
Ravizza 1998). A number of commentators have also suggested that a range of
different genetic and psycho-social factors can seriously diminish people’s capacity to
be morally responsible for their risky choices (Buyx 2008). I would add that it might
be possible to argue that a significant number of “normal” adults lack the capacity to
be morally responsible even if they are not aversely affected by different genetic and
psycho-social factors.
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I do not deny that young children often lack the capacity to be morally responsible for
their health. I also quite agree that adults who suffer from moderate to severe forms of
brain damage and moderate to serious forms of mental health problems lack the
capacity to be morally responsible for their risky choice. However, I do not wish to be
side tracked by these issues in this chapter and so I will simply stipulate at this point
that all children (i.e. everyone under the age of 18) and all adults suffering from
severe brain injuries or serious mental health conditions lack sufficient mental
capacity to be responsible for their risky health affecting choices. Instead, I will take a
closer look at the more contentious claim that genetic and psycho-social factors can
destroy or seriously damage people’s capacity to be morally responsible for their risky
choices and the equally contentious claim that “normal” people lack sufficient
capacity to be morally responsible even though they are not aversely affected by such
factors.
With regard to the second of these claims, the only mental capacity which a large
number of regular people might actually lack to any significant degree is the cognitive
capacity to understand risks. The medical literature is replete with studies which
demonstrate that people have great difficulty understanding basic statistical concepts
and anyone who has tried to explain risks to patients or research participants will
know just how hard it is so do this successfully (Pailing 2003).
We need to be a little careful here. Just because many people don’t understand
statistical concepts does not mean that they are not capable of doing so. It is entirely
possible that most people have the capacity to understand these concepts but, because
they were badly educated – or because they failed to put any effort into improving
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their understanding of basic mathematical concepts – their underlying capacity
remains “dormant”. On the other hand, it may be that there really is an underlying
lack of capacity.
Unfortunately, there is insufficient evidence for us to be sure about this issue.
However, I am ready to concede that a large swathe of people may partially lack the
capacity to understand these concepts and I am ready to accept that many people’s
degree of moral responsibility is partially diminished as a consequence. Nonetheless,
we do not have enough evidence to conclude that most people lack this capacity to a
significant degree and so we are entitled, at this point in time, to conclude that
people’s degree of moral responsibility is not seriously affected by this problem.
What, then, of the more specific claim that certain genetic and psycho-social factors
can seriously diminish people’s mental capacity? The easiest way to approach this
claim is to look at each main factor in turn and analyse which mental capacity is
affected by these factors. I will begin by looking at the claim that genetic factors can
diminish people’s ability to be morally responsible for their risky behaviours and I
will then look at the claim that a number of psycho-social factors can do the same
thing.
One strand of evidence for the claim that genetic factors can diminish people’s mental
capacities is derived from research which suggests that some chromosomal and
genetic mutations can increase the probability that people behave in a specific kind of
way. For example, there is increasing evidence to suggest that people who inherit
certain “MAO-A” gene variants – and people who are born with XYY syndrome – are
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more prone to aggression and are more likely to take risks with their health (Witkin et
al 1976; Walzer et al 1978; Gotz et al 1999). There is even some evidence to suggest
that the CYP2A6 gene affects people’s ability to stop smoking and that the A1 allele
of the dopamine D2 receptor gene makes it harder for people to stop drinking alcohol
(Cloninger 1991; Malaiyandi et al 2005).
There is much debate about the validity of these claims, but even if these specific
claims are unfounded, it is reasonable to think that at least some people are born with
malformed genes or chromosomes are more likely to engage in risky behaviours.
After all, many our brain functions are partially controlled by genes and it is prima
facia reasonable to think that malformations in some of these genes will affect the
way that we behave. However, we should not automatically conclude that some
people will be less morally responsible for their risky choices just because they inherit
genes that influence their behaviour. Before drawing such a conclusion we must first
have a better idea about which mental capacities are affected by these genetic
abnormalities and whether people can do anything about the impact that their
abnormal genes have on them.
It is very difficult to work out which mental capacities are affected by which gene
malformations. The main claim that is made with respect to most chromosomal and
genetic abnormalities is that these abnormalities somehow diminish people’s
volitional ability to act on the basis of their reasons (Baron 2001). More specifically,
the claim seems to be that these genetic abnormalities make it more difficult for
people to avoid acting on their desires to take risks even when they can perceive that
there are strong reasons to avoid doing so.
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I agree with Glannon (2002) that the presence of such genes will not entirely destroy
people’s ability to respond to reasons.76 The evidence suggests that those people who
are affected by genetic and chromosomal abnormalities often retain the ability to
resist taking risks with their health and this suggests that most genetic mutations do
not entirely overwhelm people’s ability to respond to reasons (Kelley 2005).
Moreover, people affected by these conditions still retain the capacity to take steps to
overcome their increased tendency to take risks. For example, there is nothing to
prevent people with XXY syndrome from attending psychological therapy classes in
order to reduce their tendency to engage in impulsive, risk taking, behaviour.
This does not mean that the inheritance of abnormal genes does not diminish people’s
capacity to be morally responsible for their risky health affecting choices at all. Some
allowance has to be made for the added difficulty that people face as a result of their
genetic inheritance. However, I dispute the claim that there is sufficient evidence to
think that genetic abnormalities significantly reduce people’s capacity to respond to
reasons and so I deny that we have good reason to conclude that people who inherit
abnormal genes are only marginally morally responsible for their risky health
affecting choices.
In addition to the various genetic factors cited above, many commentators also claim
that psycho-social factors can diminish people’s capacity for moral responsibility. Of
these, the most commonly cited factor is “addiction” and the most common claim that
is made is that the addictive power of a number of substances damages people’s
76 The law in many countries take a similar position with respect to legal responsibility. For example, in
the case of Regina v. Newell (1980) the courts concluded that genetic predispositions could not entirely
destroy people’s ability to be criminally responsible.
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capacity to avoid consuming the dangerous products which contain these addictive
substances (Buyx 2008).
There is certainly no doubt that nicotine, ethanol and a number of chemicals found in
other recreational drugs have the ability to cause both physical and psychological
addiction (Glannon 1998). I also accept that there is some reason to believe that a
small number of food products, most notably chocolate, have addictive properties too
(Brownwell et al. 2010). But which capacities are affected by addictive substances
and should we conclude that people who are addicted are, for this reason, only
marginally morally responsible for their drug taking behaviour?
There is a large psychological and psycho-pharmaceutical literature devoted to the
issue of how addictive substances actually impact on people’s brains and how they
reduce people’s ability to avoid taking the drug again in the future. The fundamental
problem boils down to the fact that addictive substances, like the genetic
abnormalities discussed earlier, reduce people’s volitional capacity to act on the basis
of reasons. More specifically, addictive substances create “irresistible urges” which
effectively undermine people’s ability to use their reason to over-rule their desires to
take the drug that they are addicted too (Fischer and Ravizza 1998). Indeed, it is for
this very reason that many philosophers argue that addictive substances can diminish
people’s moral responsibility for taking recreational drugs (Glover 1970).
Addictive substances can damage people’s mental capacities by undermining people’s
volitional capacity to act on the basis of reasons rather than desires. However, there
are good reasons to think that most addictions do not entirely destroy people’s
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capacities to stop taking drugs. Moreover, we have sufficient reason to think that
people who are addicted may still, in large part, be morally responsible for their
addictive state.
The reasons I make these claims are threefold. Firstly, people’s decision to consume
addictive substances for the first time cannot be explained by the addictive power of
any of these substances. This is obviously something of a truism, but it is worth
pointing out because it means that even if people’s mental capacities to resist taking
addictive substance is later reduced by the addictive properties of these substances
they may still be entirely morally responsible for choosing to take the drug in the first
instance. We have to recognise that many people start experimenting with drugs when
they are children (Leslie 2008). Consequently, some people will become addicted
long before they are old enough to be morally responsible for their actions. However,
this is not always true and in the case of people who start taking drugs as adults this
latter excuse simply does not apply.
Secondly, some addictive substances like alcohol have to be consumed for many
years before they become addictive (Glannon 2002). This is important because it
means that the claim that people cannot be morally responsible because they started
consuming drugs when they were children does not always hold water. Indeed,
Dietrich (2002) suggests that we can sometimes regard people as morally responsible
for becoming addicted even when they started taking drugs as children because, at
least with respect to some drugs, people have sufficient time to stop consuming these
drugs (as adults) before addiction sets in. This is especially true when the people
concerned have plenty of opportunity to seek help from health care professionals who
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can offer medications and psychological therapies to enable people to wean
themselves off drugs before they become addicted to them (Wikler 1987).
Thirdly, even when people are addicted to a drug this does not mean that they lose the
capacity to do anything about their addiction. A whole range of different support
groups are now available to help people “break” their addictions (e.g. Alcoholics and
Narcotics Anonymous) and many medical drugs, such as methadone and nicotine
patches, are available to help people manage the addictions that they do have. This is
important because, as Dietrich (2002) argues, we may reasonably regard people as
largely morally responsible for their ongoing addiction if they do not make any efforts
to “enter therapy” or “join one of the numerous self help groups” which are available
to those who are addicted.
In sum, then, we should conclude that addictive substances really can diminish or
destroy people’s ability to act on the basis of reasons and that, for this reason, they
have the power to diminish people’s degree of moral responsibility in relation to their
risky drug taking behaviour. However, I also think that we have good reason to think
that many people who are addicted are substantially morally responsible for their
risky behaviours.
Yet another common claim that is made in relation to “responsibility diminishing”
psycho-social factors is the claim that the way in which certain risky products are
marketed diminishes people’s capacity to avoid consuming these products. In
particular, it is claimed that the way in which the tobacco, alcohol and food industries’
advertise their products undermines people’s capacity to avoid smoking, drinking and
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eating unhealthy food (Buyx 2008). Of course, advertising has a positive side because
it informs people of the various options available to them. However, we now know
that the goal of most advertising is to subvert our normal reasoning process.77 For
example, most modern adverts use affective conditioning techniques to encourage
consumers to transfer the positive feelings that they naturally have about some
concepts or objects or ideas (e.g. sex or sunshine) to the product that is being sold
(Markman 2010).
Certain forms of advertising, such as subliminal advertising, have even been banned
in many countries because of their power to subvert rational thought and some
dangerous products, such as tobacco, can now only be advertised in a limited number
of ways in most developed countries (Benjamin and Baker 2004). Nonetheless, even
with these prohibitions in place, it is often argued that the ubiquity and nature of most
forms of advertising diminishes people’s moral responsibility for some of their health
affecting choices (Brownell 2010).
There seems to be good reason to think that advertising can partially diminish
people’s capacity to act on the basis of reasons rather than on the basis of their
desires. Given that this is exactly what most forms of advertising are designed to do –
and given how large marketing budgets are – it would be hard to argue otherwise.
77 Many of the pioneers of commercial advertising were psychologists who specifically set out to
devise and use a variety of psychological techniques to influence consumer’s choices and advertisers
now routinely make use of many psychological techniques to exploit our weaknesses in order to
encourage us to purchase products. For example, one of the earliest advertisers, Walter Dill Scott
argued that “man has been called the reasoning animal but he could with greater truthfulness be called
the creature of suggestion” because he realised that human beings were heavily affected by simple
advertising techniques which were designed to act on our emotions rather than our reasons (Benjamin
& Baker 2004).
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However, with the exception of subliminal form of advertising, most marketing
techniques do not have the power to seriously diminish our mental capacity to
respond to reasons or our ability to be substantively morally responsible for our risky
choices. Part of my reason for saying this is because most people are now wise to the
purpose and power of advertising which means that they can take measures to
counteract the effects that advertising would otherwise have. Indeed, I believe that
most human being have the power to consciously ignore the underlying associations
that advertisers rely on to over-rule our reason.
The last factor that many people refer to as having the power to diminish our mental
capacities – and thus our ability to be morally responsible for our risky health
affecting choices – is, perhaps, the most complex to understand and explain. This
factor can be best described as “upbringing”, but it refers to more than just the way
we are brought up by our parents. It also refers to the impact that our peers have on us
and the way in which general social forces – such as socio-economic class – influence
our way of seeing the world.
The basic claim that is made in these cases is that certain dysfunctional or
maladaptive experiences make it more likely that people will take risks with their
health both when they are children and, more importantly, when they are adults. For
example, being brought up by very abusive parents increases the probability that
people will self harm later in life (Mina and Gallop 1998). Likewise, a number of
researchers have argued that people who grow up in lower socio-economic groups are
more likely to engage in risky health affecting behaviour as adults (Marmot 2004;
Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). But how do these various psycho-social forces affect
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our mental capacities and do they undermine people’s moral responsibility for their
choices?
The way in which these kinds of psycho-social forces affect our capacities in later life
is extremely complicated, but it seems clear that these factors can affect our
volitional, cognitive, conative and affective capacities to some degree. For example,
children who are brought up in very abusive families may well have a diminished
desire to be healthy, a diminished capacity to identify emotionally with their choices,
a diminished capacity to perceive reasons for avoiding risky behaviours and a
diminished capacity to act on the basis of reasons rather than their desires. Indeed, a
very abusive upbringing can probably skew people’s understanding of the world so
severely that they simply cannot perceive the kinds of reasons that other people
perceive or desire the kinds of desires that other people desire.
However, we cannot say the same of the more ubiquitous psycho-social factors that
affect our upbringing. For example, people who are born in social class IV or V
cannot seriously argue that their socio-economic milieu damaged any of their mental
capacities. This is not because people born into these social classes are completely
unaffected by the fact that fellow members of their socio-economic group are more
likely to smoke, drink excessively, take drugs and eat unhealthy foods.
Rather, it is because these factors do not seriously undermine any of their volitional,
cognitive, affective or conative capacities. Being born into social class V, for
example, does not significantly undermine people’s capacity to act on the basis of
reasons or their capacity to desire their own health. Moreover, people’s ability to
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reflect on what they are doing and to make adjustments when they realise that they are
being influenced by these wider social group seems undimmed regardless of which
socio-economic group people are born into.
As such, though I accept that an abusive upbringing can seriously diminish people’s
moral responsibility for their risky health affecting choices the same is not true of
other aspects of people’s upbringing. In particular, adults cannot realistically claim
that their degree of moral responsibility for their risky health affecting choices is
diminished just because they were born into a lower socio-economic group.
5.1.3 The mental capacity condition: conclusion
In conclusion, there is good reason to think that some people’s degree of moral
responsibility is seriously diminished because they lack some mental capacity. In
particular, children and people suffering from serious brain injuries or serious mental
health problems are exempt from claims about moral responsibility and that other
people’s degree of moral responsibility can be partially affected by a range of genetic
and psycho-social forces. I would also add that many of these factors can combine
together to significantly diminish people’s mental capacities. However, in the
majority of cases, people’s relevant mental capacities remain intact throughout their
lives and so the common intuition that most people have sufficient mental capacity to
be morally responsible for their risky choices is correct.
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5.2 The freedom condition: introduction
Aristotle (1984) was in no doubt that an agent needed to be acting “voluntarily” in
order to be the proper subject of praise or blame and few have ever countermanded
the idea that some sort of freedom is necessary for moral responsibility (Glover 1970;
Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Glannon 2002). However, this consensus about the
necessity of freedom belies a complex set of disagreements about the meaning of
freedom, the kind of freedom that is necessary for moral responsibility and whether,
and to what extent, the relevant kind of freedom actually exists. Indeed, Yoder (2002)
argues that “at a theoretical level we lack any consensus [about] a philosophically
adequate notion of free will”.
Unfortunately, I do not have the space in this thesis to fully explore why this
consensus is lacking, but it is impossible to seriously engage with the question of
whether people are morally responsible for their risky behaviour without discussing
whether people are sufficiently free to be morally responsible for their choices.
Bearing these two points in mind, my goals in this section will be as follows. Firstly, I
will provide an overview of the various interpretations of the kind of freedoms that
philosophers have thought necessary for moral responsibility. Secondly, I will explain
which of these interpretations I find most convincing. Thirdly, I will discuss whether
we have good reason to think that people really are free to make choices about their
risky health affecting behaviours. My discussion of these issues will necessarily be
brief, but I hope that the analysis will, nevertheless, prove to be useful and will
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convince people that the majority of human beings are sufficiently free to be morally
responsible for their risky health affecting choices.
5.2.1 What kind of freedom is necessary for moral responsibility?
Of all the disagreements that exist between philosophers who write about the concepts
of free will and moral responsibility, the disagreement about which type of freedom is
necessary for moral responsibility seems to be one of the most intractable. There are
two broad schools of thought on this matter. On the one hand, there are philosophers
(known as incompatibilists) who believe that the freedom necessary for moral
responsibility is the “ability to do otherwise” (Van Inwagen 1983; Kane 1994). What
this means, in a technical sense, is that people can only be free if their future is not
determined (Watson 1987). On the other hand, there are philosophers (known as
compatibilists) who argue that the kind of freedom which is necessary for moral
responsibility has nothing to do with the ability to do otherwise (Frankfurt 1989;
Fischer 1994).
Unfortunately, different compatibilists define and describe the concept of
“compatibilist freedom” in different ways and so there is no single doctrine of
compatibilism. The traditional way of construing compatibilist freedom states that
people are free as long as they are not acting as a result of some kind of external
coercion (Glannon 2002). For example, Hume (1987) suggests that if people act of
“necessity” as a result of some kind of force or constraint then their “liberty of
spontaneity” (i.e. their freedom) is destroyed.
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In more recent times, compatibilists have taken rather different approaches. Watson
(1987), Fischer and Ravizza (1998) and Wolff (1998) have all argued that people can
be free as long as they are able to “respond to reasons”, whilst Frankfurt (1971) has
defended a “hierarchical model” of freedom.
The former approach is fairly self explanatory although there is much debate about
how responsive to reasons people need to be and which set of reasons people must be
responsive to in order to be morally responsible. Watson (1987) and Wolff (1998)
argue that people can only truly be said to be free if they can specifically respond to
value based reasons, whilst Fischer and Ravizza (1998) take a less normative stance
and argue that people are free as long as they can perceive reasons for – and against –
acting in a certain way and can act on the basis of these reasons.
The hierarchical model, meanwhile, states that a person has freedom of will when he
wills what he wants to will and he has freedom of action when he is able to act
according to his will (Frankfurt 1992). In other words, a person is free when his first
order desires are in conformity with his second order volitions. Frankfurt (1971) also
argues that a person can only be free and morally responsible if they identify, or
decisively identify, with their desires.
Of these very different compatibilist and incompatibilist conceptions of freedom the
traditional (“no coercion”) compatibilist conception is the best way of understanding
what freedom really means and the best way of conceptualising the kind of freedom
which is necessary for moral responsibility. I do not have the space to delve into all
the reasons why I think that this is the case here. However, I will briefly explain my
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primary reasons for rejecting some of the other, compatibilist, conceptions of
freedom.
The key problem with the hierarchical account is that this argument seems vulnerable
to an infinite regress (Zimmerman 1981). There is no prima facia reason to think that
we should stop at the second order level when determining whether people are free
and so we could argue that people are only free when their first order desires are in
conformity with their third, fourth, fifth (etc.) order volitions. Frankfurt’s account is
also vulnerable because people’s higher order volitions could be induced by a
coercive element. This is problematic because we surely would not want to conclude
that, in these cases, people are nevertheless free (Stump 1988). I am also not
convinced that people who fail to identify with their desires are, for this reason,
lacking in freedom. Certainly, it is important that people are able to emotionally
identify with their desires if they are to be morally responsible. But this ability is best
described as a mental capacity rather than a form of freedom.
The problem with the “reasons responsiveness” conception of compatibilist freedom
is that it also misclassifies the importance of reasons responsiveness for moral
responsibility. In other words, it makes more sense to regard reasons responsiveness
as a mental capacity than as some kind of freedom. The reason why this is the case is
because acts of coercion do not always undermine people’s ability to respond to
reasons and, if this is true, it suggests that a “reasons responsive” compatibilist would
not regard coercion as a “freedom diminishing” factor. This, in turn, is problematic
because it is deeply counter-intuitive to claim that coercion does not undermine
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freedom. Moreover, few “reasons responsive” compatibilists would want to draw this
kind of conclusion.
A “reason responsive” compatibilist might object by arguing that coercion does
undermine people’s ability to respond to reasons in each and every case. However,
although I accept that in some cases people who are being coerced do lose their ability
to respond to reasons I do not think that this happens in every case.78 The reason why
most people make “rational” choices when they are coerced (e.g. by handing over
money to an armed robber rather than crying hysterically and trying to wrest control
over the robbers weapon) is precisely because they can still respond to reasons.79
To some extent this may be a matter of semantics. Fischer and Ravizza (1998) and
Glannon (2002) slip between talking of the inability to respond to reasons as a failure
of mental capacity and talking of this inability as a lack of freedom. Moreover, I
entirely agree with them that reasons responsiveness is necessary for moral
responsibility. However, even if this is ultimately a semantic rather than a substantive
issue, it is easier to separate the two issues and regard acts of coercion as an attack on
our freedom and a lack of ability to respond to reasons as a problem with our mental
capacities.
78 People might lose the ability to respond to reasons if the coercion is overt and so threatening that
people lose the ability to deliberate and act on the basis of reason as a result of being “paralysed” with
fear.
79 It may also be argued that the problem with coercion is that it undermines people’s ability to respond
to their “own” reasons. However, I am not convinced that this is the right approach either. After all, if
someone is coerced it is not clear that they are, by definition, acting on other people’s reasons or on
reasons that they cannot identify with. Moreover, if we think that this is the case we might prove too
much for we often act on the basis of other people’s reasons even when we are not being coerced.
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5.2.2 Are we sufficiently free to be morally responsible for our risky health
affecting behaviour?
It should be clear that whether we really are sufficiently free to be morally responsible
for our risky health affecting behaviour depends on what kind of freedom we think is
necessary for moral responsibility as well as whether we think that this kind of
freedom actually exists in the real world. Once again, incompatibilists and
compatibilists (of all stripes) are divided over this issue.
Incompatibilists of a “hard determinist” persuasion think that the thesis of causal
determinism is true and thus they argue that people lack freedom because they lack
the ability to do otherwise than they actually do. Incompatibilists who adopt the
philosophical thesis known as “metaphysical libertarianism”, on the other hand, argue
that causal determinism is false and most of them also claim that people are free
because they have the ability to do otherwise. Compatibilists, meanwhile, generally
believe that people are free – in the compatibilist rather than the “ability to do
otherwise” sense – but it is entirely possible for any kind of compatibilist to argue that
people are not free at all. For example a “reasons responsiveness” compatibilist might
defend the claim that people always lack the ability to respond to reasons and, on this
basis, conclude that no one is ever free.
I do not intend to engage with the long standing debate about whether or not people
are free in the “ability to do otherwise” sense here. Personally, I think it is very hard
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to understand what it would mean for people to free in this particular sense.80 It is also
unclear how metaphysical libertarians can make sense of the casual forces that seem
to have systematic effects on our choices.81 However, though I will not try to solve
this perennial question here I do want to say a few words about the implications of
adopting the metaphysical libertarian and hard determinist position from the point of
view of moral responsibility before I analyse whether people are free from the
compatibilist perspective.
Those who adopt the metaphysical libertarian position generally argue that people are
morally responsible. This is because metaphysical libertarians believe that the world
is not causally determined and most of them think that human beings have the ability
to do otherwise. They also generally argue that people are able to do otherwise in a
rather “complete” kind of way. This is because, from their perspective, people’s will
is entirely untrammelled by causal forces and so people’s choices are entirely
unconstrained. Consequently, they regard people as free in a rather absolute sense.
Those who adopt the hard determinist position, on the other hand, will draw the exact
opposite conclusion. They will argue that people cannot be free or morally
responsible at all. This is because they believe that everything in the world is causally
80 Chisholm (1967) argues that people can only be free in this sense if they are “prime movers
unmoved”, but it is not easy to understand what this really means, never mind believe that human
beings actually possess this capacity.
81 For example, we know that people born into lower socio-economic groups are more likely to smoke
that people born into higher socio-economic groups. But if causal forces do not impinge on people’s
decisions to engage in risky behaviours it is hard to make sense of this evidence. If we accept that
causal forces can determine behaviour then we can say that social class is, partially, causally
responsible for the way in which people behave. In other words, we could explain the data about
smoking and social class. But if we deny that causal forces can play this role the systematic differences
in risky behaviour between social groups seems impossible to understand.
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determined and this necessarily implies that the ability to do otherwise is impossible –
in which case metaphysical freedom is a mere chimera.
The compatibilist position is more complex. As I noted above, most compatibilist
argue that people are free, but they also concede that “there are many degrees of
freedom of choice” and that people’s degree of moral responsibility varies accordingly
(Buyx 2008). However, there is little agreement between different compatibilists
about how free (and morally responsible) people really are. This is partly because
different compatibilists understand the concept of freedom differently, but even those
who are in agreement about the concept of freedom disagree about the extent to which
their preferred conception actually obtains in the real world. For example, Frankfurt
(1992) believes that many drug addicts are free because they identify with their first
order preferences to take the drugs that they are addicted too. However, people who
adopt the reasons responsive approach tend to argue that most drug addicts are not
free because addictive substances destroy people’s ability to respond to reasons
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998).
I have argued above that the best interpretation of compatibilist freedom is the “no
coercion” interpretation. In other words, I have suggested that people are free as long
as they are not being coerced by other people. Importantly, if we adopt this particular
conception of compatibilist freedom, we can argue quite easily that, in the vast
majority of cases, people are sufficiently free to be morally responsible for their
choice to engage in most risky behaviour from the perspective of the freedom
condition. The simple reason for this is because most people are not coerced into
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making the risky choices that they make; very few people who smoke or scuba dive or
sunbathe excessively are coerced into taking these risks.
This is not to say that there are no exceptions to the rule. At the extreme end, there are
many examples of women (and men) being forced to have unprotected sexual
intercourse. Rape is a relatively common phenomenon and we should not forget that a
small, but important, number of women are effectively coerced into being prostitutes
(and coerced into having risky sex) too. At the less extreme end it may be argued that
some teenagers (and some adults) are put under a huge amount of pressure from their
peers to smoke, drink or consume recreational drugs.82
However, although I accept that there are legitimate exceptions, it does not makes
sense to say that (non subliminal) forms of advertising, addictive substances,
abnormal genes and many other psycho-social factors described earlier act as coercive
forces. Thus, we can conclude that the vast majority of people are free and morally
responsible for their risky health affecting behaviour – at least from the perspective of
the “no coercion” conception of compatibilist freedom.
I would also like to add at this point that those who adopt the reasons responsiveness
and hierarchical approaches to compatibilist freedom are likely to agree that most
people are sufficiently free to be morally responsible for their risky health affecting
choices. This is because, as I have argued in the previous section, there is good reason
to think that most people have the capacity to be able to respond to reasons and, in
particular, the capacity to act on the basis of reasons to remain healthy rather than
82 I do not think that all cases of peer pressure amount to coercion, but I concede that peer pressure can
be sufficiently intense to constitute coercion.
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desires to take risks. They also, in most cases, have the capacity to identify with their
first order desires. However, if we adopt the reasons responsiveness or the
hierarchical approaches we are also likely to argue that people are less free than they
are from the perspective of the “no coercion” approach to freedom. This is because a
whole range of different factors which do not “coerce” people nonetheless impact on
their ability to respond to reasons and their ability to identify with their first order
desires.
5.2.3 The freedom condition: conclusion
In conclusion, there is good reason to think that most people are sufficiently free in
order to be morally responsible for their risky health affecting behaviour. I have not
tried to prove that causal determinism is true or that metaphysical libertarianism is
false. Such matters would take me far beyond the limits of this thesis. Likewise, I
have only given a very brief overview of the many different compatibilist approaches
to freedom and I have only hinted at the reasons why the “no coercion” conception of
freedom is correct.
This means that my account of the freedom condition and the conclusions that I have
drawn here are vulnerable to a range of counter-arguments that I have not even
mentioned, never mind responded to. Nonetheless, my disagreement with the reasons
responsive compatibilists is unlikely to amount to much given that I agree with them
about the important of this capacity from the perspective of moral responsibility and
although metaphysical libertarians and hard determinists will not be impressed I can
164
at least appeal to the fact that there is evidence to suggest that the vast majority of
contemporary philosophers believe that some form of compatibilism is correct.83
5.3 The epistemological condition: introduction
The idea that individuals need to have access to least some information in order to be
able to make rational, informed, decisions and in order to be morally responsible for
their actions is familiar to us all. The idea that ignorance, in certain circumstances,
can excuse some behaviour and render ascriptions of moral responsibility meaningless
is also a very common intuition. 84
In the philosophical tradition there has also long been recognition of the fact that
knowledge and moral responsibility are intimately linked and that ignorance may
reduce, or even entirely nullify, moral responsibility (Fischer and Ravizza 1998).
Aristotle (1984) argued that in order to be morally responsible for his actions a man
needed to know: (i) what he was doing, (ii) who he is, (iii) what (or whom) he is
acting on, (iv) what instrument he is acting with, (v) his purpose, and (vi) how he is
performing his act. He also defended the idea that ignorance can excuse people from
ascriptions of praise and blame.
83 Chalmers (2009) asked philosophers whether they “accepted” or “leant toward” either
“compatibilism”, “libertarianism”, or a position he described as “no free will”. Of 931 respondents,
59% noted that they accepted or leant towards compatibilism, 13.7% accepted or leant toward
libertarianism and only 12.2% accepted or leant toward “no free will”. 14.9% or respondents gave
another answer or did not answer the question.
84 If a man who was blind from birth walked into a minefield because he could not see the warning
signs it is hard to believe anyone would judge the man to be morally responsible for his risky choice.
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Most contemporary philosophers agree with Aristotle that people must know – or
have access to – certain types of information in order to be morally responsible and
that ignorance, in certain situations, can undermine ascriptions of moral responsibility
(Glover 1970; Scanlon 1998).
The law has also traditionally placed great emphasis on the importance of knowledge
and access to information when making judgments about civil and criminal
responsibility. For example, the M’Naghten test specifically states that an individual
may be excused from ascriptions of criminal responsibility if he did not “know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing…or he did not know that what he was
doing what was wrong” for reasons of mental insanity (Elliot 1996). Glannon (2002)
argues that the knowledge condition of responsibility features more prominently than
either the freedom or the mental capacity condition when courts of law try to
determine whether individuals can be regarded as criminally responsible for their
actions.85
However, though the epistemological condition has long been regarded as vitally
important for moral (and legal) responsibility, relatively little analysis of this
condition has been carried out by philosophers. Of the many works that have been
published on the topic of moral responsibility in the last few decades, for example, the
vast majority have concentrated solely on the freedom or the mental capacity
85 In the context of the civil law in England and Wales, a patient’s consent for treatment will be deemed
legally invalid if it is thought that the patient was not sufficiently informed about the treatment to
which they were giving their consent (Herring 2010). In other words, the law sets a very high premium
on patients being provided with relevant information if they are later to be treated as responsible for
their health care choices.
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conditions of moral responsibility.86 Moreover, in the medical and bioethical literature
on personal responsibility for health virtually no explicit mention is ever made of the
epistemological condition – although a few experts do mention the issue in passing
(Buyx 2008; Golan 2010).
In this section I will not attempt to provide an extensive analysis of the
epistemological condition, but I will discuss a number of practical issues which are
germane to the question of whether this condition obtains in relation to risky health
affecting behaviour.
I will begin by describing the kind of information that people need to have access to
in order to make reasoned, informed, decisions and I will analyse how accessible and
readily comprehensible this information needs to be if people are to be morally
responsible for their risky choices. I will then discuss whether this information is
sufficiently accessible and sufficiently comprehensible for people to be morally
responsible for their risky health affecting choices in the real world. Finally, I will
discuss the distinction between culpable and non-culpable ignorance and I will try to
elucidate how many people can claim to be genuinely non-culpably ignorant given the
background assumption that relevant information is sufficiently accessible and
sufficiently comprehensible.
86 Fischer and Ravizza (1998), in their highly influential monograph on moral responsibility, almost
entirely ignore the epistemological issue and relegate the discussion to a footnote where they simply
say: “we shall assume that our analysis can be supplemented with a component that would attend to
the epistemic condition on responsibility”.
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5.3.1 What kind of information do people need access to in order to be morally
responsible for their risky health affecting choices?
If we accept that people cannot be morally responsible for their health affecting
behaviours unless they have access to at least some information we need to determine
what type of information people need to have access to how accessible and
comprehensible this information needs to be.
With regard to the first issue, the first thing to note is that there is a limit to the type of
information that people need to possess in order to rationally deliberate about the
choices that they make. It is also worth bearing in mind that many governments and
health care organisations have issued guidelines which are designed to help health
care professionals determine what “type” of information patients need access to if
they are to be able to make informed choices about their heath care (General Medical
Council 2008). Thus, if we bear the first point in mind and make judicious use of the
various guidelines that have previously been published it should be possible to
construct a list of the kind of information that people need access to in order to be
morally responsible for their choices. Such a list – which is not intended to be
exhaustive – but which is intended to cover all the key information that people need
access to, can be found in Figure 4.0 below.
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Figure 4.0. The Type of Information Needed for Moral Responsibility in Relation
to Risky Behaviour.
Type of Information Explanation
The nature of the behaviour To include both the “metaphysical” and
the “normative” nature of the behaviour.
The reasons for engaging in the
behaviour
To include both the potential benefits and
the potential costs of engaging in the
behaviour
The nature of any disease that might be
caused by the behaviour
To include both the symptoms of the
disease(s) and the severity of the
disease(s) caused by the behaviour
The social and psychological
consequences (for the patient) of
developing any disease which might be
caused by the behaviour
To include both the general psychological
and social effects of having an
acute/chronic disease as well as more
specific problems (e.g. the impact of
social stigma if the disease typically
carries such a stigma)
The potential complications of any
disease that might be caused by the
behaviour
To include the physical and
psychological complications which may
be caused by the disease(s) caused by the
risky behaviour
The probability of harm and benefits
occurring if people engage in a risky
health affecting behaviour
To include an understanding that
probability is hard to determine and that
each individual faces a different (and
partially unknowable) risk
The nature, cost and availability (if any)
of the investigations and treatments for
any disease (or complication of disease)
which might be caused by the behaviour
To include an understanding of the
duration of these investigations and
treatments and any common side effects
associated with them
The impact that the behaviour (and any
disease caused by the behaviour) might
have upon other people
To include the impact our decision might
have on other people’s access to health
care both now and in the future
I hope that this table is fairly self-explanatory and that it is obvious why people need
access to the kind of information that I have listed above in order to be morally
responsible for their risky health affecting choices. Of course, one might want to dig a
little deeper and ask why it is that people need access to any information in order to
be morally responsible for their choices. Indeed, one might want to ask why there is
an epistemic condition of responsibility in the first place.
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Some theoretical account of the epistemological condition is ultimately needed and
such an account would help to inform decisions about the kind of information people
need access to in order to be morally responsible.87 However, a thoroughgoing
theoretical account of the epistemological condition has not yet been produced by
normative philosophers and I will not develop my own account here. Nevertheless,
this lack of theoretical groundwork does not mean that we cannot say anything useful
about the kind of information that people need access to in order to be morally
responsible for their risky choices. In the absence of such a theoretical account it is
legitimate to use common sense intuition – and common practice – to construct
precisely the kind of list that I have constructed above as long as we accept that this
list may need to be revised in light of future theoretical developments.
Even if we accept that this is the case we still need to determine how accessible and
how comprehensible this information needs to be if we are going to claim that people
have sufficient access to sufficiently comprehensible information to be morally
responsible for their choices. Once again, the lack of a thoroughgoing philosophical
account of the epistemological condition makes this task very difficult. However,
Scanlon (1998) has made some attempt to create a theoretical framework with respect
to the issue of how far governments have to go to warn their citizens about various
risks and his account can be utilized to frame the discussions about the degree of
87 The underlying basis of the need for an epistemological condition probably has much to do with the
fact that people cannot deliberate rationally, or respond to reasons, or bring their values to bear on the
choices that they make unless they have access to some relevant information. In other words, the
epistemological condition is necessary because without access to information the mental capacities that
are themselves necessary for moral responsibility cannot gain traction in the real world.
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accessibility of information that is needed if people are to be morally responsible for
their risky health affecting choices.
According to Scanlon’s “Value of Choice” account of moral responsibility, there is a
limit to how much effort governments must expend in trying to warn their citizens
about certain risks. He claims that, at a certain point, officials can legitimately argue
that they have “done enough” because people “cannot reasonably reject” the
contractualist principle that a governments’ duty, in this respect, is necessarily limited
(Ibid, p 258). In other words, governments can justifiably limit the amount of effort
they expend warning people about risks on the basis that people cannot reasonably
reject this claim. Scanlon also gives a practical account of what this might mean in
practice when he discusses the issue of how far governments would have to go to
warn residents about the movement of hazardous waste from one location to another
(Ibid, p 258).
If we adopt the general idea that there is a limit to how much effort governments must
expend in warning their citizens about certain risks and if we also adopt the
Scanlonian rationale for this claim – i.e. that this limit can be justified on the basis
that people cannot reasonably reject this claim – what lessons can we draw about how
accessible and comprehensible information about risky behaviour needs to be if
people are to be deemed morally responsible for their ignorance?
It is not easy to say, but I think that the following claim is justifiable on the basis of
Scanlon’s ideas: the information listed in the table above can be deemed sufficiently
accessible and sufficiently comprehensible if (a) people conducting a simple online
171
search using basic words (such as “risks of smoking” or “information about alcohol”)
will be directed to at least one website in the “top ten” search results which provides
relevant information in a form which is jargon free and comprehensible to an average
16 year old child, (b) health care professionals are readily available to provide more
details and (c) simple warnings about common risks are regularly issued by
governments using an array of different advertising techniques (e.g. television
announcements and billboard signs).
It is an open question whether Scanlon would accept this particular specification and
many philosophers who are sympathetic to Scanlon’s ideas might entirely disagree
with my claim. However, my approach does gel with the spirit of Scanlon’s approach
because, if the information listed in table 1.0 was available in the way that I have
described above, then most people could not reasonably claim that they lacked
sufficient access to sufficiently comprehensible information to be morally responsible
for their risky health affecting behaviour. Furthermore, my practical approach fits
well with common sense intuition about this matter.
5.3.2 Do people have access to the information that they need?
I have argued above that people need to have access to certain types of health
information in readily accessible and easily comprehensible forms in order to be
morally responsible for their risky health affecting choices. I have also tried to define
what kind of information is needed and how readily accessible and easily
comprehensible this information needs to be. But do people actually have sufficient
access to sufficiently comprehensible health information?
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My answer, in short, is that they usually do. In other words, the epistemological
condition does obtain in most cases of risky health affecting behaviours and we
should regard most people as morally responsible for their risky behaviour – at least
from the perspective of the epistemological condition. My primary reason for making
this claim is that, over the last few decades, most developed world governments
(alongside a whole host of other non-governmental organizations) have made
concerted efforts to raise people’s awareness of public heath issues. In particular,
these governments have launched an array of public health campaigns which have
made use of many different forms of advertising to warn people about the risks of
many of the more common risky health affecting behaviours.88 Furthermore, they
have tried to ensure that health care professionals are properly trained to provide
health information to patients and they have provided a wealth of information online
via easily accessible and readily comprehensible websites.
If we take smoking as an example we can see that the amount of readily available and
easily comprehensible information about this particular risky behaviour is colossal. A
simple search using the Google search engine for the terms “smoking and disease”
reveals a staggering 37,100,000 results.89 Some of the results contain links to websites
containing fairly esoteric information, but many of them provide a great deal of
information about most of the relevant aspects of smoking in an easily accessible and
comprehensible fashion. The first 10 websites which were highlighted in my search
all contained information which was easy to understand and eight of the ten websites
88 They have even, in some cases, required the companies who sell dangerous products (e.g. tobacco
and alcohol) to place warning information about the dangers of these products on their packaging.
89 This search was conduced on 20th November 2010.
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included information which was specifically designed for the general public (see
Figure 5.0 for the results). 90
Figure 5.0 Top Ten ‘Google’ Hits for Search Terms: ‘Smoking and Disease’.
Source Website Address
Net Doctor http://www.netdoctor.co.uk/health_advice/facts/smokehealth.htm
Patient.co.uk http://www.patient.co.uk/health/Smoking-The-Facts.htm
Can Stop
Smoking
http://www.canstopsmoking.com/smoking-facts/effects-
smoking.htm
BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/4377928.stm
The Family GP
website
http://www.thefamilygp.com/is-smoking-a-disease.htm
Quit Smoking
Campaign
http://www.quit-smoking-stop.com/smoking-diseases.html
British Heart
Foundation
http://www.bhf.org.uk/keeping_your_heart_healthy/preventing
_heart_disease/smoking
ASH http://www.ash.org.uk/files/documents/ASH_110.pdf
Oxford University http://www.ox.ac.uk/media/news_stories/2009/090918_3.html
Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tobacco_smoking
British Medical
Journal
http://www.bmj.com/content/329/7459/200.abstract
It is also increasingly common practice for health care professionals in the UK to
routinely ask all their patients about their smoking habits and to provide advice to
smokers about the risks of smoking.91 Moreover, public health campaigns about the
dangers of smoking are now ubiquitous and, in many developed countries, including
90 I accept that not everyone has access to the internet at home and that this is especially true of the
poorer echelons of society. However, internet access is now widespread in the developed world and, in
the UK at least, libraries and some other public institutions provide free access to the internet.
Moreover, internet access is now available in numerous “internet shops” at a relatively cheap price.
People who lack access to the internet also have the option to seek help from health care professionals
in the UK and in many other developing countries.
91 The National Institute of Clinical Health and Excellence (2008b) has recently published guidelines
which advises doctors to remind their patients about the health benefits of smoking cessation “at every
opportunity”.
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the UK, tobacco companies have been forced to place warning labels on cigarette
packs to remind smokers of the dangers of their habit. Hence, in the case of smoking
there is good reason to think that people have access to all the information that they
need in order to be morally responsible for their choices to smoke from the
perspective of the epistemological condition.
What is true of smoking is also true of many other risky behaviours too. Simple online
searches of most of the risky health affecting behaviours that I discussed in the last
chapter lead to a range of websites in the “top ten” search results which provide a
great deal of easily comprehensible information. Moreover, in the case of many of
these behaviours developing world government have gone to great lengths to warn
people about the risks of engaging in these behaviours using leaflets, advertising and,
in some cases, warning labels.92 Health care professionals are also increasingly
advised to take a proactive approach towards telling their patients about the dangers
of risky behaviours like excessive alcohol consumption, excessive sunbathing and
unprotected sexual intercourse. Thus, we have good reason to believe that, from the
perspective of the epistemological condition, people can be morally responsible for
engaging in a wide range of risky health affecting behaviours in addition to smoking.
There are, however, at least two reasons why we might think that people do not have
access to all the information that they need. The key problem is that people do not
currently have access to much information about the probability of developing a
disease if they partake in a risky behaviour or about the impact that their risky
92 For example, in the UK citizens are regularly warned about the dangers of alcohol and certain foods
via warning labels placed on these products and also via advertising campaigns
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behaviour might have upon other people.93 The reason for this is because most public
health campaigns and popular websites either fail to mention these issues or skirt
around them. Moreover, although health care professionals do provide information to
patients about the probability of developing diseases, they rarely do so in any depth
and they almost never discuss the impact that risky behaviour may have on other
people.
I accept that there is a relative paucity of information about these issues currently
available and this does mean that people’s degree of moral responsibility is
diminished as a result. However, an increasing number of websites do provide
information about the costs that accrue to others when people take risks. For example,
a number of UK based websites provide information about the costs of certain
diseases to the NHS and, indeed, to the wider UK economy.94 An increasing number
of websites also provide basic information about the incidence and prevalence of
diseases and some discuss the mean probability of developing a disease if people
engage in certain risky behaviours. Thus, things are slowly improving and I think that
there is now sufficient information available for us to conclude that people’s degree of
moral responsibility is not substantially diminished by the relative paucity of
information about these issues (Cummings et al 2004).
93 Golan (2010) argues that a lack of information about the latter of these requirements means that
patients are often unaware of the “probable financial impact of their habits on societal resources”.
94 The website of Diabetes UK is a good example.
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5.3.3 Culpable and non-culpable ignorance
One might have assumed that the vast increase in the amount and availability of
health information would have quickly led to an equally significant increase in
people’s understanding of risky behaviour and Kelly (2005) is, to an extent, right to
claim that “knowledge of the consequences of [risky] behaviours is now more widely
known, thanks to public health initiatives, advertising and education”. However, the
level of understanding of risky behaviour has failed to keep pace with the amount of
information that is available.95
People’s knowledge about smoking is an excellent case in point. Most of the surveys
relating to people’s knowledge about smoking confirm that the vast majority of
smokers have some notion that smoking poses a threat to their health. For example, a
survey conduced by Hammond et al. (2006) discovered that the vast majority of
smokers understood that smoking was, in some sense, risky. However, many other
studies have shown that smoker’s understanding of the risks of smoking is lamentably
poor. A study conducted in the United States showed that the only smoking induced
disease that could be identified by a clear majority of smokers was lung cancer and
only a small minority could identify the association with Chronic Obstructive
Pulmonary Disease or any form of cardiovascular disease (Weinstein et al. 2003).96
Such is the scale of the lack of awareness that the authors of the latter study actually
95 Buyx (2008) argues that even after all the effort that has gone into public health campaigns “the
health literacy of large parts of the population remains insufficient”.
96 Tellingly, a significant numbers of respondents in this study did not realise that people with these
diseases suffered considerable ill-health and pain.
177
concluded that most people “do not have even a basic understanding of the nature
and severity of the consequences of smoking” (Ibid, p 354).97
The situation with regard to alcohol is even worse. A survey conducted by the British
government found that although the majority of people knew that drinking alcohol
caused liver damage, 85% did not realise that drinking increased the risk of breast
cancer, 66% did not know alcohol increased the risk of bowel cancer and 59% did not
know that alcohol can cause oral cancers (BBC News 2012). Other risky behaviours –
and the diseases that they cause – are even less well understood. For example, a recent
study found that only 2.5% of people could cite Human Papilloma Virus as a cause of
cervical cancer even though about 90% of cervical cancer cases are caused by this
virus (Marlow et al. 2007).
This generalised ignorance of the risks associated with certain behaviour has bemused
a number of commentators. Richardson (2008) notes that he does not “understand
how the general population cannot get this message [about the risks associated with
some common behaviours] because it is blazoned out from every pillar and post”.98
Many of these same commentators also argue that the sheer availability of
information makes people’s ignorance culpable. In this vein, Thornton (2009) argues
97 There is also a particular problem with the understanding of degree of risk. For example, one study
has shown that smokers underestimate the death rate from lung cancer and overestimated survival
duration and another study has demonstrated that a significant proportion of smokers underestimate the
risks of stroke, heart disease and respiratory disease (Schoenbaum 1997). As I noted previously, this is,
in some ways, more understandable because it is well know that the general populations’ understanding
of statistical risk is poor.
98 It is especially difficult to fathom how it is possible for the majority of citizens to fail to understand
the risks of smoking and drinking alcohol given that it would seem to be hard to avoid learning about
this information even if one was trying not to learn about the risks.
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that “extensive media publicity and health promotion campaigns have provided the
public with information about how additive alcohol can be [which means that]
ignorance of the dangers of alcohol is a less convincing plea in light of this publicity
drive”. However, before we jump to this conclusion we need to think about why so
many people continue to remain ignorant about the risks that they take and whether
the explanations that we uncover offer reasons to conclude that people’s ignorance is
non-culpable.
One possible explanation for most people’s continued ignorance in the face of
overwhelming information is that they lack the capacity to understand the information
that is available. However, as I argued earlier in this chapter, although a certain group
of people (e.g. those who have suffered some kind of brain damage) may not have
sufficient mental capacity to understand information about risky health affecting
behaviours there is no reason to think that this is true of most people. The only
exception to the rule relates to the issue of people’s capacity to understand
probability, but we know that people’s ignorance is not limited to a failure to
understand degrees of risk and so this explanation does not explain why ignorance is
so rife.
Another reason for the high levels of ignorance about risky behaviour could be that
many people lack the linguistic skills to understand the information that is being
provided. Many people living in developed countries are immigrants and many
immigrants lack a sound grasp of the dominant language of their adopted country. As
such, they may lack the ability to both search for and understanding the health
information that is available. A significant number of adults – especially those in
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social groups V – also receive such a poor education that they are entirely, or
partially, illiterate.
However, information about many risky health affecting behaviours is now available
in a whole array of different languages on many websites and many developed world
governments provide translators who can help health care professionals to explain
health information to patients. People who are illiterate, meanwhile, still have access
to health care professionals who can explain the information to them verbally if need
be. It is also worth bearing in mind that the people who took part in the studies quoted
above were literate and could speak English. As such, this particular explanation
cannot explain the scale of the ignorance that seems to exist either.
Yet another explanation for people’s ignorance is that most people simply cannot be
bothered to put much effort into finding out about the information that is available.
People make a voluntary choice not to learn more about the risks they take because
this would take too much time and energy. It is hard to prove that this is actually the
case, but most people’s level of understanding is close the level one would expect if
they primarily accessed the type of information about risky behaviour which is made
available via government advertising and warning labels placed on various products.99
In other words, what happens in most cases is that people take note of this kind of
99 There is a limit to how much time and effort we can expect people to dedicate to such activities and
this idea is captured by the concept of “reasonable expectations of effort”. The point is that beyond a
certain point spending more resources finding out about risks would appreciably reduce the amount of
time available to get involved with other normatively valuable aspects of life and this is simply not a
normatively reasonable demand. However, I would also argue that the amount of effort needed to find
out about relevant information in the internet age is simply not sufficient to warrant claims to the effect
that the degree of effort being demanded is unreasonable.
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information but they do not seek to “top up” their knowledge by reading further about
the risks online or by visiting their health care professional because doing so takes too
much effort. 100
We should also bear in mind that some people will deliberately avoid finding out
about some aspect of a heath affecting behaviour for reasons that are not connected to
a failure of effort. Some might do so because they are scared of what they might find,
whilst others might do so because they enjoy taking a risk that is of an unknown
nature and quantity or because finding out about the risks associated with a given
behaviour will ruin their enjoyment of the activity in question.
What, then, are we to make of all these explanations for continued ignorance in the
face of overwhelming information? Should we conclude that those who proffer these
“excuses” are not culpably ignorant? The answer depends on which “excuse” people
are relying on. If people are ignorant because they choose to avoid finding out about
the risks because this would reduce their pleasure, or because they could not be
bothered to expend the energy to find out, or because they actually wanted to take an
unknown risk, or because they were somewhat afraid of finding out about the risks
then I think that their ignorance should be regarded as culpable.
100 Some people might claim that they are “too busy” to actually find out the information they need to
find out about, but given that it takes no more than a few hours to read the relevant information online
it is hard to believe that this is an acceptable explanation. Most people spend umpteen hours taking
risks in their lives (perhaps as much as an hour a day if they smoke regularly, for example) and it is
hard to believe that people cannot spend a few short hours finding out about what might happen if they
continue engaging in their risky behaviour of choice.
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On the other hand, if people are ignorant because they lack the mental capacity to
understand information, or because information is not available in a language that
they can understand, or because they are illiterate, or because their fear of the risks
was literally overwhelming, I think we should regard their ignorance as (largely) non-
culpable.
Thus, because I think that most people are ignorant because they cannot be bothered
to find out about the risks that they take, we should conclude that ignorance – at least
when relevant information is sufficiently accessible and sufficiently comprehensible –
is culpable.101
5.3.4 The epistemological condition: conclusion
In conclusion, the epistemological condition does obtain in most cases and most
people are, to a significant degree, morally responsible for their risky health affecting
behaviours. This is because there is enough relevant health information available to
people in easily accessible and readily comprehensible forms and the reasons why
most people continue to remain ignorant are culpable reasons. There are exceptions to
the rule and I accept that most people’s degree of moral responsibility is partially
101 I would like to add at this point that people need to be given a reasonable amount of time to learn
about new discoveries before their continued ignorance is deemed culpable. The problem is that it can
take years from the point that scientists and epidemiologist make discoveries about the links between
behaviours and diseases to the point where we can safely say that this information has been well
publicised. Quite how much “lag time” is required before we can conclude that people’s continued
ignorance is culpable is not clear, but I think that at least a few years must pass by from the point at
which a serious public health campaign begins before we can start making these claims.
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diminished by the fact that certain information is not very easy to find. However, I am
confident in claiming that, from the perspective of the epistemological condition, the
vast majority of people are significantly morally responsible for their risky health
affecting choices.
5.4 Moral responsibility: general conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that we have good reason to think that a majority of
people are significantly morally responsible for their risky health affecting
behaviours. This is because there is good reason to think that the mental capacity,
freedom and epistemological conditions do obtain in the real world. In other words,
people have sufficient mental capacity, sufficient freedom and sufficient access to
information to be morally responsible for their risky behaviour.
Having said as much, I have conceded that certain groups of people (e.g. children) are
not morally responsible for their risky health affecting choices in any way and that
other people (e.g. people who have only limited access to certain health information)
are only partially morally responsible and I have also accepted that a whole range of
different factors will sometimes club together to significantly reduce some people’s
degree of moral responsibility. Nevertheless, this is very much the exception to the
rule and most people should be regarded as substantively morally responsible for their
risky behaviours.
However, before moving onto the next chapter I would like to make one final point.
This relates to the fact that people’s degree of moral responsibility is likely to be
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much higher in the case of risks such as unprotected sexual intercourse, occupational
hazards, sunbathing and sports related injuries than it is in the case of risks such as
smoking, drinking and the consumption of recreational drugs. This is because there
are far more “responsibility diminishing” factors at play in the case of the latter
behaviours than the former behaviours. This is important because the surveys in
chapter 3 suggest that most people think that risky behaviours like smoking, drinking
and consuming drugs should be penalised more than other kinds of risky behaviours.
There may be many reasons why it is more legitimate to penalise smokers rather than
sunbathers even though people are less morally responsible for the former behaviour.
However, the fact that smokers (and other users of addictive drugs) are generally less
morally responsible than people who engage in other kinds of risky behaviours does
give us some reason to think that these people should have to pay fewer costs than
people who take other kinds of risks. Indeed, I will argue in the next few chapters that
cost bearing policies should try to ensure that people bear costs in proportion to their
degree of moral responsibility and this ultimately means that people who smoke,
drink and take drugs may well have to pay fewer relative costs than people who
sunbathe, have unprotected sexual intercourse and take part in extreme sports –
although whether we draw this conclusion depends on the normative arguments that
underpin our cost bearing claims.
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Chapter 6
Consequential Responsibility: Should People Bear Costs?
“What did you do this past summer? “Oh” said the grasshopper, I kept myself busy
by singing all day long and all night, too”. “Well then”, remarked the ants, as they
laughed and shut their storehouse, “since you kept yourself busy by singing all
summer, you can do the same by dancing all winter.”
– Aesop
6.0 Introduction: normative defences of cost bearing
Over the course of the last few chapters I have argued that people are causally
responsible for their ill-health and morally responsible for their decisions to engage in
risky health affecting behaviours. In this chapter, I will try to determine whether
people who are causally and/or morally responsible should bear some sort of health
cost. In order to do this I will analyse five different normative arguments which
converge together in the sense that they can all be used to defend the claim that people
who engage in certain “core” types of risky health affecting behaviours should bear
some of the costs of their choices. Some of these arguments also defend cost bearing
in “non-core” cases and I will highlight this divergence in the five arguments at the
end of the chapter.
During my analysis I will claim that one of these five arguments (i.e. the luck
egalitarian argument) is more compelling than the others and I will claim that this
argument provides us with a sound basis for making people consequentially
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responsible for their risky health affecting choices. The other arguments that I will
explore also have some merit, but I will suggest that they face a number of problems
which are difficult, though perhaps not impossible, to overcome.
6.1 Bearing costs: an overview of the five normative arguments
There are many different possible ways of defending the claim that people who are
morally responsible for a health affecting behaviour should bear some kind of health
cost. However, I will only discuss what I will call the “moralistic desert”, “expected
consequences”, “rights-harm”, “luck egalitarian” and “utilitarian” arguments in this
thesis. I will explain why I will focus on these arguments in a moment but, before I do
so, I will very briefly state the core claims that underpin each of these arguments.
The first argument that I will explore will be an argument based on the concept of
desert. As we shall see, desert, like responsibility, can mean many different things to
many different people, but, in this thesis, I will rely on what I will call a “moralistic”
version of the desert-based family of arguments.102 In particular, I will argue that cost
bearing in relation to risky health affecting behaviour can be defended on the basis of
the moralistic desert argument as long as the following claims are sound: that there is
something intrinsically immoral about certain kinds of risky health affecting
behaviours and that people who are morally responsible for engaging in these kinds of
102 Desert need not be a moralised concept in the way that I use it in this thesis. For example, it may be
conceptualised in a prudential rather than a moral form. Thus it could be argued that people deserve to
bear costs because they have been imprudent rather than because they have behaved in an intrinsically
immoral fashion.
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behaviours should bear some health costs as a form of “punishment” or “sanction” or
“denial of benefit”.
The second argument that I will scrutinize is the expected consequences argument.
This argument – which might also be dubbed the “autonomy” argument – defends
cost bearing on the basis of two primary premises. The first premise is that autonomy
is an extremely important value and the second premise is that the only way that
autonomy can be properly valued is if people who make autonomous choices are
made to bear the expected consequences of these choices. Applied to risky health
affecting behaviours the basic claim will be that people ought to bear some of the
costs of their risky health affecting behaviour because bearing some of these costs is
an expected consequence of their risky choices.
The third argument that I will analyse is the rights-harm argument. This argument is
based on the claim that citizens have a limited and forfeitable positive right to
healthcare and that they also have a duty to ensure that other people’s positive rights
to healthcare are upheld. In practical terms this means that people who are morally
responsible for taking risks with their health and subsequently fall ill must bear some
of the costs of their choices in situations of resource scarcity. This is because, if they
don’t bear the costs of their risky choices in these kinds of situations, they will
decrease the amount of resources available to people who are not causally and
morally responsible for their ill-health and doing this will harm these people by
violating their positive right to healthcare.
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The fourth argument that I will investigate is the luck egalitarian argument. This
argument states that people who are morally responsible should be made to bear the
costs of their health affecting choices because justice requires that public resources
(which include health care resources) should be distributed to people suffering from
sheer bad luck rather than from the unfortunate effects of their own choices. The
claim, in effect, is that considerations of fairness entail that people who are morally
responsible for taking risks with their health should be treated differently from people
who are not morally responsible for their ill-health. More specifically, fairness
requires that only the latter group should be compensated by society.
The last argument that I will analyse is the utilitarian argument. Utilitarians, I will
suggest, can defend cost bearing on the basis that requiring people who take risks with
their health to bear costs will incentivise people to modify their risky health affecting
behaviour. Obviously, making people bear costs will reduce utility in some ways, but
the utilitarian may be able to claim that the incentive effects of implementing cost
bearing policies outweigh the harm caused and, as a consequence, net utility will
increase if these policies are put in place.103
103 As I noted in the first chapter, the utilitarian argument differs from all the other normative
arguments that I will analyse in this chapter because moral responsibility is not a necessary condition
for consequential responsibility according to this account. In other words, the utilitarian could defend
cost bearing policies even if people are not morally responsible for taking risks with their health. The
reason why this is true is because incentives can work in situations where people are only causally
responsible for their risky health affecting behaviours. For example, it is possible to incentivise a young
child not to play with fire even though a young child is not morally responsible for deciding which
risks to take in life.
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I will limit my discussion in this chapter to these five arguments for the following
reasons. The moralistic-desert argument is, I think, the argument that underpins most
people’s beliefs that some patients should bear some of the costs of some of their
risky health affecting choices. As such, it is probably the most popular of all the
normative arguments that exist to defend cost bearing and deserves a proper hearing
for this reason. The expected consequences argument, meanwhile, seems like a
potentially promising argument because there is an overlapping consensus in liberal
democratic cultures that autonomy is very valuable. Thus, if the argument can be
shown to work it is likely to attract many supporters.
The rights-harm argument is worth exploring because the concepts of “rights” and
“duties” increasingly pervades the discourse of policy makers interested in health care
policies. As such, this argument is likely to appeal to wide variety of different
stakeholders if it can be shown to be sound. The luck egalitarian argument is also
worth discussing partly because it has already been mooted by many philosophers as a
theory of justice that could be used to defend cost bearing in relation to health and
also because this argument is very compelling (Segall 2010). Finally, the utilitarian
argument is worth analysing because utilitarianism is still regarded as the dominant
normative approach from the point of view of many health care policy makers and
this approach has much to be said for it – especially when it is combined with the
principle of “moral responsibility” to form a hybrid or pluralistic argument.
These arguments are not exhaustive and it is entirely possible that other normative
arguments – such as a solidarity based argument or a libertarian argument – could
provide an even more robust defence of cost bearing in relation to risky health
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affecting behaviours (Brown 2009). However, I do not have space in this thesis to
discuss every possible argument that could be deployed to defend cost bearing and so
I will limit myself to the five arguments that I have briefly outlined above.
6.2 Desert
Health care professionals, policy makers and lay people regularly claim that patients
who are responsible for their ill-health deserve their ill health. Similarly, patients who
are said to deserve their ill-health are also sometimes said to deserve to bear the costs
of their health affecting behaviour. Quite what is meant by these claims is not easy to
decipher because desert – like responsibility – is a slippery and complex concept
which often signifies different things to different people in different situations.104 For
example, the following claims are all intelligible and widely held but they also reflect
very different usages of the concept of desert: a heroic person deserves a reward for
his valour; an evil man deserves to be unhappy; a diligent student deserves high
grades for his efforts; a generous man deserves good luck because of his munificence
and a rapist deserves to be punished for harming others.105
However, I think that when most people make desert claims in relation to risky
behaviour they are relying on what I call a moralistic desert claim. In particular, they
are adopting the idea that people should bear the cost of at least some of their risky
104 The sheer variety of desert claims raises the possibility that there may be no single concept of desert
although we use the term desert as if it signifies one concept.
105 When we consider what Feinberg (1970) calls the “desert basis” we might say that X deserves Y
either because X has performed some deserving act (e.g. an act of heroism) or because something bad
has happened to them (e.g. suffering) or because one or more of X’s characteristics (e.g. generosity of
spirit) is itself deserving.
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health affecting behaviours because some of these behaviours are intrinsically
immoral. By “intrinsically immoral” I mean that the behaviours are inherently wrong
or inherently bad for reasons that are independent of consequentialist calculations.106 I
also think that people who adopt this approach commit themselves to the further claim
that people who choose to engage in such behaviours deserve to be punished or
sanctioned or denied a benefit as a consequence.107
I am not alone in believing this. Cohen and Benjamin (1991) argue that support for
polices which deny liver transplants to alcoholics is explained by the fact that many
physicians believe that heavy drinking is intrinsically “morally wrong” and that such
behaviour ought to be sanctioned. Likewise, Wikler (1978) argues that some kind of
moralistic claim underpins many people’s beliefs that certain risky health affecting
behaviour is immoral and should be penalised in some way.108
106 Consequentialists would regard risky health affecting behaviours as instrumentally rather than
intrinsically immoral. Utilitarians, for example, would argue that risky health affecting behaviours are
only immoral if they diminish net utility and would be happy to re-describe these behaviours as moral
if they, in fact, increased net utility.
107 In this thesis I will not distinguish between punishment, sanction and denial of benefits. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that some people do construe cost bearing as a form of punishment. Indeed, the
language of punishment is sometimes used when health care professionals discuss these issues.
However, other people eschew the language of punishment and prefer to talk of sanctioning or denying
people a benefit for engaging in risky behaviours.
108 Other desert-based approaches to defending cost bearing are possible, but I will not explore them
here. Denier (2005), for example, argues that costs and benefits could be denied or awarded on the
basis of “energy expended” – i.e. on the basis of effort.
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6.2.1. Evidence of wolves in sheep’s clothing
Some people openly embrace the claim that a wide range of risky health affecting
behaviours are intrinsically immoral and that people who engage in such behaviours
should be punished or sanctioned or denied a benefit by being forced to bear costs.
Newspapers are full of claims that “wanton” alcoholics should not receive liver
transplants and that “reckless” drug addicts should not receive free health care.
Moreover, as we have seen, the academic literature is replete with physicians and
others openly declaring their adherence to these beliefs.109
Evidence gleaned from a number of surveys also suggest that many patients, health
care professionals and members of the lay-public believe that some risky health
affecting behaviours are vicious or wrong and that people deserve to bear some cost
precisely for this reason. For example, a number of recent studies exploring people’s
beliefs about obesity demonstrate that many people openly describe obese patients as
“lazy”, “gluttonous”, “immoral” or “undisciplined” and that they “get what they
deserve” when then fall ill (Kelly et al 2010).110 Yoder (2002) also notes that there is
growing evidence to suggest that people tend to “attribute moral qualities to people
based on their health”.111 People who engage in certain kinds of risky behaviour also
109 Knowles (1977) overtly adopts a moralistic position and seems more than happy to use the
traditional language of vice to describe many risky health affecting behaviours.
110 It might also be remembered that in one of the studies that I analysed in chapter 3 many respondents
claimed that people who were responsible for taking risks with their ill-health were “less deserving”
than patients who did not take such risks (Neuberger et al 1998).
111 For example, people who are thin and look fit tend to have positive attributes such as the ability to
work hard, delay gratification and control impulses to them, whilst people who are overweight and look
unfit tend to have negative attributes such as laziness, indolence and lack of self control attributed to
them (Brownell 1991).
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regularly report that they suffer prejudice because other people make moralistic
judgements about their choices of behaviour even when these behaviours are
primarily or entirely self-harming.112
However, although a number of people openly declare their allegiance to moralistic
desert claims, many more seem to harbour such beliefs without openly stating that
they do. Two different kinds of evidence suggest that this is the case and I will briefly
discuss this evidence here before moving on to analyse the moralistic desert argument
in more detail.
The first piece of evidence is the manner in which some people use distinctly
moralistic language when describing risky health affecting behaviour whilst denying
that they are defending cost bearing policies on the basis of some kind of “intrinsic”
immorality judgment. Many people who ostensibly claim that they do not adhere to an
intrinsic immorality approach to cost bearing argue that “sloth”, “gluttony” and
“sexual promiscuity” are the causes of various risky health affecting behaviours. In
doing so they correctly identify the fact that lack of exercise, over-eating and sexual
112 The following statement neatly demonstrates how judgmental some people can be when they
encounter people who are obese: “one morning I gained 1501b, and my whole life changed. My
husband looked at me differently, my kids were embarrassed, friends felt sorry for me, and strangers
were shamelessly disgusted by my presence. The pleasures of shopping, family outings and going to
parties turned into wrenchingly painful experiences. In truth, I became depressed by just the thought of
running the most basic errands; a trip to the grocery store or the video shop was enough to put me in a
bad mood. But mostly, I became angry. Angry because what I experienced in the week that I wore a ‘fat
suit’–designed to make me look like a 250-plus-lb woman–was that our society not only hates fat
people, it feels entitled to participate in a prejudice that at many levels parallels racism and religious
bigotry. And in a country that prides itself on being sensitive to the handicapped and the homeless, the
obese continue to be the target of cultural abuse” (Lampert 1993).
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promiscuity (at least when coupled with unsafe sexual practices) are causes of
diseases, but their eschewing of technical terms in favour of morally loaded terms
rather gives the game away (Wikler 1978).
This phenomenon is most obvious in relation to sexual promiscuity. Many argue that
people who are promiscuous should bear the costs of their promiscuity – i.e. the costs
associated with sexually transmitted diseases. However, this claim seems to rest on a
very selective reading of the data on promiscuity. It is certainly true that people who
are more sexually promiscuous are more likely to suffer from sexually transmitted
diseases, but this is not because of their promiscuity. It is because a substantial
proportion of people who are promiscuous do not practise safe sex. In other words,
this sub-group essentially skew the data by making it look like promiscuity is the
primary cause of the increase in sexually transmitted diseases when the real problem
is lack of safe sexual practice. Promiscuity itself is, to a large extent, a confounding
variable.
This is important because it means that people who are concerned with holding people
responsible for their health-affecting actions should be unconcerned with promiscuity.
Instead, they should be concerned with people who practice unsafe sex. Yet, crucially,
the emphasis of many people’s arguments invariably still rests on the promiscuous or,
to use Knowles’ (1977) terminology, the “sexually intemperate” rather than on people
who practise unsafe sex. One might argue that this simply reflects ignorance about the
difference between unprotected and protected sexual intercourse, but this seems
increasingly unlikely given the widespread understanding that it is unprotected sexual
intercourse which creates risk. The more likely explanation is that promiscuity is still
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regarded as an intrinsically immoral behaviour by many people and it is because of
this that they defend the claim that people who develop sexually transmitted
infections should bear the costs of their choices.
The other source of evidence is the selective way in which many people pick from the
list of possible health-affecting behaviours when they defend cost bearing policies on
the basis of “responsibility for health” judgements. Of the wide range of different
behaviours that cause disease, lay and professional commentators alike almost
invariably limit their discussion to those behaviours that are traditionally deemed
“sins” rather than to more socially acceptable (but equally risky) behaviours (Wikler
1978; Harris 1995). Even in the academic literature a great deal of the research on the
topic of responsibility for health concentrates on people who have abused addictive
substances (e.g. tobacco, alcohol, recreational drugs), people who are sexually
promiscuous and, to a lesser extent, people who consume too much food and are
overweight or obese. Very little mention, if any, is made of pregnant women, athletes,
recreational skiers, firemen, policemen or healthcare professionals.
If one openly defends an intrinsic immorality position, then concentrating one’s fire
on a limited number of risky health affecting behaviours makes sense, but for those
who proclaim that they do not base cost bearing judgments on the basis of the
intrinsic immorality of certain risky behaviours this focus of attention on traditionally
“sinful” behaviour is, again, rather telling. Indeed, Wikler (2002) argues that “the
coincidence of two lists, that of lifestyles deemed burdensomely expensive and that of
lifestyles deemed sinful… suggests a different agenda from the stated one”.
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These two sources of evidence do not prove conclusively that some people are
secretly harbouring beliefs about the intrinsic immorality of certain risky health
affecting behaviours. In particular, the second kind of evidence that I discussed above
could be explained on the basis that people are making their judgments on the basis of
utilitarian arguments. Nonetheless, the first kind of evidence in combination with the
second kind of evidence is very suggestive and I think that it is reasonable to claim,
on the basis of this evidence, that the “intrinsic immorality” position may be the most
popular defence of cost bearing of all – at least amongst the lay public.
6.2.2 The moralistic desert argument in detail
I mentioned earlier that the moralistic desert argument depends on the claim that some
risky health affecting behaviours are intrinsically immoral and that these behaviours
are intrinsically immoral in such a way that people who engage in them deserve to
bear a cost as a form of punishment or sanction or as a denial of benefit. If we spell
out the whole desert argument it runs as follows:
1. All risky health affecting behaviours involve taking risks which can cause
harm to oneself and some of these behaviours involve taking risks which can
cause harm to other people.
2. Behaviours which risk harming other people or risk harming oneself are
intrinsically immoral (i.e. wrong or bad) unless they are done for good reason.
3. Some risky health affecting behaviours which harm other people and some
which harm the self are not done for good reason.
4. Therefore, some risky health affecting behaviours are intrinsically immoral
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5. People who engage in intrinsically immoral risky health affecting
behaviours deserve to be punished or sanctioned or be denied a benefit by the
state for retributive reasons.
6. Forcing people to bear some of the health costs of their choices is one
legitimate method of punishing or sanctioning or denying a benefit to people
who have engaged in risky health affecting choices which are intrinsically
immoral.
7. Therefore people who engage in some risky health affecting behaviours
deserve to penalised and the penalty may take the form of cost bearing.
The first premise of the argument is self-evident and I will simply take it for granted
that all risky health affecting behaviours can cause harm to oneself and that some can
also cause harm to other people. The other premises of the argument are much more
controversial and I will now discuss theses propositions in the following sub-sections.
6.2.2.1 The intrinsic immorality of harm to self and harm to others
The claim that actions which harm other people are intrinsically immoral is widely
accepted by many philosophers and lay people alike. At least some of these other-
harming behaviours can also be classified as “risky health affecting behaviours”. 113
However, most risky health affecting behaviours do not cause direct harm to other
people.114 This means that we cannot rely on claims about the intrinsic immorality of
other harming behaviour if we wish to argue that most people who take risks with
113 Assault and rape fall neatly into both categories.
114 Eating too much saturated fat, sunbathing excessively and drinking alcohol are not activities that
harm other people in any obvious way.
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their health ought to bear the costs of their choices.115 Instead, we must rely on the
much more controversial claim that self-harming behaviours (which are done for no
good reasons) are intrinsically immoral.
Traditionally, three arguments have been proffered to defend the idea that at least
some self harming behaviour can be intrinsically immoral. The first argument is
religious in nature, the second argument is based on Kant’s theory of morality and the
third argument ultimately derives from Aristotle’s theory of virtue. I will now discuss
the Kantian and Aristotelian arguments in more detail, but I will ignore the religious
argument because, even if many people accept the validity of this argument, it is not
possible to underwrite public policies in secular countries like the UK on the basis of
an argument that relies on theistic premises.116
6.2.2.1.1 The Kantian argument
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant (1998) discusses a number of different risky
health affecting behaviours and he classifies many of these behaviours as intrinsically
immoral even though they only case harm to oneself. Kant does not provide an
exhaustive list of these behaviours in his work but he does mention suicide, gluttony
115 For the purposes of this thesis I will ignore the complication that some risky health affecting
behaviours can harm other people in certain situations. For example, I will ignore the fact that smoking
in the presence of other people can cause harm (i.e. the phenomenon of passive smoking) and the fact
that people who drink too much alcohol or consume certain types of recreational drugs are more likely
to harm other people whilst driving under the influence of these drugs.
116 The religious argument comes in many forms but the key underlying claim is that self harm is
intrinsically immoral because people do not have the right to harm any of God’s creations (including
oneself) without authority from God himself. Indeed, this rationale provides one the key reason why
suicide is frowned upon by many of the world’s major religions.
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and drunkenness as classic examples of self harming behaviours and there does not
seem to be any reason why his arguments could not be extended to include other risky
health behaviours like “sloth”, smoking and excessive sunbathing. Indeed, given
Kant’s arguments it seems that we are committed to extending the list he constructs to
cover a whole range of other risky health affecting behaviours.
At first glance, the rationale provided by Kant as to why certain self harming
behaviours should be classified as intrinsically immoral seems to depend on the
behaviour in question. Kant (1996) argues that gluttony, or as he puts it: “self
stupefaction [by the] excessive use of food or drink”, is intrinsically immoral because
it is such an unnatural use of one’s attributes that it represents a “violation of one’s
duty to himself”. His argument against suicide, meanwhile, is based on the claim that
“to destroy the subject of morality in his own person is tantamount to obliterating
from the world, as far as he can, the very existence of morality itself; but morality is,
nevertheless, an end in itself. Accordingly, to dispose of oneself as a mere means to
some end of one’s own liking is to degrade the humanity in one’s own person”.
However, though Kant seems to offer different reasons why engaging in certain kinds
of risky behaviour is immoral it has been suggested that Kant’s core argument about
the immorality of self-harming behaviour boils down to two claims. Firstly, harming
oneself often involves using one’s self or one’s humanity as a mere means (Denis
2010). Secondly, harming oneself in some situations involves the destruction of the
faculties on which the exercise of our freedom – and thus our capacity to be moral –
depends (Korsgaard 1996).
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The latter claim seems to be compelling. Kant’s argument in this case is that we have
a duty to preserve both the physical and mental faculties upon which we depend to act
freely and rationally – i.e. the faculties upon which we depend in order to act in
accordance with the moral law. Risky health affecting behaviours tend to damage or
destroy these faculties. Self harming behaviours can cause temporary or permanent
damage either to our physical bodies or to our brains/minds and in some cases they
can kill us. Those self-harming behaviours that run the risk of killing us are immoral
because they run the risk of permanently destroying the faculties upon which our
exercise of freedom depends, whilst those self harming behaviours which run the risk
of damaging us are immoral because they can either temporarily (e.g. during a
gluttonous stupor) or permanently (e.g. after a stroke) hamper those same capacities
(Guyer 2006).
Kant does not argue that all risky health affecting behaviours are intrinsically
immoral. He explicitly argues that it is permissible in certain situations to sacrifice
one’s life in order to save one’s fellow countrymen and his reason for making this
claim is that such behaviour, though it involves the potential destruction of one’s
capacities, will protect other people’s capacities to act freely and rationally
(Korsgaard 1996). Likewise, I think Kant would accept that women who choose to
have unprotected sex in order to have children, though they take risks in the process,
cannot be regarded as treating themselves or their humanity as a mere means. Indeed,
a wider claim can be made here, namely that Kant would allow – and even encourage
– people to take risks whenever their goal was to protect other people’s capacities to
be free and, hence, moral.
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In summary, Kant seems to believe that people who take risks with their health (e.g.
by drinking too much alcohol) for no good reason should be regarded as acting in an
intrinsically immoral way and that we all have perfect duties to avoid taking risks
without good reason. However, he also believed that people who take risks with their
health for good reasons (i.e. in order to protect other people’s capacities to be free,
rational and moral) should not be regarded in this light and should, in fact, be
regarded in a good moral light. What is not as clear is what Kant would make of what
I described in chapter 4 as “everyday risks”.117
Some everyday risks are necessary risks and Kant would presumably accept that there
was nothing impermissible about taking such risks. However, some everyday risks are
not strictly necessary; they could be avoided but only at some practical cost. For
example, if driving in a car is more dangerous than taking public transport then we
can say that taking the risk of driving a car is not necessary as long as public transport
is available. This is true even if it will inconvenience us and reduce our ability to do
that which we wish to do.
I am not entirely sure how a Kantian would deal with this problem. It is possible that
Kantians would allow some degree of leeway in relation to everyday risks, but it is
not entirely clear on what basis an exception could have been made. Kant certainly
believed that we had duties to develop our talents and it may be that if taking the least
risky option each day meant that the development of our talents would be aversely
117 Kant (1996) was not opposed to all forms of intoxication. He seems to have believed that the
consumption of a small amount of wine might promote our faculties in certain contexts – e.g. at a
dinner party. However, he would certainly have opposed the idea that getting seriously intoxicated was
acceptable and given our modern understanding of the dangers of addiction Kant might also have taken
a harsher line with regard to the consumption of any amount of alcohol.
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affected this would provide us with sufficient reason to take greater risks. However,
Kant also believed that the duty to develop our talents is an imperfect duty whilst out
duty not to destroy or damage our bodily and mental faculties is a perfect duty. As
such, it does not seem likely that the duty to prefect our talents would override the
duty to take the least risky option where everyday risks are concerned.
Not everyone will be convinced by the Kantian claim that certain risky health
affecting behaviours are intrinsically immoral. Consequentialists, will deny that the
right way to assess the moral permissibility of an action is to address whether it
involves treating people are mere means or whether it destroys or damages the
faculties that we rely upon in order to be free, rational and moral.
Even people who are sympathetic to Kant’s general arguments and accept that
behaviours which involve treating other people as mere means is intrinsically
immoral deny that Kant’s arguments can be applied in relation to behaviours that
harm the self. For example, some Kantian scholars have argued that it is conceptually
confused to suggest that we can have duties to ourselves or that we can violate rights
that we owe to ourselves or that we can create binding obligations by making
promises to ourselves (Denis 2010). Such a duty seems to make the person who will
be constrained the same person that as the person who is doing the constraining and
this is problematic because it seems that we could always escape from such
obligations by releasing ourselves from them (Wood 2007). It is not clear in what
sense it is possible for us to be bound by a duty which we can seemingly release
ourselves from at will.
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I will not respond to the consequentialist critique of Kant’s arguments here for this is
too large and complex a counterargument for me to deal with properly in this thesis,
but I will respond to the other argument that Kant was wrong to think that we can
have duties to ourselves. As it happens, Kant was well aware that the idea of a duty to
oneself might seem incoherent and he opens his exposition of these duties by
admitting that the whole notion of a binding duty to oneself sounds implausible
because one could release oneself from such a duty with ease (Kant 1996). However,
he counters these objections on the basis that human beings are part animal and part
rational – or part “sensible” and part “intelligible” – and that the latter aspects of our
humanity can impose binging obligations on the former aspects (Guyer 2006). To put
it another way, the author of an obligation to ourselves is not the same person as the
subject who is obliged and so we cannot release ourselves from the grip of self-
imposed duties at will.
If do not have space to explore these Kantian arguments in any further depth here, but
for those who are convinced that Kant was right to claim that certain kinds of self-
harming behaviour are intrinsically immoral, a means of defending cost-bearing on
the basis of desert is certainly opened up by Kant’s arguments. Admittedly, I do not
think that many lay-people, health care professionals or policy makers ground their
cost bearing claims on the basis of this kind of argument. Moreover, Kant’s
arguments rest on claims (e.g. the claim about sensible and intelligible aspects of our
humanity) which are dubious and difficult to prove. However, the Kantian position is
not without plausibility and it does have the advantage that it neatly divides different
risky health affecting behaviours – with the possible exception of “everyday risks” –
in a way which will appeal to the intuitions of most people.
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6.2.2.1.2 The Aristotelian (virtue) argument
The other, non-religious, argument that seeks to explain why causing harm to self is
intrinsically immoral is derived from Aristotle’s (1984) theory of virtue. From the
Aristotelian point of view any behaviour (which is based on stable character trait) is
“intrinsically immoral” or, to use the actual Aristotelian language, “vicious”, if it
inhibits human flourishing (eudemonia). Consequently, if we can demonstrate that
certain kinds of risky health affecting behaviours inhibit human flourishing it will be
possible to argue that these behaviours are vicious or bad in an intrinsically immoral
sense.118
It may be argued that engaging in any risky behaviour is vicious. This is because
health and existence is necessary for human flourishing and risky behaviours may
damage people’s health or kill people prematurely. However, although this “all risks”
approach is prima facia plausible and although it has the advantage that most people
will agree that ill-health – and death – inhibit human flourishing the argument also
suffers from a number of problems.
118 Some people will agree with the general thrust of the virtue-based argument but feel uneasy about
the use of the language of vice to describe be people who take certain risks with their health. Indeed,
some people will feel more comfortable saying that the act of smoking has little moral worth (or some
kind of “negative” moral worth) than saying that the act of smoking is vicious. Moreover, using the
language of moral worth in this way – and eschewing any direct reference to virtue and vice – has the
advantage that we can still make moral claims about the kinds of risks people take but we are not so
reliant on language which is morally loaded. However, I will stick with Aristotle’s language of virtue
and vice in this chapter because this language is more in keeping with the way many people actually
voice their values about those who take certain risks with their health. Knowles (1977), for example, is
unequivocal about this and he is far from being alone in this matter. That said, there is no necessity in
this and anyone who wishes to substitute the language of virtue and vice with the language of moral
worth in the following section can certainly do so.
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The most serious issue is simply that the all risks approach is committed to the claim
that there is something intrinsically immoral about risky behaviour even when the
behaviour is carried out for ostensibly virtuous ends. It may be possible to argue that
the viciousness or badness of such an action can be “overcome” if the action is done
for reasons that significantly contribute to the flourishing of others. However, it
makes little conceptual sense to claim that there is anything vicious or bad about an
act which causes harm to oneself but which is carried out for good reasons – such as
an act carried out for the sole purpose of enabling other people to survive and flourish.
In fact, an altruistic act that involves taking a risk of causing harm to oneself furnishes
us with a reason to claim that the act is more, not less, virtuous.
This objection suggests that an alternative to the “all risks” approach is needed. But
the only alternative approach that might be viable would be an approach that would
make use of a richer account of flourishing and a “thicker” conception of the good
life. For example, it could be argued that people are only able to flourish and live a
good life if they possess and regularly exhibit the following characteristics: caution,
prudence, moderation, responsibility, determination, self control, sobriety,
temperance, frugality, self restraint and moral courage.
On the basis of these specific claims it would be possible to argue that people who
take risks with their own ill-health because they are impatient or reckless or cowardly
etc. are vicious or bad because they behave in ways which damage human flourishing.
For example, smokers who smoke because they cannot sublimate their desire for a
cigarette could be deemed vicious for they lack the self control necessary for human
flourishing and people who are obese because they lack self-restraint may be deemed
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vicious because they are too weak willed to flourish. Similarly, people who sky dive
or ski or scuba dive in order to experience the thrills of risk taking could be regarded
as “vicious” because they are imprudent and reckless.119 People who take risks with
their health in order to protect other people, on the other hand, could be said to
contribute to human flourishing and thus their risky actions could be deemed entirely
virtuous or good.
As for people who take everyday risks it is not entirely clear what might be said of
them. They can hardly be said to be reckless or imprudent just because they take such
risks, but it is not clear that the rationale for taking everyday risks enables people to
flourish either. This may incline people to think that the taking of everyday risks is, in
some sense, a morally neutral activity. However, a good case can be made that human
beings cannot properly flourish unless they can perform basic day to day activities
without worrying too much about reducing day to day risks to a minimum. As such, it
is reasonable to argue that the taking of everyday risks contributes, to a small extent,
to human flourishing and should be regarded as morally permissible from the
perspective of the particular virtue account that I have just outlined.
This narrower approach avoids the reductio ad absurdum associated with the claim
that all risk taking activities are prima facia vicious. Moreover, the particular version
of the narrow approach that I have outlined fits rather well with many people’s
intuitions about which kinds of risky behaviours – and which kinds of reasons for
engaging in risky behaviours – are morally acceptable and which are not. It also fits
well with most people’s intuitive beliefs that pregnant women and firemen should not
119 This is a particularly good example of where the language of moral worth seems more appropriate
than the language of vice.
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bear costs, but that people who smoke and people who engage in risky sports should
do so. Indeed, I think that it is precisely this kind of account that underpins most (non-
religious) people’s reasons for defending cost bearing in relation to risky health
affecting choices. In other words, it is because people think that certain behaviours
damage human flourishing that they deem these behaviours to be “vicious” and
believe that people who engage in them should be penalised in some way.
However, though this narrower approach has these advantages over the “all risks”
approach, they are bought at a relatively heavy price. The main problem is that the
narrower approach depends on a quite a selective (and rather anti-hedonistic) reading
of what it means for a human being to flourish. In other words, it depends on a very
specific conception of the good and a highly circumscribed understanding of virtues
and vices. As I have just noted, many people do seem to believe that individuals who
cannot sublimate their desires, or who take risks with their health for frivolous
reasons, or who consume so many recreational drugs that they are unable to function
– and so on – fail to flourish. However, there is a great plurality of views about what it
means to live a good life and many reasonable people disagree about which
behaviours (and which reasons for acting) really enable people to flourish (Cohen and
Benjamin 1991). 120
Some people believe that living a hedonistic and care free life enables people to
flourish in a way that a life of careful prudence and risk avoidance does not. In fact,
they would probably argue that people who are always careful and restrained and
prudent fail to properly appreciate a key element of what makes life worth living,
120 Daniels (2008) argues that risks that may seem to be entirely avoidable and utterly wrong from
some people’s perspective may be part of other people’s conception of what makes life worth living.
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namely the joy of taking risks and the sense of fulfilment that human beings can
experience when they learn to overcome their fears. Furthermore, some people will
regard risks taken in the name of ambition or pride or adventure (e.g. the reasons why
some astronauts, mountaineers, deep sea divers and test pilots take the risks that they
take) as inherently vicious in nature, but others will argue that ambition and pride
contribute to human flourishing and that risks taken for these reasons are to be
commended.
Others will argue that the kind of person who possesses the basket of character traits
that I have described earlier on (i.e. self control, sobriety etc.) will stymie the
development of other character traits (e.g. courage and curiosity) which are widely
regarded as virtues even by those who defend the idea that a life of careful prudence is
essential for human flourishing. Curiosity and courage often require us to take risks
with our health and if we are unwilling to take risks for these reasons our capacity to
develop and maintain our curiosity and courage will shrivel.
The claim that a life full of “frivolous” or “ambition driven” risk taking contributes
more to human flourishing than a like of moderation and sobriety is not easy to prove.
However, there is no prima facia reason to think that such a life does not contribute to
human flourishing and no reason to think that the burden of proof must lie on those
who believe that virtue lies in a high-octane existence rather than those who defend a
more sedate conception of human flourishing. Indeed, there is some reason to believe
that conceptions of the good (including conceptions of virtue, vice and human
flourishing) should vary from person to person – at least to an extent. This is because
human beings are very diverse and – quite apart from the fact there is some virtue in
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diversity itself – it is possible that people who are very different can only flourish if
they live very different lives.
As with the Kantian arguments that I discussed above, I do not intend to explore the
merits and demerits of these virtue arguments in any more depth here. However, I will
reiterate at this point that for those who believe that it is possible to define the good
life in such a way that only certain kinds of risk taking behaviours (and only certain
reasons for taking risks) contribute to human flourishing the first step in the moralistic
desert defence of cost-bearing will have been established. This is because, if this
account is true, it will prove possible to argue that certain kinds of self-harming
behaviour are intrinsically immoral. I will also reiterate that this approach is not
implausible and I think it explains many people’s intuitions about who should, and
who should not, bear costs when they engage in risky health affecting behaviour.
Having said as much, there are substantial problems with the narrow and the “all
risks” versions of the virtue based argument and I am not convinced that these
problems can be overcome.
6.2.2.2 Punishment, sanctions and denial of benefits through cost-bearing
Even if we grant that some risky health affecting behaviours are intrinsically immoral
– whether for Kantian or Aristotelian reasons – it is still necessary to establish that
people who engage in these behaviours should be punished or sanctioned or denied a
benefit for doing so and that the state has the right and the duty to do this. It is also
necessary to establish that the punishment or sanction or denial of benefit that is owed
can legitimately take the form of cost bearing. In other words, premises five and six of
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the argument outlined above also need to be defended if the moralistic desert
argument is going to be successful in defending cost bearing claims in relation to
risky health affecting choices.
When people perform actions that are intrinsically immoral two kinds of arguments
are classically deployed to defend the claim that those who commit such acts should
be punished or sanctioned or denied a benefit. The first argument is consequentialist
in nature and rests on the assumption that imposing some kind of penalty will increase
net utility by reforming those who have committed the act and by deterring people
who might otherwise commit the act (Wilson 2002). The second argument is
retributive in nature and rests on the assumption that some kind of response to an
immoral act is warranted even if the response decreases net utility (Cragg 1992).
In this section I will stick to the retributive approach because there is an intimate link
between theories of retributive justice and the concept of moralistic desert and
because consequentialist arguments do not fit well with non-consequentialist claims
about the intrinsic immorality of some risky behaviour.121 Moreover, I think that it is
some notion of retribution which is often doing the work when people claim that those
who engage in certain types of risky health affecting behaviours ought to bear costs.
Harris (1985) agrees with this claim and he argues that people who wish to deny
access to health care to patients on the basis of responsibility judgements are aiming
to “punish” what they perceive as immoral behaviour for retributive reasons.
121 In other words, there is something rather odd about the idea that a consequentialist argument about
imposing penalties should be employed in a situation where the reason for imposing the penalty is
related to non-consequentialist claims about the intrinsic, rather than instrumental, immorality of a
given behaviour.
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Unfortunately, the principle of retributive justice is rather difficult to articulate. A
renowned legal scholar simply claims that a retributive theory of punishment seeks to
justify punishment in terms of a cluster of moral concepts that include: “rights,
deserts, merit, moral responsibility, justice and respect for autonomy” (Murphy
1993). This is rather uninformative, but the broad definition reflects the fact that
different versions of retributive justice place greater weight on different elements of
this cluster and there is no consensus about which approach is most valid.
Nonetheless, the dominant theories of retributivism are probably the “reciprocity
account” and the “respect for rationality account” (Duff 1993). Both of these theories
derive from Kant’s theory of punishment, but they have also recently been articulated
and defended by a number of contemporary legal scholars.
The key claim underlying the reciprocity account is that retribution is necessary
because it rebalances the scales of justice (Murphy 1993).122 This rebalancing is
needed because people who engage in intrinsically immoral actions gain some kind of
benefit or advantage that they do not deserve. The benefit may be material in nature,
but most scholars define the benefit as the advantage gained when an individual does
not submit to some moral or legal law when others do so. In other words, the benefit
is the advantage gained from a failure of reciprocation. Punishment or sanction or a
denial of benefit then becomes necessary because it removes the underserved benefit
by imposing a penalty that re-balances the harm caused by the initial action (Cragg
1992).
122 Kant specifically argues that punishment helps to ensure that “the pointer of the scale of justice is
made to incline no more to side than to the other” (Kant 1996).
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The main claim underlying the rationality account, meanwhile, is that punishment or
sanction or denial of benefit is justified because it ensures that people are treated as
rational beings and ends in themselves (Kant 1996). The basis of this claim has to do
with the idea that when a rational person treats others in a certain way they essentially
declare that, in their judgment, this is the way that people should be treated. Thus, in
order to respect the rationality of the person who has committed the immoral
behaviour it is necessary to treat them in the same way that they treated others and so,
if someone harms another person, they should be harmed in turn. In this way we are
allowing the person who commits the harm to determine how they wish to be treated
and, in this way, we respect their rational judgment by allowing this to determine how
they are treated (Rachels 2003).123
Both of these approaches may be used to defend the claim that people who engage in
risky health affecting behaviours that harm other people ought to be made to bear a
cost. This is because bearing a cost will help to nullify any advantage gained when
people harm other people and it will also ensure that people are treated in the way that
they treated others. The German legislation that I discussed in previous chapters
clearly states that people who are injured as a consequence of criminal behaviour
should have to bear some health costs as a result and it is possible that the chief
rationale for this is retributive in nature (Schmidt 2007).
However, as we have seen, most risky health affecting behaviours are intrinsically
immoral because they harm the self rather than other people and it is not clear that
either the reciprocity account or the respect for rationality account can ground the
123 Or, as Kant (1996) puts it, “his own evil deed draws the punishment on himself”.
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claim that people who engage in self harming behaviour deserve to be punished or
sanctioned denied a benefit. The reciprocity account fails to apply in the case of self
harming behaviour because this theory is firmly based on the idea that some people
gain a benefit over other people when they ignore certain moral or legal laws, but this
is ostensibly not the case where the allegedly immoral behaviour does not harm other
people. There may also be some difficulty with applying the “respect for rationality”
conception of retributive justice to self harming cases because the account is based on
the way in which individuals treat other people.
Nonetheless, it may be possible to argue that those who self-harm upset the scales of
justice in some sense and that cost bearing may be needed in order to rebalance these
scales. Likewise, a penalty may be justified on the basis that people who harm
themselves are, in effect, declaring that this is how they should be treated. This might
imply that if we fail to penalise such behaviour we would undermine the respect that
the self-harmer is due in virtue of his or her rationality. I must admit that I am far
from sure that these arguments will succeed. However, for those who think that
people who take certain kinds of risks with their health deserve to bear a cost on
retributive grounds, some such argument will need to be developed to explain how
retributive concepts can apply in self-harming cases.
It is worth noting at this stage that Kant (1996) himself was opposed to the idea that
perfect duties to oneself – which included duties not to cause harm to oneself for no
good reason – should be prohibited or punished. He firmly believed that these duties
had to be self-imposed and self-enforced because if they were enforced via an
external agency they would lose their value (Denis 2010). They would lose their
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value, in part, because the use of external force in these cases would undermine
people’s ability to act autonomously. This, in turn, would be problematic because
moral action, in Kant’s eyes, depends on people using their capacity for freedom and
rationality to act in ways that are in accordance with the moral law (Wood 2007). In
fact, Kant explicitly opposed the idea that the state should interfere with people who
harm themselves by intoxicating themselves with food and wine and he argued that
the state should neither penalise these individuals not prohibit them from harming
themselves if that is what they wished to do (Denis 2010). However, though Kant did
not think that the principle of retributive justice should be applied in these cases
where people harm the self I have tried to show that such an approach is at least
plausible on Kantian grounds.
The idea that states should intervene in order to penalise people who harm themselves
as opposed to people who harm other people is also problematic because it runs
headlong into a very powerful liberal objection known as the “harm argument”. The
classical statement of the harm objection is Mill’s and I will quote the relevant
passage in full here:
“The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively,
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He
cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for
him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of
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others, to do so would be wise, or even right...The only part of the conduct of
anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In
the part which merely concerns him, his independence is, of right, absolute.
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign” (Mill
1998).
States often interfere with people’s lives either for paternalistic reasons or in order to
penalise people for behaving immorally even when behaviour only causes harm to the
perpetrator. But just because this is common practice does not mean that it is right.
Moreover, as Mill expounded very eloquently over a century ago there are many
reasons why government intervention is unacceptable when the goal is either to
protect people from themselves or to punish immoral behaviour which only harms the
perpetrator. One key reason for this is the massive amount of disutility that would
result if the state trammelled on people freedom in this way. Another reason has to do
with the fact that allowing the state to defend one certain conception of the good can
lead to widespread abuse and the “tyranny of the majority”.
In sum, we can conclude that there are powerful consequentialist and non-
consequentialist reasons for not allowing the state to interfere by imposing penalties
on those who take risks with their own health. This is not to say that these objections
will prove fatal to the moralisic-desert argument, but those who wish to defend this
argument will have to address these objections and I am uncertain that a plausible
counter-argument can be mounted.
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It should also be borne in mind that even if the retributive account can be relied upon
to defend the claim that people who behave in an intrinsically immoral way deserve
some kind of penalty this account also needs to explain why the penalty that needs to
be imposed could (or should) take the form of cost bearing. The point being that all
sorts of responses are possible when someone commits an intrinsically immoral act
and we need a way of determining which kind of responses are permissible and
whether certain kinds of responses are especially desirable.
As it happens, all theories of retributive justice are firmly committed to the
proposition that the nature and severity of the response to an intrinsically immoral act
should be proportional to the nature and severity of the wrongdoing – and some also
talk of the need for the punishment to be apt in some sense (Corlett 2006). The
question for the retributive theorist then is whether bearing health costs is a
proportional and apt response to a risky health affecting behaviour.
At a very general level, it is possible to argue that requiring people to bear health care
costs (broadly construed) is especially apt in the case of risky health affecting
behaviour because there is some kind of “natural” match between taking a risk with
one’s health and bearing a health care cost. For example, requiring an arsonist to bear
the costs of his burns injury and requiring someone who consumes too many calories
to bear the costs generated by his obesity does ensure that the cost is linked to the risk
in a way that some will see as metaphysically profound.
Moreover, it may be agued that at least some forms of health care cost bearing are
proportional to the nature of the immoral act performed. For example, requiring a
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smoker to pay for lung cancer treatment via increased tax payments does seem like a
proportional response if we think that smoking for no good reason is intrinsically
immoral. Of course, some kinds of cost bearing will rarely, if ever, be proportional.
For example, denying people who have failed to exercise regularly access to any form
of healthcare will be a disproportional response because this would be tantamount to
capital punishment. However, some forms of cost bearing do seem reasonable both in
terms of aptness and proportionality and, thus, prima facia defensible from the
retributive perspective.
6.2.2.3 Desert: concluding thoughts
I have argued above that many people openly espouse the moralistic-desert argument
whilst others secretly (or unintentionally) rely on this argument too without declaring
(or realising) that they do so. I have also argued that this defence of cost bearing is
susceptible to a whole range of powerful objections. In particular, the argument is
vulnerable to the claim that self harming behaviours are not, in fact, intrinsically
immoral and that, even if they are, the state has no right to intervene by requiring
people to bear costs in such cases.
I would also add, at this stage, that the moralistic desert argument might be considered
vulnerable because it is committed to cost bearing even in situations where health care
resource are abundant. It is committed to this conclusion because neither the
immorality of a risky health affecting behaviours nor the retributive motivation for
imposing penalties for engaging in that behaviour depends on circumstantial factors
like the availability of health care resources.
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Not everyone will regard this as an especially troubling objection, but for many the
fact that this is true will serve to undermine the normative claims of this particular
approach to cost bearing. Golan (2010), for example, argues that “in a Utopian
context of unlimited healthcare resources, personal responsibility for one’s own ill-
health would be unlikely to gain widespread acceptance” and he might well have
added that even if people would still support cost bearing in these contexts there is
something normatively perverse about this.
On the other hand, the moralistic-desert approach does succeed in mapping on to
many people’s intuition that certain kinds of risky health affecting behaviours (e.g.
altruistic risk taking) should not be penalised whereas other kinds of risky health
affecting behaviours (e.g. consumption of recreational drugs) should be penalised.
This may not necessarily be an advantage because it may be that most people’s moral
intuitions are either wrong or can be explained on the basis of some kind of utilitarian
explanation. However, the fact that this approach fits with people’s intuitions gives
this account further prima facia plausibility.
6.3 Expected consequences, autonomy and cost-bearing
The second normative defence of cost bearing that I will explore is the “expected
consequences” approach. This account offers a way of side-stepping many of the
objections levelled at the desert account because it does not rely on the proposition
that there is anything intrinsically morally wrong with most risky health affecting or
on the proposition that people should bear costs for retributive reasons. Instead, the
argument relies on the claims that autonomy is – and ought to be – highly cherished
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and that autonomy cannot be properly valued unless people bear the expected
consequences of actions that they are morally responsible for choosing. More
specifically, the argument runs as follows:
1. Autonomy is highly valuable.
2. Autonomy can only be properly valued if people experience the expected
consequences of their autonomous actions.
3. The state must ensure that autonomy is valued by ensuring that people
experience the expected consequences of their choices.
4. Health care cost bearing is an expected consequence of taking risks with
one’s health.
5. Therefore, the state must ensure that those who take risks with their health
bear the costs of their choices.
I do not claim that the expected consequences argument is popular either amongst the
lay public or amongst philosophers. Nonetheless, I will explore this normative
defence because it offers an interesting alternative to some of the more traditional
approaches that I will discuss in this chapter and it also rests upon a value (i.e.
autonomy) for which there is broad and powerful support amongst the lay public and
philosophers alike.
6.3.1 The high value of autonomy
The first premise of the expected consequences argument is relatively
uncontroversial. Philosophers from across the normative divide concur that the
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capacity of rational human beings to make free decisions and to “govern” themselves
is important – even if they disagree about why, exactly, autonomy matters. It is also
true to say that in most liberal countries there is a strong commitment to autonomy
even amongst sub-groups of the population who place much emphasis on
communitarian concepts. This means that there is something of an overlapping
consensus about the value of autonomy amongst philosophers and lay-people.
Of course, just because a majority of people value something does not make that thing
valuable, but there are sufficient reasons to believe that autonomy is independently
valuable and for the rest of this section I will simply assume that this is the case.
6.3.2 Autonomy and expected consequences
The second premise of the expected consequences argument – i.e. that autonomy
cannot be properly valued unless people experience the full (negative and positive)
expected consequences of their actions – is likely to prove much more controversial
than the first and many will baulk at the claim that autonomy’s value can only be
realised if people experience the expected consequences of their choices.
In response to these sceptical voices, Sher (1987) has argued that experiencing the
expected consequences of an autonomous action is integral to the meaning and value
of autonomy itself and he also argues that if people do not experience the expected
consequences of their action their autonomy will necessarily be diminished. In a
similar vein, Simon (1979) suggests that if we fail to ensure that the fate of free
people is determined by their own purposes, intentions and judgements (and that they
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experience that which they are expecting to experience) we will fail to treat human
beings as persons. Moreover, Brown (2005) argues that if the link between our actions
and their expected consequences is cut, autonomy becomes a hollow and relatively
meaningless value and he suggests that “expecting people to take individual
responsibility for the success or failure of their own lives is an important way of
showing respect for their competence as freethinking agents”.
But why should we think that there is such a strong link between autonomy and the
expected consequences of an action? The argument starts with the observation that
when we deliberate and seek to act autonomously we weigh the consequences that
might result from our actions and, in some cases, the expected consequences of our
actions are part of what we choose when we decide on a given course of action. In
other words, we choose certain actions in certain situations partly because they have
certain (expected) consequences.
However, it may be said that there is a direct link between acting autonomously and
experiencing the expected consequences of those actions because our autonomous
choices encompass not just our choices but also the expected consequences of those
choices. Indeed, in a very real sense, the connection between autonomous acts and the
consequences of those acts are internal to the concept of autonomy itself.
Moreover, if we accept this account we can argue that the value which is attached to
autonomous choices is carried over to the consequences of the choice. This is because
some of the consequences of the choices that we make are an integral part of what we
choose when we make autonomous decisions and it would be “quite arbitrary to say
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that it is good that the agent perform the act he has chosen, but not good that he enjoy
or suffer the act’s predictable consequences” (Sher 1987). This, in turn, is because
choice encompasses both the acts that we choose to engage in and the consequences
of those acts and so the value which we attach to the performance of autonomous
choice naturally belongs to both the act and the consequence of the act.
If we accept these premises we can then conclude that if the link between choices and
expected outcomes is broken – i.e. if people are effectively prevented from
experiencing or realising the expected consequences of their actions – then their
autonomy will necessarily be severely curtailed and will be worth relatively little.
This is not to say that people’s choices will no longer be autonomous in any sense, but
rather that the autonomy that remains will be a mere shell of what autonomy can (and
should) be. Thus, if the very first premise of the expected consequences defence of
cost bearing is true – viz. that autonomy is highly valuable – we seem committed to
want to live in a world where our choices have consequences and in a world where
people experience the (expected) consequences of the autonomous actions for which
they are morally responsible.
This argument may appear to be vulnerable to the objection that the traditional
concept of autonomy deals primarily with the freedom to choose rather than the
freedom to see one’s choices bear fruit. If we are free and rational agents and make a
decision after due deliberation (i.e. if we are morally responsible for our choice) we
are usually regarded as being autonomous regardless of whether our decision actually
has any effect on the world.
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When sheer luck, or the behaviour of other people, unexpectedly supervenes and
blocks some of the expected consequences of our actions we do not suddenly think
that our decisions lacked autonomy. In fact, given that events that we do not control
regularly prevent the expected consequences of our actions from occurring, we might
have to relegate the whole notion of autonomy to the margins of our moral world if
we were to accept that autonomy is annihilated whenever unexpected consequences
disrupt our goals.
In response it may be said that this objection simply misses the point. The expected
consequences account does not claim that people cannot be autonomous if the
expected consequences of their choices fail to materialise.124 Rather, the claim that is
being made is that it is important that expected consequences follow from our
autonomous choices as much as possible otherwise our autonomy will come to mean
very little in reality. When luck “gets in the way” we may rightly conclude that
people’s autonomy has been somewhat thwarted or that the full value of autonomous
choice has not been realised, but we are not committed to claiming that autonomy
itself has been entirely destroyed. As such, this particular objection does not
undermine the expected consequence argument.
124 This is because the expected consequences argument does not claim that experiencing the expected
outcome is constitutive of autonomy. It may be argued that experiencing the expected outcome does
constitute autonomy, but it would be hard to justify this claim because, in very many cases, the
expected outcome does not occur yet we do not regard our actions as heteronymous as a consequence.
For example if an individual, after much contemplation and a great deal of rational discussion, decided
to take cocaine for the first time in his life it would seem odd to say that he had not made an
autonomous decision to take cocaine if it later transpired that he accidentally consume heroin instead.
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It may also be argued that the expected consequences account is vulnerable to another
objection, viz. that not all the expected consequences of our choices inherit the
autonomy-value of the choices that we make. For example, most people would deny
that women who choose to fall pregnant or firemen who suffer burns injuries whilst
rescuing other people should bear the expected consequences of their choices.
Likewise, in situations where the risks taken are a “necessary element of all
reasonable lives” (such as the “everyday” risks that I discussed in chapter 4) we do
not usually think that risk takers should bear the expected costs of their choices (Ibid,
p 46). Furthermore, if an individual is coerced into taking a risk we do not normally
believe that this individual should bear the expected consequences of his choice.
But why should we think that the autonomy value of the choices that we make do not
transmit to the expected consequences in these kinds of cases? In the case of coercion
the reason is obvious. The issue in these situations is not that the link between the
value of choice and the expected consequences is broken. Rather, the problem is that
the original choice was not an autonomous choice and thus there was no autonomy-
value to be transmitted from the “choice” to the expected consequence in the first
place.
However, in the case of altruistic risk taking or in the case of risks taken for socially
valuable reasons I do not see why the autonomy-value of the choices that we make is
not transmit to the expected consequences of the choice. As long as the choices are
autonomous choices the expected consequences account implies that the autonomy-
value of these choices are transmitted to the consequences. Thus, there is no way of
escaping the conclusion that costs should be borne in these situations because there
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are no are grounds within the expected consequences account to accommodate these
ideas. In other words, the adoption of a pluralistic approach which takes account of
values other than autonomy is the only way to “save” the expected consequences
account from the conclusion that pregnant women and firemen should not bear the
costs of their choices.
Where “necessary” risks are involved, the situation is a little less clear. In these cases
we might argue that the autonomy value is not transmitted from the choice to the
consequences because the risk taken is necessary to enable most other autonomous
choices to be made. In a society where driving is “essential” for people to live
reasonably full lives the decision to take the risk of driving (sensibly) is necessary
because without taking this risk our ability to engage in other autonomous choices
will be curtailed. If we accept this we may then be able to argue that where a choice is
necessary in this sense it is not a “meaningful expression of our will” and so the
choice confers little value on the expected consequences (Ibid, p 49). Thus, if a
careful driver is injured in a road traffic accident he should not have to bear any health
costs.
However, although the expected consequences account is premised on the idea that
autonomy is valuable, it does not necessarily follow that the expected consequences
argument is committed to the claim that actions which maximise the value of
autonomy should not be subject to the second premise of the argument. Indeed, this is
not the case because it is vital for people to experience the positive and the negative
expected consequences of all their choices if autonomy is to be truly valued.
Consequently, the claim that we should not make people bear the expected costs of
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their autonomous decisions when these autonomous decisions are necessary to open
up other autonomous decisions needs to be established independently of the expected
consequences argument itself. Of course, there is no reason why a new premise could
not be added to the argument, but this new premise will have to rely on a principle of
maximisation which is not inherent to the expected consequences account. 125
What this means, in effect, is that the expected consequences argument – in its pure
form – cannot distinguish between different types of risky health affecting behaviour
when it comes to cost bearing. In other words, this approach is just as likely to
demand cost-bearing where people engage in altruistic, socially valuable and
“everyday” risks as it is where people smoke, take drugs or consume too much meat
for hedonistic (or other) reasons. It would beg the question to assume that this
“failure” undermined the argument, but the fact that the expected consequences
account does not reflect most people’s intuitions on this matter may be problematic.
125 In a similar vein it may be argued that if we really care about autonomy we should not make people
bear costs if doing so means that they lose more autonomy. For example, if the form that cost bearing
takes would imply that people will die prematurely, the overall loss of autonomy that will result will be
much higher than if people were not forced to bear costs. Dead people, after all, have no ability to act
autonomously. My response is identical to the response that I have just given. Firstly, experiencing the
expected consequences of our actions, including negative consequences, is essential if autonomy is to
have any real value. Secondly, we would need to include a “maximisation of autonomy” principle into
the argument in order to defend this position and although this could be done it would not stem from
inside the expected consequence rationale. As it happens, this approach might still provide a defence of
some forms of cost bearing (e.g. taxation of risky behaviour) – though not others (e.g. denial of access
to healthcare) – but I will not explore this particular argument any further in this thesis.
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6.3.3 Should the state ensure that autonomy is valued?
Even if we grant that autonomy is not properly valued unless people experience the
expected consequences of their choices it is another matter entirely whether the state
should intervene to ensure that this occurs. In some cases the state will not need to
intervene because people will “naturally” experience the consequences of their
choices. For example, some people who choose to smoke develop lung cancer and the
government need not intervene in any way to ensure that this happens. In these kinds
of situations the state must simply resist the temptation to prevent people from
experiencing the expected, negative, consequences of their behaviours.126
However, in other situations, the state will have to intervene if people are to
experience the expected consequence of their choices. If the expected consequence of
developing a disease after taking a risk includes the expectation of bearing health
costs, for example, then governments will have to act to ensure that the health system
in operation forces people who developed such diseases to pay the expected health
cost.
The prima facia problem with this idea is that state intervention in the name of
autonomy has a paradoxical ring to it. States regularly intervenes in our lives to
126 Having said as much it is not entirely clear what would count as a “natural” expected consequence.
For example, it is not clear whether lung cancer is an expected consequence of smoking. Certainly,
smokers are much more likely to get lung cancer than non-smokers, but fewer than 50% of smokers
will develop this condition which means, on the balance of probability, developing lung cancer may not
be expected. However, this problem need not detain us here because what I am interested in is the issue
of whether cost bearing in the event of a disease developing is an expected consequence rather than
whether the disease itself is expected.
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ensure that we do not infringe other people’s autonomy, but what we are discussing
here is state intervention to protect the value of autonomy itself and this does not
seem, on the face of it, a legitimate task for the state. One reason for this is because
state intervention to protect the value of autonomy sounds very much like state
intervention to protect one specific conception of the good. It may be argued that
autonomy is a “thin” conception of the good and that there is an overlapping
consensus about the value of this particular value. Moreover, allowing states to
protect autonomy would enable a range of “thicker” conceptions of the good to be
protected from state interference.
However, some people do not regard autonomy as an especially important value and
they may resent the idea that they have to bear health costs in order to protect a value
that they do not especially care about. From these people’s point of view, state
intervention to protect the value of autonomy will be as unjustified as state
intervention to punish people for their intrinsically immoral behaviour.
In response to this objection we have to recognise that although there is a real sense in
which autonomy is a “thinner” value in some sense and that there may be more of a
justification for the state to intervene to protect this value, we cannot entirely escape
from the fact that some people (and maybe even entire cultures) would regard
autonomy as a rather “thick” value. This means that the expected consequence
account is vulnerable to the claim that state interference to defend cost bearing on the
basis of autonomy-protection may not be legitimate – even though this objection has
less bite than it does in the case of state intervention in the name of penalising
intrinsically immoral behaviour.
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6.3.4 Are health costs expected consequences?
Although the penultimate premise of the expected consequences argument is open to
serious objection, it is the last premise of the argument that is the most problematic.
The last premise states that health care cost bearing is an expected consequence of
risky health affecting choices. The problem with this is that people’s expectations will
entirely depend on whether bearing costs is an expected consequence within the
society that people live in.
In many countries people who fall ill do expect to pay some kind of health cost. In
most developing countries people expect to pay for most of their treatment when they
fall ill and they also expect to be denied access to treatment if they cannot afford to
pay. However, in most developed countries people who fall ill expect that health care
will be provided free of charge and that they won’t have to bear any kind of cost even
if they were causally and morally responsible for their ill-health.127 In the UK, for
example, cost bearing, would not be an expected consequence even if people were ill
because they took risks with their health because the NHS does not (currently) operate
on this basis.
The heath system in the UK and elsewhere could be changed so that people who take
risks with their health do bear costs and if this was done people living in these
countries would then be expected to bear the consequences of their choices. However,
it is not clear what the justification for this change would be. Certainly, the expected
consequences argument could not itself be the source of this justification because the
127 Health care has to be paid for somehow, but it is free at the point of need in many developing
countries and this is true even if the patient has never paid any tax.
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argument does not tell us what people should expect. Instead, it simply tells us that if
people expect a certain consequence then they should have to bear that consequence
in order that autonomy is properly valued.
This is a major problem because the goal of the expected consequence account is to
provide an independent defence of cost bearing, but the most that the argument can
establish is a defence of cost bearing once a society has specified, on some other
normative grounds, that people should bear the cost of their choices.128 If the expected
consequences account cannot provide an independent account of why people who
engage in risky health affecting behaviour should bear the costs of their choices then
its usefulness as a normative theory is very much in doubt.
In response it may be possible to argue that cost bearing is a “natural” expected
consequence of risky health affecting behaviour in just the same way that ill-health
might be a natural consequence of taking risks. However, aside from the fact that this
is a rather dubious idea, even if we accept that it is true, it is not clear how this really
helps. If cost bearing is a natural cost, but society has previously decided to ensure
that these natural costs should not be borne by those who take risks with their health,
then the fact that bearing costs is natural seems irrelevant because people who take
risks will not expect to bear these natural costs. Moreover, it is not clear which kind of
cost bearing is, in fact, natural. The only obvious contender would be denial of access
128 The nature of the costs that people have to bear would also have to depend on what people actually
expect. This means that the expected consequences account cannot independently specify which kind
of cost bearing policy should be adopted (e.g. a taxation or a denial of access policy) either.
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to health care (rather than an “artificial” taxation policy) but the sense in which denial
of access is the natural form of cost bearing is very unclear.
This means that the expected consequences can only justify cost bearing if cost
bearing is already an expected consequence of people’s choices. This may not prove
to be a fatal problem, but it does undermine the power of the argument and it also
leaves it dependent on some further normative argument which would need to furnish
us with a reason to believe that the expectation of cost bearing was, in fact, something
which people should expect.
I would also like to add at this stage that there is also a potentially serious ambiguity
about the claim that people ought to bear the expected consequences of their choices.
The ambiguity relates to the fact that it is not clear who it is that needs to be expecting
a given consequence. Do we mean that the individual who must bear the cost must
have expected this consequence or is it sufficient for the individual to live in a society
where this is the general expectation?
If we say the individual must expect this consequence then, aside from the difficulty
that it would be hard to know what each individual actually did expect, it would imply
that people could avoid having to bear costs by deliberately refusing to expect the
expectations that society generally expects. If, on the other hand, we argue that what
matters is the general expectation in society we would have to accept that some
individuals would have to bear costs even though they did not expect to do so and this
would be problematic because the autonomy-value of their choices would not be
transferred to the outcomes that they end up experiencing.
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6.3.5 Expected consequences: concluding thoughts
The expected consequences account offers a very different defence of cost bearing to
the moralistic desert argument because it is not based on the claim that there is
anything intrinsically wrong with taking risks. It is also a rather novel approach which
may appeal to many people because it rests on the claim that autonomy has special
value. However, the expected consequence approach is not without its problems. In
particular, it is very vulnerable to the fact that this approach cannot independently
ground the claim that people should bear costs because it can only demonstrate that
people should bear costs if bearing costs is something that people actually expect.
It is also worth reiterating that the expected consequences account cannot make
distinctions between different kinds of risk (e.g. risks taken for altruistic reasons and
risk taken for hedonistic reasons) and so cannot explain many of our basic intuitions
about who should bear costs. 129 Moreover, the expected consequences account cannot
be regarded as “value neutral” defence of cost bearing because it is premised on the
claim that autonomy is an important value. Thus, in a sense, the expected
consequences account suffers from the worst of two worlds: it is not neutral between
different conceptions of the good but, equally, it cannot distinguish between different
kinds of risky health affecting behaviours. Contrast this with the moralistic desert
argument which, like the expected consequences argument, abandons liberal
129 This is not necessarily a problem because our intuitions may be “wrong”, but it must still give us
some pause for thought.
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neutrality but, in return, is able to explain to make distinctions between risky
behaviours which reflect most people’s moral intuitions.130
The last point I would like to make is that the expected consequences account would,
like the moralistic desert approach, require people to bear costs even in situations
where resources were abundant as long as people still expected to bear costs in these
kinds of situations. Admittedly, if resource were abundant it is less likely that
societies would require people who took risks to bear costs, but if they did the
expected consequences account would be committed to claim that these costs should
be borne even if resource were not scarce. This is not a “real-world” problem, but as
with the moralistic desert argument many will see this as a serious objection to this
particular approach.
6.4 The Rights-Harm Argument
The rights-harm argument, like the expected consequences argument, takes a different
approach to the moralistic desert argument because it is not premised on the idea that
there is anything intrinsically wrong with taking certain kinds of risks or that we need
to rely on retributive concepts of justice in order to defend cost bearing. However, it
also differs from the expected consequence account because it makes no appeal to the
value of autonomy or the importance of ensuring that people experience the expected
consequences of their choices.
130 The expected consequences account also suffers from the disadvantage that it does not reflect the
views of most people who support cost-bearing. I cannot prove that this is the case, but there is little
evidence to suggest that people defend health care cost bearing in the name of autonomy and expected
consequences. That does not mean that they should not adopt this approach, but from the policy makers
perspective it might be problematic if few people subscribe to this particular argument.
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Instead, the rights-harm argument is based on the claim that people should be forced
to bear the costs of at least some of their health affecting choices if doing otherwise
would involve the consumption of too many scarce healthcare resources and, thus, the
violation of other people’s positive right to health care. In summary, the right-harm
argument runs as follows:
1. All citizens have a (limited and forfeitable) positive right to healthcare –
including a (limited and forfeitable) right to healthcare without having to bear
costs.
2. Citizens who have the ability to do so have a duty to provide the resources
needed to ensure that their fellow citizens receive the healthcare that they are
owed by virtue of their (limited and forfeitable) positive right to healthcare.
3. Citizens who are morally responsible for taking risks with their health have
a duty to bear costs if failing to do so would harm other people by violating
their ability to access the healthcare that they are owed by virtue of their
(limited and forfeitable) positive right to healthcare.
4. The state has the right and the duty to prevent rights violations, including
the violation of people’s (limited and forfeitable) positive right to healthcare.
5. Therefore, citizens who are morally responsible for taking risks with their
health may be required to bear some of the costs of their health affecting
choices in situations of scarcity.
As we can see the rights-harm defence of cost bearing is complex and it will take time
to unpack it. However, if the argument is sound it will serve as a powerful defence of
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cost bearing not only because the concept of rights and duties are deeply embedded in
the culture of many modern societies – so much so that many health policies now
make reference to the moral (and legal) right to health – but also because there are
many powerful normative reasons to think that rights trump other aspects of the
normative fabric of our world.
6.4.1 Positive rights to health and corresponding duties
Civil and political rights are well established at law and many philosophers and lay
people believe that people have moral versions of these legal rights too (Wolff 2012).
International law also makes it clear that people have legal forms of social, economic
and cultural rights – including the right to health. Indeed, a legal right to health has
been embodied in international law for over half a century via Article 25(1) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) which states that people have a “right
to a standard of living adequate for health”. 131 The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976) also makes it clear that people have a
legal right to “the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”.
Interestingly, a number of policy documents assume that a moral right to health also
exists. For example, the NHS Constitution (2009) explicitly talks about the moral
rights of patients to access a wide range of health services and the American Medical
Associations Patient's Bill of Rights states clearly that patients have a moral “right to
essential health care”. 132 But, even if many policymakers, health care professionals
131 This includes a “right to medical care”.
132 The World Health Organization Constitution (1946) also notes that “the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being”.
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and patients now believe that they have a moral right to health it is less clear whether
this claim is philosophically defensible.133
There are many different ways of defending the proposition that people have a moral
right to health. Some philosophers argue that a human right to health can be defended
on the grounds that giving people rights will maximise overall levels of welfare whilst
others argue that it can be defended on the basis of our common humanity, or on some
notion of human dignity, or because these rights spring from our nature as human
agents (Wolff 2012). Theological philosophers might also argue that a human right to
health is part of a God-given set of rights. However, though I do not wish to argue
here that these approaches are unsound, I think that the most powerful defence of the
human right to health is based on the idea that health is a vital interest and it is this
defence of human rights that I will explore further in this chapter.
There are three primary reasons for claiming that health is a vital interest. Firstly,
health is intrinsically valuable. Secondly, health is a basic need. Thirdly, health is
necessary for fair equality of opportunity. The claim that health is intrinsically
valuable is contestable, but there is a very broad consensus that health is extremely
valuable for its own sake and if we have reason to think that anything has intrinsic
value then we have good reason to think that health counts as one of these things. The
second claim is also fairly uncontroversial. Basic needs are those things which are
“functionally necessary for the most fundamental projects involved in living a human
133 Critically the moral right to health is usually seen as a positive, not a negative, right to health. A
negative right to health would only imply that people have a duty to not prevent people from taking
steps to be healthy. A positive right to health, as we shall see, implies that people have more onerous
duties to ensure that people’s right to health is protected.
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life” and there can be little doubt that health fits into this category (Dennier 2005).
Finally, Daniels (1985) has argued convincingly that health is necessary to protect our
normal functioning and our opportunities to form, pursue and revise our life-plans
and, as a result, we can say that health protects our vital interests because health is
necessary for fair equality of opportunity.
Many people will accept that health is intrinsically valuable, that it is a basic need and
that it is needed for fair equality of opportunity but will not agree that health is a
human right. Some of those who reject this idea do so at a very general level. For
example, Bentham believed that the concept of a natural moral right is simply
“nonsense upon stilts” and subsequent utilitarians have followed suit.134 Other
philosophers have offered much more specific critiques of the human right to health
claim. In this chapter I will not attempt to deal with any general criticisms of the
“moral rights” approach, but I will spend some time analysing the more specific
critiques that have been raised against the concept of moral rights to health.
The first specific objection to any human right to health claim is that the right to
health amounts to be a right to be healthy. This, it is claimed, is problematic because
if the right to health is a right to be healthy then the right to health can never be
achieved because we lack the resources and the technology to ensure that every
disease and injury can be cured (Wolff 2012). However, I see no reason to assume
that the right to be health must be equated with the right to be healthy. International
legal documents explicitly state that the legal right to health should not be interpreted
as a right to be healthy and no philosopher is likely to seriously argue that the moral
134 Utilitarians might still defend the concept of legal right and even a non-natural moral right, but only
if the adoption of such rights maximised utility.
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right to health should be interpreted in this way either. Thus, it is fair to say that this
particular objection is something of a “straw man objection” and I will not explore it
any further here.
I will also stipulate at this point that I interpret the right to health to mean a right to
healthcare. Others have argued that the right to health is broader than this and should
include the right to all of the determinants of health rather than just healthcare (Beitz
2009). Moreover, in international law, the legal right to health is defined as a right to
“a variety of goods, facilities, services, and conditions” necessary for the realisation
of health and this is interpreted to mean much more than a simple right to “medical
care” (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1976). I will
adopt the more conservative interpretation of health rights here, but my decision
should not be interpreted to mean that I reject the wider claim about the right to all the
determinants of health. Rather my decisions is based on the necessity of keeping an
already complicated argument as simple as possible.
The second specific objection that is often levelled at the right to health – and the
right to healthcare – is that there cannot be such a right because it is impossible to
determine the scope of the right (Denier 2005). In particular, it is claimed that it is
impossible to determine how much healthcare people are owed.
It is unquestionably difficult to give a precise account of the scope of the right to
health, but we can delimit the scope of the right by relying on the concept that I have
claimed that the right itself is based upon – i.e. the concept of vital interests. If we
adopt this approach we will be forced to conclude that the right to health does not
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amount to a right to every possible form of healthcare because many forms of ill-
health do not seriously affect our vital interests.135 Instead, the right to health will be a
limited right. However, although it will be hard to delimit the exact scope of the right
to health using this method we should be able to specify the scope in broad terms and
if we can do this then we can claim that the second objection can be overcome. 136
The third objection that is often raised against the right to health is that the right to
health cannot exist because, it if did, it would cause intractable “rights conflicts”. In
particular, the existence of this right would create a clash between different positive
rights and also between different positive and negative rights. The clash between the
positive right to health care and other positive rights would occur because, if we
accept that people have positive rights to health, we are also likely to think that people
have a right to a range of other social, economic and cultural goods. For example, if
we adopt the “vital interests” argument that underpins the right to health we are likely
to believe that there is right to education since education is also a vital interest.
In response, I will firstly point out that just because positive rights would clash if they
existed does not mean that they do not exist. Instead, the criticism ought to be that the
rights exist but that the clashes between them cannot be resolved in a non-arbitrary
manner. However, I also deny that this latter objection rings true because, once again,
135 For example, when people are infected with a rhinovirus and develop a common cold or when they
develop a small lipoma on their skin I think it is reasonable to say that these types of ill-health (in most
cases) do not affect people’s vital interests.
136 The American Medical Association claims that the right to health is a right to “essential” healthcare
– although the World Health Organizations (1946) claims that the right to health means a right to the
“highest attainable standard of health”. I think that the “right” answer lies somewhere in between
these claims, but I will not explore this matter further here.
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we can rely on the concept of vital interests to helps us establish some kind of
hierarchy of rights. This is not to say that the right to health will always trump other
rights – in fact it often will not – but it does mean that some kind of resolution to
positive rights clashes is possible and that the right to some level of healthcare will do
rather well in such clashes because health is often an especially vital interest.137
The clash between the positive right to health care and negative rights, meanwhile,
will occur because the positive right to healthcare implies that other people have a
positive duty to ensure that this right is upheld.138 In particular, the positive right to
health implies that other people have a duty to ensure that there are enough health
care resources available to provide care to those who have a right to such care and a
duty to bear one’s own health costs (in situations where the cost only exits because
one was morally responsible for taking risks) if failing to do so will lead to a
consumption of resources which will harm other people by depriving them of the
healthcare that they have a right to (Denier 2005).139 140
137 If we include the right to the social determinants of health in the right to health then the right to
education will also be partially subsumed under the right to health.
138 These duties follow from the proposition that people have a right to health because of the conceptual
link that exists between certain kinds of rights and duties. If people have claim rights then other people
must have duties towards those who have these rights. Thus, if I am right to argue that we all have a
right to healthcare it follows by necessity that at least one other person has a duty to ensure that we
receive the healthcare that we have a right to.
139 Importantly, the rights-harm argument does not imply that people who are morally responsible must
bear all the costs of their choices. Instead the claim is that beyond a certain threshold costs must be
borne. The threshold itself will be defined by the level of care that people have a right to – and how
expensive it proves to ensure that people who are not responsible for their ill-health get access to the
care they need. This makes the cost that people who are responsible have to bear rather fluid and
difficult to calculate, but given how expensive healthcare is it is likely that people who are morally
responsible will have to bear quite a bit of their own costs if they develop expensive diseases as a result
of their health affecting choices
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Given the existence of these duties a conflict between people’s positive right to
healthcare and people’s negative rights is inevitable. In particular, there will be
conflict between some people’s positive right to healthcare and other people’s
negative rights not to be economically productive and not to have to contribute a
portion of their productive labour to other people. This is a very serious objection
because these rights essentially amount to the right not to be forced to work when one
does not want to and the right not to have to work for the sake of other people against
one’s will. To put it bluntly, if I have a positive right to health care it means that “I
am entitled to the time, the effort, the ability, the wealth, of whoever is going to be
forced to provide that care” (Kelley 1994).141
It is difficult to know how to respond to this objection because the issue here is not
just the general problem that negative rights are usually considered to be more
important than positive rights – a problem that, in some cases, can be overcome – but
the more specific claim that the negative right to be free (i.e. the right not to be an
economic slave of sorts) seems like a much more important right than the positive
right to healthcare. Indeed, on the “vital interests” approach to rights it seems very
reasonable to conclude that the right not to be a slave protects a much more vital
interest than the right to receive healthcare.
This is not to deny that most people would benefit from having a positive right to
health and that in some situations a right to health may be more vitally important than
140 It may also mean that people have a third duty – i.e. a duty to try and remain healthy enough to work
productively. This is because people cannot fulfil their duties unless they can be productive. However,
I will not explore this “duty to be healthy” in this thesis.
141 Nozick (1977) famously describes some taxes – including taxes designed to provide health care to
others – to be on a par with slave labour.
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the right to freedom. For example, if not having access to healthcare is likely to be
mortal then it could well be argued that the right to health is more important than the
right to freedom. However, is it not just right-libertarians who will take issue with this
claim and I admit that, in general, the right to freedom will be regarded by most
people as a much more vital right than the right to health.
As such, this particular objection raises a very serious problem for the rights-harm
defence of cost bearing. Ironically enough, right-libertarians might well be able to
devise their own defence of cost bearing in relation to risky health affecting
behaviours, but their claim that the negative right to freedom trumps (or destroys)
people’s positive right to health care – a claim which many people will surely support
– means that the rights-harm argument might well come unstuck.
The last objection that I wish to discuss in this section does not challenge the
existence or the relative importance of this right but rather the separate claim that the
“right to health care without bearing costs” must be forfeitable (Denier 2005). If the
rights-harm argument is to work, the right to health without bearing costs must be
forfeitable otherwise no one could be required to bear the costs of their health care
choices even if they were morally responsible for them and even if this would cause
other people’s right to health care to be violated.
The trouble with this claim is that it is likely to prove hugely controversial. In the
academic literature the legal and moral right to free healthcare is never usually
described as a right that can be forfeited or lost in any sense (Wolff 2012). There is no
suggestion in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
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(1976) that the legal right to health can be forfeited for any reason. Likewise,
philosophers and policy makers who make reference to moral rights to health in their
work do not regard these rights as forfeitable (Beitz 2009). Yet, the positive right to
health care without bearing costs must be forfeitable if the existence of this right is to
underpin a defence of cost bearing in relation to health affecting behaviour.
What then are we to say about this matter? Can a positive right to health care without
cost bearing be forfeited? Contrary to what many writers claim, I think that this is
possible. To begin with we should bear in mind that even (allegedly) lexically prior
rights like first generation civil and political rights can be forfeited in certain
circumstances. In times of war people’s right to life can be forfeited and people’s
right to liberty can also be forfeited if they commit serious crimes.142 As such, there is
at least some reason to think that second generation rights could be forfeited in some
situations. Moreover, as we have just seen, positive rights (if they exist) will often
have to be forfeited when they clash with other negative and positive rights. For
example, if there are not enough resources to ensure that the right to education and the
right to health are fully protected then, in some situations, the right to health will have
to be partially forfeited.
Of course, these arguments simply demonstrate that the right to health without cost
bearing can be forfeited in certain situations not that the this right can be forfeited
because the exercise of that right will violate other people’s rights. However, I agree
142 Likewise, people who are infected with certain types of dangerous communicable infectious
diseases are quarantined, investigated, screened and, in some countries, treated against their will in
many jurisdictions even though this clearly involves a whole series of violations to fairly vital and
basic rights including the right to bodily integrity and the right to freedom of movement (Herring
2008).
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with Denier (2005) that “just as a person can forfeit his or her right to liberty by
criminal behaviour, one could argue that a person can forfeit his or her right to
healthcare by failing to act responsibly”. In fact, I can think of few better reasons to
defend the claim that a positive right to healthcare without cost bearing must be
forfeited than the fact that a failure to forfeit the right will violate other people’s
positive rights in situations where those who must forfeit the right are morally
responsible for putting themselves in this invidious position and where those who
would otherwise be harmed if the risk takers do not bear costs are not morally
responsible for needing heath care.
6.4.2 Does the state have the right and the duty to prevent rights violations?
Even if we accept that people have positive moral rights to health care and that other
people have corresponding duties both to add to the collective pool of resources and
to bear costs in order to avoid diminishing this pool in certain circumstances we still
need to establish that the state has the right to intervene to ensure that people’s rights
are respected and that people fulfil their duties.
The defence of state intervention in the case of the rights-harm argument is, in
principle, easier to justify than it was in the case of moralistic desert and expected
consequences. This is because the goal of state intervention in this case is the
prevention of rights violations. This is important because the prevention of rights
violations is widely considered to be one of the most important roles that states can
play. Moreover, this is a much more legitimate role than the goal of penalising
immoral behaviour or even protecting the value of autonomy. This is because the aim
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in this case is not to defend a thick or thin conception of the good but to defend a
concept of “right” and this is an advantage because it means that the state is able to
main neutrality between conceptions of the good. This, in turn, is important because it
means that the position will be more defensible from a liberal perspective.143
6.4.3 Rights Harm argument: concluding thoughts
The rights-harm defence of cost-bearing is complicated and, as we have seen, a slew
of objections can be raised against this approach to cost bearing. I have argued that
some of these objections can be rebutted but that others are very powerful and are
hard to side-step. In particular, the claim that there cannot be a positive right to health
because such a right would violate people’s negative right not to work is a very
serious one. As such, I agree with Wolff (2012) that much more philosophical work
must be carried out if a successful defence of the right to health is going to be
mounted. However, the concept of a positive moral right to health is already as much
a part of political and social discourse about health care as is the concept of a legal
right to health in international legal discourse and if these objections can be overcome
then the rights-harm defence of cost bearing will resonate with many people and may
prove to be very powerful.
Moreover, the rights-harm argument has one other important advantage over the
moralistic-desert and expected consequences accounts: it does not require people to
143 Obviously, the state would also be committed to protecting people’s negative rights too and if we
concede that people’s negative right not to work trumps people’s positive right to health care then we
will be forced to conclude that the state must not protect people’s right to health. However, if we accept
that the positive right to health trumps the negative right not to work then I think it is reasonable to
argue that the state has the right (and the duty) to enforce cost bearing where needed.
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bear costs in situations where resources are abundant. This is because, if resources
were abundant, then it would not be possible for people to harm other people by
consuming resources because there would always be plenty of resources left even
after everyone had received the healthcare that they needed. Of course, in the real
world health care resources are not abundant and nor are they every likely to be.
Nonetheless, this feature of the argument does seem like an advantage because the
very idea of making people bear costs if resources are abundant will seem repugnant
to many.
However, the rights-harm argument is also lumbered, like the expected consequences
account, with what many will regard as a major problem. This problem relates to the
fact that the rights-harm approach cannot distinguish between people who take risks
for reasonable or altruistic reasons and those who take risks for hedonistic reasons
when it comes to determining who should bear costs. The rights-harm argument will
require both pregnant women and smokers, for example, to bear costs even though
this flies in the face of most people’s intuitions.
The rights harm argument is also committed to one rather odd conclusion. If people
who take risks actually contribute more to the pool of resources than people who do
not take risks it may be that, in reality, they should not only not have to bear costs, but
they might even have more of a right to health care without paying any kind of cost
than non risk takers (Wilkinson).144 Prima facia it may seem that this is simply a
theoretical point, but because risk takers tend to die prematurely they tend to collect
fewer social security payments in the form of pensions. Furthermore, they sometimes
144 McLachlan (1995) puts the point differently and asks whether risk takers who cost less money have
the right to “ask for a rebate?”.
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cost the state less in health care spending terms because a substantial amount of health
care spending is directed at the “very” old – i.e. at people who tend not to take risks
and manage to live a long life as a result (Persaud 1995).145
Indeed, Baal et al (2008) argue that life time health costs are highest for the healthy
(these were defined as non smokers with a “normal” body mass index), lowest for
smokers and somewhere in between for the obese.146 A number of studies have also
suggested that smokers save money for the state because they have a cost-efficient
mortality rate (Dietrich 2002; Hayashida et al 2010). In other words, “the truly
burdensome individual may be the unreasonably fit senior citizen who lives on for
more than 30 years after retirement” (Wikler 1978).
We have to be careful here because many of these calculations are based on the fact
that some risk takers (most notably smokers) pay high levels of commodity taxes
already. In other words, they already bear costs (in the form of taxes) and the real
problem may be that they pay too much tax rather than the fact that they pay tax at all.
To put it another way, if they stopped paying tax they really would become a net drain
on resources and the rights-harm argument would then justify forcing them to pay
some kind of cost.
However, if risk takers did not pay any taxes (or any other similar cost) and yet still
contributed more resources to the social pool than they used it seems that these risk
takers should not have to bear any costs because they do not harm other people by
denying them resources that they had a right to. In fact, it may be non-risk takers who
145 This is partly because of the ubiquity and cost of treating dementia.
146 Their data suggests that the lifetime health cost (from the age of 20 onwards) for these groups in the
Netherlands was 281,000 Euro, 220,000 Euro and 250,000 Euro respectively.
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should bear costs in this kind of situation rather than the risk takers. Again, this is not
a likely scenario, but it is at least possible that it could happen and, if it did happen,
then those who defended cost bearing on the basis of the rights-harm argument would
be committed to this rather counter-intuitive conclusion.147
6.5 Justice and luck egalitarianism
A number of different theories of distributive justice can be relied upon to defend
cost-bearing in relation to risky health affecting behaviour. A solidarity based
argument for cost bearing has been mooted and other philosophers have argued that a
defence of cost-bearing could be derived from a theory of justice based on the
principle of fairness as reciprocity or on some kind of principle of restoration (Smart
1994; Wilkinson 1999; Brown 2009).148 A defence of cost-bearing could also be
mounted on the basis of “communitarian, libertarian and contractualist” approaches
to justice (Schmidt 2009).149
147 This is not necessarily problematic but one imagines that most people – including most health care
professionals and most policy makers – would baulk at this possibility. If so their only recourse would
be to reject the rights-harm argument as a whole. Personally, I would be reasonably happy to bite this
particular bullet, but I realise that many would not.
148 The solidarity based argument states that individuals have a duty to reciprocate with each other, a
duty to ensure that they avoid placing excessive demands on each other and a limited duty to help each
other out when there is a strong need. On the basis of this argument it has been suggested that society
should “encourage” people to act responsible by adopting healthier lifestyles, finding productive work
if they can and taking steps to avoid placing excessive demands on the healthcare system (Buyx 2008;
Brown 2009). I would argue that some degree of cost-bearing could also be based on this principle in
line with the idea that people who are morally responsible for their ill-health ought not to overly burden
their fellow citizens and, thus, abuse the solidarity principle.
149 Buyx (2008) argues that a communitarian account of justice could require individuals to contribute
to the common good by being responsible and she goes on to argue that such an account “could also
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However, in this section of the thesis I will concentrate on the theory of justice which
is commonly referred to as “luck egalitarianism”.150 I will stick to this particular
theory of justice for three reasons. Firstly, luck egalitarianism has attracted support
from a wide range of contemporary political philosophers and it is now one of the
dominant theories of distributive justice (Kymlicka 2001). Secondly, many luck
egalitarians have already suggested that the theory could defend claims of cost
bearing in relation to health (Segall 2010). Thirdly, I find luck egalitarianism to be
especially compelling and I think that it captures the essence of what is meant by
distributive fairness.
Nonetheless, before I move to the analysis of the luck egalitarian defence of cost
bearing I want to say a few words about another fairness-based defence of cost
bearing which seem to lack a name in the literature but which I will call the
“intuitive” or “common-sense” conception of distributive justice. It is worth spending
a few moments discussing this “theory” of justice because a number of bioethicists as
well as some health care professionals and patients seem to rely on this conception of
justice to underpin cost bearing claims (Schmidt 2008).
The intuitive conception of distributive fairness simply states that in situations of
resource scarcity it is unfair if people who are morally responsible for taking risks
with their health (for no good reason) avoid cost bearing because this will deplete the
legitimises a public system that exerts pressure and withholds resources in cases where individuals do
not comply”.
150 Some people prefer to use terms like “responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism” to describe what I will
call luck egalitarianism.
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resources available to other patients who are not morally responsible for their ill-
health. Wikler (1987), for example, argues that “those who risk illness by smoking,
lack of exercise and other unhealthy habits are unfairly burdening their
neighbours…Fairness demands then, that these costs be imposed on those who
generate them…the person who takes risks with his own health gambles with
resources which belong to others”.
This particular approach to cost bearing differs from the luck egalitarian approach that
I will discuss shortly because it only applies in situations of resource scarcity where
people have taken risks “for no good reasons” and it relies on a fairly unsophisticated
concept of justice. Interestingly, this account of fairness may underpin the “right-
harm” theory that I discussed in the previous section. In other words, it is possible that
the ultimate basis of the rights-harm argument is not the existence of a natural moral
right to health but the intuitive conception of fairness which states that in situations of
resource scarcity people who are morally responsible for needing extra resources must
bear costs in order to avoid taking resources that somehow belong to others. This
would imply that the language of rights is simply the gloss that is put on deeper
claims about justice. If true, this would mean that a discussion about whether people
have a positive moral right to health and whether people who are morally responsible
have to bear costs can only be settled by an analysis of the concept of justice.151
151 Wolff (2012) argues that, in a practical sense, it is easier for philosophers and activists to lobby in
favour of health policies on the basis of rights than on the basis of claims about justice because
politicians and policy makers are more familiar with – and more afraid of – the concept of moral (and
legal) rights and are thus more easily influenced by claims that certain policies will prevent rights-
violations than by claims that certain policies will prevent injustices.
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Given more space and time I would like to have explored and developed this intuitive
conception of fairness in more detail and I would also have liked to delve further into
the debate about whether the right-harm argument can be re-described as a debate
about justice. However, I will now leave these issues aside and concentrate on the
question of whether the more fully developed theory of distributive justice known as
luck egalitarianism can be relied upon to defend cost bearing claims.
6.5.1 Luck egalitarianism: a brief overview
Luck egalitarianism was first developed as a theory of justice over thirty years ago by
Ronald Dworkin and since the publication of Dworkin’s (1981a; 1981b) seminal
articles on luck egalitarianism many philosophers have developed and defended their
own version of this theory of justice (Temkin 1986; Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989;
Roemer 1998). Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is much disagreement between these
different luck egalitarians about how the theory should be defined and understood.
However, most luck egalitarians subscribe to the following propositions: (i) equality
is a core feature of justice, (ii) inequalities which are due to luck are unfair and (iii)
inequalities which are due to people’s choices are not unfair. Most, if not all, luck
egalitarians also believe that the currency of justice should be allocated in such a way
that the effects of bad luck are ameliorated (in so far as they can be) whilst the effects
of choices for which people are responsible for should be left uncompensated – unless
they are compensated for reasons that have nothing to do with justice (e.g. for reasons
of charity).152
152 The currency of justice is variously described as resources, welfare, capabilities or “access to
advantage”.
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Dworkin (2002) summed up the luck egalitarian position up by claiming that it would
be unjust if people were to ‘lead their lives with less wealth available to them, or in
otherwise less favourable circumstances…not through some choice or gamble…but
through bad brute luck’. 153 This is because Dworkin claims an unequal distribution of
the currency of justice is only fair if it is “endowment insensitive” and “ambition
sensitive” – i.e. only if reflects people’s choices rather than their circumstances.
Fundamentally, then, luck egalitarianism reflects the common ethical intuition that
people’s fate should not be determined by factors beyond their control and that they
should bear some of the costs associated with the choices that they make (Kymlicka
2001).
At this point it should be obvious why so many supporters (and critics) of luck
egalitarianism believe that this theory of justice can be deployed to defend cost
bearing in relation to risky health affecting behaviour. This is because people who
take risks with their health (and who are morally responsible for doing so) may be
said to suffer from bad “option” luck whilst people who are not morally responsible
for their ill-health may be said to suffer from bad brute luck (Cappelen and Norheim
2006; Buyx 2008). Consequently, it follows that people who are not responsible for
their ill-health should be provided with health care resources to help ameliorate the
bad luck that they have suffered, but people who are morally responsible for their ill-
153 Bad brute luck is defined by Dworkin (2002) as a “matter of how risks fall out that are not in that
sense deliberate gambles”. Option luck, by contrast, is a “matter of how deliberate and calculated
gambles turn out – whether someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she should
have anticipated and might have declined.
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health should bear their own costs because they have no justice-based claims to any
publicly funded resources (Cappelen and Norheim 2005; Feiring 2008).154
In fact, one of luck egalitarianism fiercest proponents, Richard Arneson (1989),
argues that it would be just to provide eyeglasses to patients who born with an eye
condition but “if a person became blind through deliberate and fully informed
participation in a dangerous sport that often gives rise to injuries that result in
blindness, it becomes questionable whether compensation is owed to him”.155
In summary, then, the luck egalitarian argument as it applies to health care cost
bearing can be summed up as follows:
1. Health inequalities that are due to (brute) luck are unjust and should be
ameliorated if possible.
154 The provision of health care resources would not always return those who have suffered pure brute
luck back to their pre-luck state. However, the provision of free health care would ameliorate some of
the negative consequences of ill-health in most cases and, on occasion, health care would return the
patient back to the state that was very similar to the one they were in before they suffered bad luck.
155 Waltzer (1984) argues that the provision of different goods should be ruled by different principles of
justice (because they belong to different “spheres of justice”) and he specifically argues that the
provision of healthcare belongs in its own sphere of justice and should be governed by principles of
solidarity, community, decency – rather than some luck egalitarian conception of justice. Interestingly,
some luck egalitarians have agreed with this idea and they argue that although luck egalitarianism has
its place the theory should not apply in the sphere of justice that deals with the distribution of health
and health care. In fact, some believe that health is the sphere of justice par excellence where luck
egalitarian theories should not apply (Segall 2010). I will not explore this argument in this thesis,
because I do not think that there are “internal” luck egalitarian reasons to make this claim, but I accept
that if we take into account different values this argument might undermine the luck egalitarian defence
of cost bearing in relation to risky health affecting behaviour.
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2. Health inequalities that people are morally responsible for (i.e. inequalities
that are the result of option luck) are not unjust and should not be
ameliorated on the grounds of justice.
3. The state has a right and a duty to ensure that claims of justice are met, but
has no further duty in relation to other kinds of distributive claims (e.g.
claims of charity).
4. Therefore, people who are morally responsible for their risky health
affecting choices should bear the costs of their health affecting choices
whilst those who are not morally responsible should not have to bear costs.
6.5.2 Brute and option luck and the demands of justice
The first and second premise of the argument outlined above forms the core of the
luck egalitarian thesis.156 The first of these claims, which is sometimes called the
“anti-luck” aspect of luck egalitarianism, runs counter to the right-libertarian claim
that not all inequalities which are due to bad brute luck are unjust (Knight and
Stemplowska 2011). Indeed, luck egalitarians of all stripes firmly believe that where
people are not morally responsible for an inequality the inequality is arbitrary from
the point of view of morality.157 Moreover, they also think that this moral arbitrariness
underpins both the claim that these kinds of equalities are unjust and the claim that a
156 These premises can come apart from each other. Many non-luck egalitarians agree that inequalities
that are due to brute luck are unjust (i.e. they accept the first premise of the argument) but reject the
claim that inequalities due to luck are always just (i.e. they reject the second premise of the argument).
However, though these propositions are logically distinct they can be combined and the unification of
these claims (alongside the commitment to equality) is what makes luck egalitarian a distinct theory of
egalitarian justice.
157 Rawls (1971), who is sometimes regarded as the source of inspiration for the luck egalitarian theory,
also argued that such inequalities were “arbitrary from the moral point of view”.
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theory of distributive justice must seek to “neutralize” the impact of luck.158 This
means, in the health care context, that luck egalitarians believe that health care
resources ought to be provided to those who suffer bad option luck (e.g. they are born
with a genetic disease) if the bad option luck creates an inequality in a relevant
currency of justice.
However, unlike many other egalitarians, luck egalitarians are also committed to the
claim that inequalities that people are responsible for are not unjust and should not be
ameliorated on the grounds of justice. This is sometimes called the “pro choice”
aspect of luck egalitarianism and this claim runs counter to many other egalitarian
theories of justice which state that at least some inequalities that people are morally
responsible for should be compensated. The key luck egalitarian claim here is that it is
not unfair for people to have more – or less – of the relevant currency of justice than
anyone else if these inequalities are solely the result of choice for which people are
morally responsible.159
In terms of health care, this means that “pure” luck egalitarians believe that people
who are morally responsible for their own health have no claim of justice to any
158 Luck egalitarians recognise that it is not always possible to achieve this latter goal. For example, if
someone is born with a fatal genetic disease for which there is no cure nothing much can be done to
neutralize the effects of luck. However, in other cases it is possible to distribute social goods in such a
way that those who suffer from bad brute luck can be compensated. For example, people born with
congenital deafness could receive a free cochlear hearing aid and this will at least partially compensate
for the bad luck that has occurred.
159 Admittedly, Dworkin’s (2002) definition of option luck suggests that it is only “deliberate and
calculated gambles” which lead to inequalities which are open to these claims. However, the concept
of moral responsibility is broader than this and it seems that most luck egalitarians (including Dworkin)
would agree that inequalities which are due to choices which are not gambles should also be regarded
as inequalities which are not unjust. The key, in other words, is not whether people gamble, but
whether they are morally responsible for their choices.
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health care resources. Thus, unless people are willing to provide these resources as a
matter of charity, those who are morally responsible will have to bear the costs of
their own risky health affecting choices.
Philosophers from the right of the political spectrum generally argue that the second
premise of the luck egalitarian argument is true but that the first premise is false. For
example, right-libertarians argue that we need not ameliorate all inequalities that are
due to brute luck in order to ensure that people are treated justly and as moral equals.
As far as the right-libertarian is concerned, as long as our basic liberty rights are
equally protected, people can suffer from bad brute luck (e.g. being born with a
debilitating genetic disease) without having a claim of justice against other people to
provide resources to help ameliorate their bad luck.
Philosophers from the left of the political spectrum, on the other hand, generally agree
with the first premise of the argument but deny that the second premise is true.
“Social” or “democratic” egalitarians argue that the luck egalitarians’ failure to
ameliorate (at least some) inequalities which are due to choice means that they do not
treat people fairly or as moral equals (Anderson 1999). For example, a democratic
egalitarian will argue that if a skier fractures her skull in an accident health resources
must be provided to treat the skier even if she is entirely morally responsible for her
injury.
Ideally, I would analyse both the right-wing and left-wing critiques of the luck
egalitarian defence of cost bearing in this thesis, but because I lack the space to do so
I will concentrate on the criticisms mounted by those who are on the left of the
political spectrum. I will do so because it is “left wing” criticisms which strike at the
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heart of the claim that luck egalitarians properly understand the value and meaning of
the concept of equality.
Democratic egalitarians deny that the choice/luck distinction is normatively vital and
they deny that this distinction always explains which inequalities are acceptable and
which need to be neutralised. One key reason for this is because many egalitarian
philosophers believe that people who are really committed to equality should care
more about the issue of whether people can function as equals in society than the
question of whether people are – or are not – morally responsible for their unequal
share of the currency of justice. Anderson (1999) argues that it is irrelevant if people
are unequal as a result of choice if the inequality undermines people’s civil, social and
political standing and she argues that people should be compensated to ensure that
they can participate as equals in society even if they are morally responsible for not
being able to do so.160
In response to this initial critique of luck egalitarianism, the first thing to note is that
few democratic egalitarians will be wholly opposed to the idea that the choice/luck
distinction ought to partially determine whether inequalities are unjust. In other
words, there will be situations where most democratic egalitarians will not think that
people should be compensated when their choices go awry. It is unlikely that a
democratic egalitarian would wish to compensate a gambler who has lost a small
amount of money and it is probable that they would not believe that a skier who has
suffered a small and inconsequential laceration to his leg should receive health care as
160 In a similar vein, Daniels (2008) argues that too much emphasis on personal responsibility for health
“ignores egalitarian considerations central to democratic equality [because] our health needs,
however they arise, interfere with our ability to function as free and equal citizens”.
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a matter of justice. This is because, in these situations, the outcome of the risky
choices that people make does not affect these individuals ability to function as social
equals.
The second thing to note is that although the democratic egalitarian’s objection seems
powerful when we consider people who engage in a small number of risky choices,
the objection has less resonance when we consider people who make large numbers of
risky choices. If a scuba diver takes a risk and suffers an injury that would undermine
his ability to function as an equal in society it seems intuitively true that providing
health care is just. However, if the same person scuba dives on a regular basis and
takes serious risks every time he does so it seems counter-intuitive to claim that he
must receive compensation (in the form of healthcare) every time he gets injured. The
point is that, at some stage, most people’s intuitions “flip” and they begin to think that
“enough is enough”. Part of the explanation for this has to do with the concept of
moral hazard (i.e. if people know that if they take risks they will be compensated they
are more likely to take risks), but I also think that it is because people consider it to be
unjust to continue to compensate someone who is morally responsible for taking
multiple risks.
The third thing to note is that the objection that luck egalitarianism will undermine
people’s ability to function as equals if they are made to bear costs relies on the idea
that people will have to bear costs through some kind of denial of access to health
care. The examples that Anderson (1999) herself uses – e.g. of the man left to
haemorrhage to death on the side of a street once he has been deemed to be
responsible for the road traffic accident that has caused his injury – implicitly assumes
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that cost bearing must be cashed out as denial of access. However, I do not see why
this must be the case. For example, luck egalitarians can require people to bear costs
by paying extra taxes or by purchasing health insurance – in which case there will be
no denial of benefit and people will not lose their ability to function as equals.
Another major critique of the luck egalitarian position is that luck egalitarianism fails
to respect people as equals because it “insults” those who suffer from certain kinds of
inequalities as a consequence of luck. It is claimed that because luck egalitarians wish
to offer compensation to those who are congenitally deaf on the grounds that they are
unlucky and unfortunate this means that they inevitably insult people by treating these
deaf people with “offensive pity” (Knight and Stemplowska 2011). Anderson (1999)
also argues that luck egalitarians are committed to officially informing certain people
that they are disadvantaged even when they can function as equal citizens and she
goes onto argue that this will fatally undermine people’s self-respect. Furthermore,
Wolff (1998) claims that luck egalitarianism requires people to “self-reveal”
themselves as disadvantaged through no fault of their own and this, he claims, is
humiliating.
In response to these closely related set of objections I will begin by pointing out that
democratic egalitarians are just as likely to see inequalities as disadvantages that need
rectifying in some situations. If being born with congenital deafness undermines
people’s ability to function as social equals, democratic egalitarians will themselves
wish to identify this inequality as a disadvantage and would wish to ameliorate it, if
possible, through the provision of health care resources. Moreover, they would have
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to “officially” inform these people of their disadvantage too. As such, it is not quite
clear why this approach is any less “insulting” than the luck egalitarian approach.
Admittedly, democratic egalitarians are likely to argue that the way in which such
inequalities should be tackled is not through the allocation of more resources to those
who are disadvantaged but by changing social attitudes so that people with these
conditions can function effectively. However, luck egalitarians might be equally
content with neutralizing the effects of luck in these situations in exactly the same
way.
I would also argue that whether people really regard it as insulting to be compensated
because of bad luck is not clear. Perhaps in today’s society this might be true, but if
people begin to see the justice of the luck egalitarian account then fewer people would
be concerned with revealing to themselves – and others – that they are not responsible
for certain conditions and they would then cease to be humiliated or insulted by such
revelations.
6.5.3 State interference in the name of justice
I argued earlier that state intervention is easier to justify in the case of rights
violations than it is in relation to the moralistic desert and expected consequences
defence of cost bearing. This is because rights violations are an especially serious
offence and the state has more solid grounds to interfere to prevent such violations
from occurring than it does to protect autonomy or to penalise people who engage in
allegedly immoral behaviour which only harms the person who engages in the
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behaviour. In the case of luck egalitarianism I argue that state intervention is also
much easier to justify than it is in the moralistic-desert and expected consequences
account. This is because the purpose of state intervention where luck egalitarianism is
concerned is to ensure that justice is done. The point being that claims of justice are,
like rights claims, normatively very strong which means that if we accept that
someone is owed something in the name of justice governments have a powerful
prima facia right and duty to ensure that what is owed is provided.
In the context of the luck egalitarian argument this means that the state has a right and
a duty to ensure that people who suffer from bad brute luck receive compensation
whilst also ensuring that people who suffer from bad option luck do not receive
compensation – at least not as a matter of state-enforced justice. Thus, the state must
intervene to ensure that people who suffer from bad brute luck receive health care and
the state has an obligation to ensure that people who suffer from (pure) option luck
bear the health costs of their choices. This does not mean that the state must intervene
wherever some form of unfairness occurs. However, where the claims of justice relate
to something as vitally important as health and health care legitimate concerns about
state interference ought to be trumped by the overriding need to ensure that justice is
done.
Importantly, the luck egalitarian defence of state intervention is also easier to defend
than state intervention in the name of autonomy or moralistic desert because there is
no requirement in this case for the state to intervene to defend a certain conception of
the good. Instead, the state is simply intervening to ensure that (distributive) justice is
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done. In this sense the luck egalitarian shares with the right-harm argument a
commitment to liberal neutrality.
6.5.4 Luck egalitarianism: concluding thoughts
The luck egalitarian conception of justice is not the only conception of justice in
existence, but this particular theory does capture the essence of the meaning of
fairness in relation to the distribution of goods and I think that we can only treat
people as moral equals if we ensure that it is only the inequalities caused by “option”,
rather than “brute”, luck that are compensated on the grounds of fairness. As such,
this account of justice offers a very powerful defence of the claim that people who are
morally responsible should bear the costs of their health affecting choices. This is not
to say that the luck egalitarian position is invulnerable. Indeed, many powerful
objections can be levelled at the luck egalitarian position from both the right and the
left of the political spectrum. Nonetheless, I think that this particular conception of
justice is correct and I also think that it provides the most powerful defence of cost
bearing in relation to risky health affecting choices of all the arguments that I will
discuss in this thesis.
Before I move onto the utilitarian argument, however, I wish to point out that the luck
egalitarianism argument shares with the moralistic desert and the expected
consequences arguments the feature that it would require people to bear health care
costs even if resources were abundant. In other words, luck egalitarians are effectively
“blind” to the availability of resources and cannot accommodate the claim that people
should receive resources as a matter of justice even if there are plenty of resources
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available for people suffering from bad brute and option luck. This is because the
availability of resources does not affect the claim that people who suffer from bad
option luck should not receive compensation in the name of justice.161 Again, this is a
very counter-intuitive and many people will believe that such an implication
undermines the normative power of the argument. However, as ever, these intuitions
may be wrong and, even if they are not, I think that the power of the luck egalitarian
argument entails that we must bite this bullet too.
It is also important to recognise that luck egalitarians cannot distinguish between
people who take different types of risks or who take risks for different reasons.
Instead they are committed to the claim that everyone who is morally responsible for
taking risks must bear costs (Fleurbaey 1995). As I have mentioned earlier, such a
conclusion runs counter to most people’s intuitions and many will regard this
implication of the luck egalitarian argument as normatively untenable. However, as I
have also argued above, it may be that most people’s intuitions about this matter are
wrong and given how compelling the luck egalitarian argument is, this is one bullet
which I think we must bite.162
161 As it happens, luck egalitarians would have no objection if people suffering from bad option luck
received these resources as a matter of charity (which is not true in the case of the moralistic desert and
the expected consequences argument), but this does not change the fact that pure luck egalitarians
would refuse to provide resources to people in the name of justice even if these resources were
plentiful.
162 Some luck egalitarians “escape” from this objection by arguing that luck egalitarianism is but one
component of justice (and but one component of morality) and that it can be supplement with other
conceptions of justice (and other moral values) which then enable “intuitive” distinctions to be made
(Segall 2010). However, from the “pure” luck egalitarian position such an escape route is not possible.
263
6.6 The utilitarian defence of cost-bearing
The last normative defence of cost bearing in relation to risky health affecting
behaviour that I will discuss is an argument based on utilitarian principles. In effect,
the utilitarian argument is a very simple one and can be summed up as follows: people
should be made to bear the cost of some of their risky health affecting choices
because this is the best way to maximise net utility.163 However, though the essence of
the argument is simple enough to state the argument rests on a number of contestable
empirical and normative claims that need further exploration. The complete utilitarian
defence of cost bearing runs as follows:
1. People can improve their health by modifying their health affecting
behaviours.
2. People who are healthy have higher levels of utility than those who are not
healthy.
3. Forcing people to bear some (non-marginal) amount of the costs of their
health affecting choices will increase the probability that people will modify
their health affecting behaviour in a way that will improve their health.
4. Forcing people to bear some (non-marginal) amount of the costs of their
health affecting choices will lead to a net gain in utility.
5. Increasing net utility should be the ultimate goal of all actions.
163 The core of the utilitarianism itself may be summarised very simply: an act (or a rule) is good if it
increases net utility and the best act (or rule) is the act (or rule) which maximises net utility. The theory
is consequentialist in nature for it determines the moral worth of an action (or rule) by appeal to the
consequences of the action rather than to its motive or nature. In this sense utilitarians regard acts (or
rules) as only instrumentally, rather than intrinsically, immoral.
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6. The state has the right and the duty to implement policies which increase
net utility
7. Therefore, forcing people to bear the costs of their health-affecting choices
is defensible on utilitarian grounds
I have argued extensively for the first premise of this argument in earlier chapters and
I will not rehearse these arguments again here. Likewise, I will take it as read that the
second premise is true.164 However, the other premises of the argument are more
controversial and I will now attempt to provide evidence for the empirical claims
made in the third and fourth premise before moving on to discuss the normative
claims made in the fifth and sixth premise.165
6.6.1 Enforcing cost bearing improves health
164 It may be possible to dispute the assertion that healthier people have higher levels of utility, but this
does not seem like a promising rebuttal because people will generally experience greater levels of
pleasure and happiness if they are healthier. Moreover, most people have a strong preference for being
healthy and being healthy is a usually regarded as a constituent part of any “objective” concept of the
good. As such, it seems fairly obvious that, ceteris paribus, being healthy will lead to greater levels of
utility than being unhealthy regardless of how we define utility.
165 Utilitarians could also argue that people should be made to bear costs if they take some types of
risks with their health because people who suffer from conditions caused by some types of risky
behaviour have a worse prognosis than people who suffer from conditions not caused by risky
behaviour. For example, Skarkey and Gillam (2010) argue that “patients with self inflicted diseases (eg
obesity-related diseases) should have lower priority in access to healthcare because they are more
likely to experience poor medical outcomes”. Such claims are usually based on the fact that people who
suffer from conditions caused by risky behaviour (e.g. smoking and drinking alcohol) are more likely
to continue to engaging in these risky behaviours after that have received treatment. This argument is
often made in relation to liver transplants for people suffering alcoholic liver diseases. If true, then it
makes sense to make these people bear costs because it ensures that limit resources are spent on
patients where the treatment will be more effective.
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Prima facia the claim that people will modify their behaviour if non-marginal costs
are imposed on their choices may seem obvious. Standard economic theory would
suggest that this is the case because, if we are rational agents, a non-marginal increase
in the cost of a given action will inevitably influence our choices. Quite what counts
as a non-marginal cost is not easy to decide, but no one is likely to deny that forcing
people to pay some of the costs of their health-affecting choices will usually count
regardless of the form that the cost takes.166
A number of commentators have specifically argued that implementing policies which
force smokers to pay costs by denying them access to coronary bypass surgery will
encourage smokers to give up their habit (Kass 1975; Sharkey and Gillam 2010). In a
similar vein, Smart (1994) has argued that providing equal access to people who are
and who are not responsible for their ill-health creates a perverse incentive and thus
increases the number of people who take risks with their health. Denier (2005) also
argues that a denial of access policy would “scare a considerable number of people
away from smoking, drinking, unsafe sexual activities and other forms of hazardous
behaviour”.
Furthermore, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that imposing non marginal
costs does change people’s behaviour. In particular, there is considerable evidence to
suggests that higher rates of tobacco taxation has led to a decrease in the number of
people who smoke and the amount of tobacco that smokers consume. For example,
the World Bank (2012) suggests that a price increase of 10% on a packet of cigarettes
166 The form that the cost takes will almost certainly affect the probability that the cost will have an
impact on people’s behaviour.
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reduces consumption by about 4%. Furthermore, modelling carried out Levy et al
(2005) indicates that when tax increases by a factor of 10 (indexed to inflation) the
smoking prevalence rate is likely to fall by 15% in the immediate aftermath of the
increase and by 30% over the following decades. The evidence is now so strong that
the US National Cancer Institute Expert Panel (1993) claims that “a substantial
increase in tobacco excise taxes may be the single most effective measure for
decreasing tobacco consumption”.
Admittedly, the evidence is not incontrovertible. Poorer people in the US tend to lack
as much health insurance cover as their wealthier counterparts and yet the fact that
they effectively facer higher health costs if they fall ill – and sometimes have to forgo
treatment altogether because they cannot afford to pay – does not seem to make them
take fewer risks than their wealthier compatriots. In fact, smoking and many other
forms of common risky behaviours, as I have noted in previous chapters, are much
more common in lower socio-economic groups.
This suggests that the prospect of bearing higher costs does not modify people’s
behaviour and Harris (1995) argues that this is not surprising because: “if the prospect
of better health and a longer life on the one hand and fear of premature death from
cancer or heart disease on the other does not act as an incentive, it is unlikely that the
further fear of failure to get priority in medical care will add much to the incentives
and disincentives already in place”.
However, in the case of poorer people, it may well be that other factors are
influencing their choices to continue smoking and taking risks – e.g. ignorance of the
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degree of risk that they are taking and ignorance about the costs of health care – and if
these other factors were nullified people in lower social groups might react rather
differently. Moreover, though Harris’ point is an important one there is still plenty of
evidence to suggest that enforcing costs (especially by placing taxes on dangerous
products like tobacco and alcohol) does diminish the number of people who take
certain kinds of risks. As such, there is sufficient reason to think that the third premise
of utilitarian cost-bearing argument is true.
6.6.2 Enforced cost-bearing and net welfare
In the previous section I have tried to establish that there is good evidence to believe
that cost-bearing policies will reduce the probability that people will engage in risky
health affecting behaviours. If this is true then it follows that implementing such
policies will improve the overall level of health in society. Moreover, if we assume
that increased health leads to increased welfare we now have a prima facia reason to
think that cost bearing policies will improve people’s wellbeing.
However, to establish the truth of the fourth premise of the argument stated above –
i.e. that enforcing cost bearing policies will lead to an increase in net utility – it will
be necessary to take a wider perspective on these matters. This is because health is not
the only variable which impacts on utility even if we define utility in an objective
rather than a subjective way. As such, a careful analysis of all the ramifications that a
268
cost bearing policy might have needs to be made before we can claim that these
policies can be defended on a utilitarian basis.167
There are a number of reasons why we might think that cost-bearing policies will
improve utility. The first reason is the one that I have mentioned above: cost bearing
policies will change health affecting behaviour for the better and the greater levels of
health that this will engender will lead to greater levels of utility. But cost-bearing
policies might also improve utility because they increase people’s sense of autonomy
(Waller 2005).
The claim that greater autonomy leads to greater utility is not especially controversial,
but the further claim that the enforcement of cost-bearing policies will lead to greater
levels of autonomy sounds paradoxical in the extreme. The natural assumption is that
any enforcement of cost will, by definition, reduce people’s range of options and,
consequently, their autonomy. However, if we utilise a thicker concept of autonomy
which takes into account second and third order preferences it is possible that we may
be drawn to the opposite conclusions.
The key point here is that many people wish to remain healthy and many people have
a second order desire to engage in positive health affecting behaviours and avoid risky
health affecting behaviours. However, most people find it difficult to act on these
preferences and desires because they are “overwhelmed” by first order desires. This is
important, because if cost bearing policies enabled people to act on their higher order
167 I will not attempt to provide an exhaustive analysis of all the possible ramifications of all possible
cost bearing policies here, but I will spend some time exploring some of the key ramifications and their
likely impact on net utility.
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preferences then it could be argued that such policies increase people’s autonomy to
act on their deep-seated preferences.
Needless to say, the notion that enforced cost-bearing policies would, in reality,
enable people to act on their higher order preferences is controversial. However, this
is not an entirely absurd claim and if it could be established that such policies did
increase people’s autonomy it might then be possible to infer that cost bearing
policies not only increase utility by directly improving health but also increase utility
by increasing people’s ability to act on their higher order preferences.
Cost-bearing policies might also improve utility in an even more in-direct way. This is
because these policies, in so far as they are effective in improving people’s health,
might free up health care resources that could be spent on improving utility in other
ways. For example, these resources could be used to provide greater levels of
paediatric health care or they could be used for other social purposes – such as
providing better educational facilities, higher social security or more public parks –
that almost everyone would benefit from. The underlying point is that providing
health care resources to those who need them represents a major opportunity cost
which means that there is real merit in the claim that utility could be enhanced if at
least some of these resources could be used for other goals.
These kinds of considerations provide reasons to believe that cost-bearing policies
increase people’s welfare. But there are a number of reasons why these policies might
decrease people’s welfare too. The most obvious reason why this might occur is
precisely because, whatever form the cost takes, the imposition of a cost is, prima
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facia, bad.168 Different health care cost bearing policies will engender different levels
of harm. Financial costs, for example, would reduce the amount of resources people
can spend on other goods, whilst denial of access to healthcare would leave some
people in extreme pain.169 However, all costs will dent utility to some extent whatever
form the cost takes. 170
Cost bearing policies might also cause a loss of utility because some people find
responsibility itself hard to bear. There is some reason to believe that certain groups
of patients prefer not to take decisions about their health care and other groups of
patients – e.g. people who have a fatalistic approach to health – are less willing to take
proactive steps to remain healthy. Moreover, many people experience the desire to
place the “locus of control” for health somewhere beyond themselves and find it
difficult to take responsibility for their own health. These factors matter because if
utilitarians argue that cost bearing policies will encourage people to take greater
responsibility for their actions and it is then found that many people find taking
responsibility onerous, cost bearing policies will cause a great deal of distress and
may, thus, decrease net utility.
168 Conceptually, this is what makes a cost a cost and gives the concept of a cost an inherent negative
value.
169 It is also important to bear in mind that the fear of having to pay costs (especially if these costs take
the form of denial of treatment) may significantly decrease people’s welfare. Such indirect negative
effects on human welfare may be hard to measure, but they need to be taken into account when
balancing the effects of cost-bearing policies on people’s health.
170 It may also be the case that the enforcement of certain cost bearing policies will lead to a “double”
loss of utility because some people will simply “pay” the extra cost and continue to behave in exactly
the same way as they did before the cost was forced upon them. For example, some people will
continue to smoke exactly the same amount of cigarettes that they previously smoked even if tax duties
were increased substantially. Thus, some people will suffer a double jeopardy because they will pay
two costs (i.e. the tax cost and the cost of suffering from ill-health).
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Against this, it might be said that taking steps to improve or maintain one’s health is
empowering. People may find the task daunting to begin with, but once they begin to
take control of their own lives they will see the merit of doing so and this will become
self-reinforcing. Some people, once they come to realise how powerful and effective a
tool “taking” responsibility is, may even seize the opportunity to take control of their
own lives and benefit considerably as a result. Pandering to people’s weaknesses may
not be the best way to improve people’s health and wellbeing because challenging
people to overcome their weakness may, in the long run, prove to be a far more
effective way of improving health and wellbeing.
The adoption of cost bearing policies may also lead to a loss of utility for the indirect
reason that an overemphasis on personal responsibility may prevent politicians,
physicians and patients from focussing on the social and environmental causes of ill-
health. Quite how big a risk is involved here is hard to determine, but the risk is
almost certainly real. However, as I argued in the first chapter, there is no necessary
link between placing an emphasis on personal responsibility for health policies and
de-emphasising the role that socio-economic factors play in determining people’s
behaviour and health or visa versa. The concepts of social and personal responsibility
for health are not mutually exclusive. Thus, although we need to especially vigilant in
order to ensure that we pay sufficient heed to personal and social factors there is no
reason to think that we cannot achieve this goal.
In summary, I think it is reasonable to claim that cost bearing policies are likely to
increase and decrease utility for different reasons and in different ways. The great
difficulty lies in determining whether these policies are more likely to lead to a net
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increase or decrease in utility. There is obviously no way of answering this question a
priori even if we can predict that the more serious the cost the stronger the deterrent
effect will be and the more suffering will be caused to those who must pay the cost.
This means that a careful, policy by policy, empirical assessment is needed if a
defence of cost bearing on utilitarian grounds is to be successfully grounded on this
empirical claim. However, we have at least some reason to think that some forms of
cost bearing polices might not only change people’s behaviour but will also have a
positive net effect on utility.
6.6.3 Increasing net welfare should be the ultimate goal of all moral action
Utilitarianism is a normative theory with a long history. It is elegant and simple to
understand and it also unquestionably captures some of our intuitions about what
morality is about. In particular, it reflects the common belief that at least one
constituent part of morality has something to do with increasing and, ideally,
maximising utility. It is partly for these reasons and partly because the utilitarian
theory is so easily applicable that utilitarian thinking has had such a strong hold over
policy makers and politicians over the last century or so. Indeed, health care policy
makers today, though they are also influenced by liberal egalitarian and libertarian
theories of justice, are still very much influenced by utilitarian thinking. For example,
one of the key quasi-governmental health organisations in the UK, the National
Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) partly assesses the value of
medical treatments on the basis of a cost-effective analysis that is, at heart, utilitarian
in nature (Herring 2010).
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However, though utilitarianism has strong roots and is often used as the basis of
policy making decisions in many branches of government many philosophers have
come to reject utilitarianism as a basis moral and political philosophy. This is not the
place or the time to venture into an in-depth discussion of the merits and demerits of
utilitarianism as a normative thesis, but I will discuss one narrow critique of
utilitarianism which is very germane to this thesis.
The objection that I will focus on has been mentioned already and it is this: the
utilitarian defence of cost-bearing applies whether people are morally responsible for
their health or not. To illustrate the point we can imagine utilitarian policy makers
implementing a tax policy with the aim of decreasing risky behaviour in order to
increase net health and net utility. Let us say that they succeed and that 20% of people
respond in the way envisaged and that the remaining 80% do not change their
behaviour. Let us further stipulate that 50% of those who don’t change their behaviour
could not have done so anyway (i.e. perhaps because they were completely addicted
and would not stop even if the tax increase was much more substantial) and that 50%
of those who do change their behaviour do so for reasons beyond their control (i.e.
they change behaviour not because they consciously think about the options but
because the tax policy works like a sub-conscious “nudge”).
If this is how the policy works then it clearly will not be sensitive to moral
responsibility considerations. Some people will end up bearing added costs even
though they are not morally responsible (e.g. the addicted group) whilst others will
avoid bearing costs even though their success in avoiding the cost had nothing to do
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with any choice for which they can be moral responsible (i.e. those influenced by
nudge factors). The question is: does this matter?
Utilitarians will argue that this does not matter because their sole concern is the
maximisation of utility. However, anyone who believes that moral responsibility is a
necessary condition for legitimate cost-bearing will deny that this is so. Indeed, it is
worth reiterating that every other normative argument that I have analysed assumes
that moral responsibility is necessary for cost bearing. This means that a very large
number of philosophers will claim that there is something fundamentally wrong with
the utilitarian approach to this matter.
On the other hand, we cannot simply stipulate that moral responsibility is necessary
because utilitarians will rightly claim that this simply begs the question against them.
Nevertheless, given the weight of opposition against the utilitarian claim the burden
of proof probably lies on their shoulders and I must admit that I am not convinced that
utilitarians can really offer a way of proving that it is normatively legitimate to hold
people to account even if they are not morally responsible for their risky choices.171
171 One route around this problem would be for utilitarians to adopt a pluralistic position whereby
people are required to bear costs if this increases net utility, but only if they are morally responsible
too. In many ways I think this plural solution offer a very powerful argument in favour of cost-bearing
and I think that many policy makers and lay people would support such a normative position.
Nonetheless, I will not discuss this option any further here because as I stated at the beginning of the
chapter I would avoid discussing normative defences of cost bearing which are based on multiple
values.
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6.6.4 The state has the right and the duty to implement policies which maximise
utility
The last premise that needs to be established if the utilitarian argument is going to be
successful in defending cost bearing is the claim that the state has the right and the
duty to implement policies which maximise utility. Utilitarians can certainly argue
that the state has this right and duty because the ultimate goal of morality, from the
utilitarians’ perspective, is to maximise utility and so, if state intervention is the best
means to this goal, then state intervention is permissible.
However, many utilitarians concede that although the state has the right and duty to
intervene in the name of utility, it should avoid doing so because state intervention
will often lead to a decrease in net utility. One reason for this is because state
intervention can cause much harm to other values (such as autonomy) which also
contribute to utility. In fact, it is this kind of consideration which ultimately
underwrites the harm argument that I discussed earlier in this chapter.172
Whether utilitarians would be willing to enforce cost bearing is, thus, a delicate matter
and it entirely depends on what the overall impact of state interference would be on
net utility. That John Stuart Mill (1998), one of the most eloquent defenders of
utilitarianism, was so opposed to state intervention might incline us to think that
although utilitarians can, in theory, defend state interference to maximise utility
172 It is also the case, of course, that non-utilitarians will deny that the state can interfere with people’s
lives in the name of utility because they deny the core utilitarian claim that the primary goal of morality
is to maximise utility.
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through the imposition of cost bearing policies, such an approach is not likely to be
defensible in practice. However, we ought not to jump to this conclusion. In order to
be sure a careful analysis of the effect that state interference in the form of enforced
cost-bearing has on net utility is needed and it is possible that at least some forms of
cost bearing (e.g. taxes on risky commodities) would not have a deleterious net effect.
As such, we must at this time suspend judgment on this issue until further empirical
work is carried out to determine how state interference via cost bearing affects net
utility.
6.6.5. Utilitarianism: concluding thoughts
The utilitarian argument offers a powerful normative defence of cost-bearing in
relation to risky health affecting behaviours. However, defending cost bearing on the
basis of utilitarianism is not without its problems. In particular, this defence relies on
empirical claims which are difficult to prove and which cannot yet be shown to be
true because we lack adequate data. Additionally, this defence rests on normative
claims about the value of utility and utility maximisation which many will deny. The
pure utilitarian position also denies that moral responsibility is a necessary condition
for consequential responsibility and many people will find this troubling because it
means that some people will be made to suffer even though they were not morally
responsible for their ill-health.
On the other hand, the utilitarian argument does have the added “intuitive” advantage
that it would not necessarily require people to bear the costs of their choices if
resources were abundant. If resources were abundant then the disutility of not
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providing resources when they were easily available would probably outweigh any
benefit derived from influencing people’s behaviour. However, this too is an
empirical claim that must be shown to be true and it may be that the disincentive
effects remain powerful enough to defend cost bearing policies even when resources
are available.
The utilitarian argument also offers some scope for distinguishing between different
types of risky behaviour. In a prima facia sense the utilitarian argument is not
committed to making any distinctions between different risk taking behaviours.
However, it does not rule out the possibility of making of these distinctions either.
This is because utilitarians are committed to adopting the policies which maximise
utility and it may be that requiring cost bearing in every kind of case achieves this
goal, but, equally, it may be that this is only true in relation to certain kinds of risk
taking behaviour.
Indeed, I would argue that because certain risky health-affecting behaviours are
instrumentally very valuable (i.e. they themselves help to increase utility) whilst
others are not, utilitarians are likely to conclude that distinctions can be made. For
example, fire fighting, falling pregnant and engaging in everyday risks are, in most
cases, instrumentally valuable activities and so it is unlikely that utilitarians would
want to disincentivise these kinds of behaviours through cost-bearing polices. Thus,
although the utilitarian defence of cost bearing policies cannot distinguish between
cases in an a priori fashion, it is almost certain that the utilitarian approach would
closely mimic the distinctions made by the moralistic desert argument discussed
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above and will, consequently, draw conclusions about who should (and who should
not) bear costs which will be inline with most people’s intuitions.
6.7 Convergence and divergence
In the introductory chapter and again at the beginning of this chapter I made reference
to a number of “convergence” claims. One of these convergence claims was that the
five normative arguments discussed above would converge to defend cost-bearing
policies in relation to certain “core” groups of risky health affecting behaviours. I also
noted that they would diverge in relation to another set of “non-core” cases. Now that
I have analysed the five normative arguments in some detail I will highlight the types
of cases where the five arguments converge to defend cost bearing and where they
pull apart from each other. I will then briefly discuss these findings before bringing
this chapter to a close and moving on to discuss cost bearing policy options in more
depth.
The following table (Figure 6.0) describes all the risky health affecting behaviours
that I identified in chapter four and details whether the five normative arguments that
I have outlined in this chapter defend cost bearing in relation to these risky
behaviours. 173 Where a check mark (✔) is present the claim being made is that cost
bearing can be defended on the basis of a relevant normative argument. Where a cross
(X) is present the claim being made is that cost bearing cannot be defended. Where a
check mark and a cross (✔/X) co-exist, this indicates that whether cost bearing is
173 I have also added one more “behaviour” – or, rather, reason for behaviour – namely: “health risks
taken for altruistic or socially valuable reasons”.
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defensible or not is unclear – though the presence of a star next to a check mark (✔*)
mark indicates that cost bearing is probably defensible and the presence of a star next
to a cross (X*) indicates that cost bearing is probably not defensible.
Figure 6.0. Risky Behaviours and Normative Arguments.
Desert Expected
Consequences
Rights-
Harm
Luck
egalitarianism
Utilitarianism
Smoking ✔ ✔* / X ✔ ✔ ✔* / X
Alcohol ✔ ✔* / X ✔ ✔ ✔* / X
Illicit Drugs ✔ ✔* / X ✔ ✔ ✔* / X
Unhealthy
Food
✔ ✔* / X ✔ ✔ ✔* / X
Unprotected
sex (aim =
pregnancy)
X ✔ / X* ✔ ✔ ✔ / X*
Unprotected
sex (aim ≠
pregnancy)
✔ ✔* / X ✔ ✔ ✔* / X
Excessive
UV light
exposure
✔ ✔* / X ✔ ✔ ✔* / X
Exercise &
Sports
X ✔ / X* ✔ ✔ ✔ / X*
Occupational
hazards
X ✔ / X* ✔ ✔ ✔ / X*
Everyday
risks
X ✔ / X* ✔ ✔ ✔ / X*
Preventative
Health Care
✔ ✔* / X ✔ ✔ ✔* / X
Post
diagnosis
behaviour
✔ ✔* / X ✔ ✔ ✔* / X
Health risks
taken for
altruistic or
socially
valuable
reasons
X ✔ / X* ✔ ✔ ✔ / X*
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As we can see from the table the rights-harm and luck egalitarian arguments (in their
“pure” forms) defend cost bearing regardless of the type of risk being taken or the
reason why the risk is being taken, whilst the moralistic desert argument only defends
cost bearing in a limited number of “core” cases. 174 The expected consequences and
utilitarian arguments are less clear cut but both could, in theory, make similar
distinctions between core and non core cases.
6.8 Consequential responsibility: general conclusion
In this chapter I have presented and analysed five normative arguments which may be
used to defend the idea that some people who are morally and/or causally responsible
for their health should be forced to bear some of the costs associated with their risky
health affecting behaviour. I have also argued that these arguments converge to
defend cost bearing in relation to certain “core” risky health affecting behaviours and
that they diverge in relation to other “non-core” behaviours. Moreover, I have argued
that the luck egalitarian offers the most defensible defence of cost bearing of all the
arguments that I have analysed here.
174 The “core” cases that all five normative arguments (probably) converge around are the cases where
people smoke, drink alcohol, use recreational drugs, consume too many “dangerous” food substances,
expose themselves to UV light, have unprotected sex for reasons other than procreation, fail to engage
in preventative health care and fail to modify their post-diagnosis behaviour.
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Chapter 7
Cost Bearing Policies
“We took risks, we knew we took them; things have come out against us, and
therefore we have no cause for complaint.”
– Robert Falcon Scott
7.0 Cost bearing: a brief introduction
Thus far in this thesis I have argued that people can, to an extent, be causally and
morally responsible for their ill-health and that there are a number of normative
arguments which can be deployed to defend the idea that people should bear some
portion of the costs associated with their risky health affecting choices.
My primary goals in this chapter will be threefold. Firstly, I will discuss how cost
bearing might be operationalised in the real world.175 In particular, I will discuss five
main policy options that I will dub the “denial of access to health care”, “payment”,
“reduced priority”, “risk tax” and “risk insurance” policies.176 Secondly, I will argue
that, of these five policies, the risk tax and risk insurance polices are the most
practically feasible and normatively defensible. Thirdly, I will defend the convergence
175 In other words, I will outline and analyse a range of responsibility-sensitive health care policies
which would ensure that people who are responsible for their health affecting behaviour bear some of
the costs associated with their choices.
176 This is not an exhaustive list of possible cost bearing policies. However, all five of these policies
have been previously mooted by academics and they have all been implemented somewhere in the
developed world. As such, I believe they deserve special attention. I will, however, mention another
possible policy approach in the final chapter which has not previously been implemented.
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claim that all five normative arguments discussed in the last chapter can be relied
upon to defend the risk tax and risk insurance policy schemes.177
Importantly, I will not discuss any form of “meta” cost-bearing policy in this chapter.
For example, I will not defend some kind of hybrid policy, such as a joint “risk tax”
and “priority” policy and I will also largely refrain from analysing how the value of
responsibility should be intertwined with other values such as need and cost-
effectiveness. My rationale for avoiding these kinds of syntheses is simply that
analysing cost bearing policies in isolation form each other – and in isolation from a
more pluralist framework will help to avoid unnecessary confusion. Adopting this non
hybrid, non pluralist approach will also allow me to more easily identify the strengths
and weaknesses of each of the policies that I will discuss. I accept that my account of
cost bearing policies will be of less immediate practical use as a result of taking such
an approach, but I also think that this “purer” method will provide a useful and clear
framework for policy makers who wish to integrate responsibility based cost-bearing
polices into politically feasible health policies.
7.1 Denial of access to health care: the policy
Perhaps the most obvious way of ensuring that people bear some health cost is to
deny access to health care to anyone who develops an illness or an injury as a
consequence of a health affecting behaviour for which they are fully causally and/or
morally responsible (Veatch 1980; Wikler 1987; Morreim 1995). People who are
partially causally and/or morally responsible, meanwhile, would receive free health
177 I will also spend some time explaining why this convergence claim is not true of the other policy
options – i.e. why the other options cannot be defended by all five normative arguments.
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care to cover that fraction of their ill-health that they were not responsible for but
would be denied further access to health care and people who were not at all causally
and/or morally responsible would be eligible for free health care to cover all their
health needs.178
In practical terms the denial of access to health policies would be dependent on health
care professionals making assessments of their patient’s degree of causal and moral
responsibility when they first make contact with them. More specifically, health care
professionals would have to interview and examine their patients and then try to
determine both the diagnosis, the cause of the diagnosis and the degree of causal and
moral responsibility for the ill-health or injury that had been sustained. This policy
would also require health care professionals to make similar judgments on an on-
going basis to determine the extent to which people were causally and morally
responsible for their post-diagnosis behaviour. For example, patients would have to be
assessed regularly to determine whether they were complying with medication,
attending appointments regularly and properly monitoring their health.
In some cases it would be possible to determine the existence and degree of moral
responsibility in the first “screening” session quite easily. If the patient was an
incompetent child, or if the patient was clearly suffering from a “pure” genetic
disease, or if the patient had been injured whilst playing an extreme sport, it would be
easy enough to determine the existence – and the degree – of causal and moral
178 In a similar vein it would also be possible to ensure that people who present with diseases or injuries
for which they are not responsible, but who fail to attend appointments or adhere to treatment
regimens, bear some kind of cost if their failure to maintain their health was something for which they
were causally and/or morally responsible for.
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responsibility. However, in many cases it would not be possible to come to any kind
of definitive conclusion about the diagnosis, let alone the extent to which people
might be causally and morally responsible, during the initial consultation (Harris
1995). As such, many consultations – and possibly quite a lot of investigations –
would be needed before any firm conclusions could be drawn. In the interim period,
treatment might well have to be provided to prevent progression of the disease as well
as to treat any symptoms that might arise.179
In these kinds of situations if a patient was found to be causally and morally
responsible at a later date access could be halted from this point forth but nothing
could realistically be done about the earlier “illegitimate” access to health care.
Technically, attempts could be made to return the patient back to the state they were
in pre-diagnosis. Alternatively, payments could be demanded retrospectively for the
healthcare that had already been provided. However, unless there was a deliberate
attempt to mislead (i.e. unless patients knew they were causally responsible for a
disease and/or morally responsible for taking the risk that caused the disease and had
tried to hide this fact) this would be unfair and, in some cases, impossible because the
bills might be too high for the patient to afford. Moreover, any attempt to return
people back to their pre-illness state would be quite barbarous and, in some cases,
impossible to achieve. As such, even under a denial of access approach some health
care would have to be provided for free even for those who were entirely causally and
morally responsible.
179 In emergency situations this would almost always be true.
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7.1.1 Denial of access to health care: strengths and weaknesses
The denial of access approach has three main strengths. The first of these is the fact
that the policy is simple to articulate and simple to understand. The second advantage
is that the policy definitively ensures that people who ought to bear some of the
avoidable costs of their health affecting choices actually do so – i.e. it is
“responsibility-sensitive”. The third strength is that this policy seems to be relatively
popular amongst health care professionals and lay people (Peters 2007).180
Nevertheless, the denial of access policy is also riddled with a number of practical and
normative problems that fatally undermine this particular approach to cost bearing. I
will not discuss all of the objections that can be levelled against this policy in this
chapter. Nor will I argue that all the objections that I will discuss cannot be gainsaid.
Indeed, I will suggest that some objections can be overcome relatively easily.
However, I will describe and analyse a number of important and powerful objections
to the denial of access policy here and I will argue that this approach to cost bearing is
neither normatively acceptable nor practically viable.
The first objection that I wish to discuss is practical in nature and it relates to the fact
that implementing a denial of access to health care would be very resource intensive.
There are a number of reasons for this. In the first place health care professionals
would have to receive extra training to ensure that they can accurately and reliably
180 The study carried out by Richards et al (2003) which I discussed in chapter 3 shows that some
patients support the denial of health approach to cost bearing. Moreover, there are many reports in the
literature of health care professionals denying treatment to smokers, obese patients and drug abusers on
the grounds that these people are responsible for their own ill-health (Morreim 1995; Persaud 1995).
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judge people’s degree of causal and moral responsibility. Secondly, health care
professionals would have to spend considerably longer with their patients in order to
make informed decisions about their patient’s degrees of responsibility and this would
involve dedicating valuable and scare resources to this task (Benjamin 1997; Martens
2001). Thirdly, health care professionals would need to be supported by a team of
administrators and investigative specialist who would be tasked with collecting and
corroborating background information which would need to be garnered and verified
before a decision about cost bearing could be made. These three factors would make
the policy both administratively burdensome and costly to operate (Wikler 1996;
Daniels 2008). I will call this the “costly resource objection”.
In response to this objection it might be argued that the cost of administering this
policy might well be worth while from a normative point of view if we believe that it
is vital to make people bear costs in this way. On a more practical note it may also be
argued that the administrative costs might be balanced, or even outweighed, by the
savings that would accrue from not providing health care to those who are deemed
responsible for their ill-health. Whether this latter claim is true or not is not easy to
determine. In order to be sure it would be necessary to evaluate the loss to the
economy that would ensue when people who would otherwise have been able to work
productively are unable to do so because their injuries and illness are not treated.
Nonetheless, there is at least a possibility that the policy would be cost-effective and
until we have further empirical data about this we need to suspend judgment rather
than assume that the costs of operating the system would be so onerous that they
would undermine this policy approach (Persuad 1995).
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Another problem with the denial access approach may be dubbed the “damage to
doctor-patient relationship objection”. Health care professionals and patients have
long paid homage to the importance of the delicate and intimate relationship that often
develops between a doctor and a patient (Glantz 2007). This relationship is often built
up over years – although it can also form much more rapidly – and it is based on
mutual respect and mutual trust. It is also an important relationship because the
success of healthcare depends on this relationship working well.
The trouble is that the denial of access policy would require health care professionals
to pass judgement on their patient’s degree of causal and moral responsibility and this
aspect of the policy might threaten or entirely undermine the doctor-patient
relationship (Ashley-Miller 1993; Garfield 1993; Sinclair et al 1993; Cappelen and
Norheim 2005). Schmidt et al (2010), for example, argue that if doctors are assigned
“watchdog” and “policing” roles this will harm the therapeutic relationship between
doctors and patients and Gantz (2007) suggests that if doctors were responsible for
withholding treatment from patients on the basis of responsibility considerations this
would distort and irreparably damage the doctor-patient relationship.
The primary problem is that many patients would begin to distrust their doctors and
would thus be less willing to reveal sensitive information that might be critical to their
wellbeing. This is because patients would (rightly) fear that their doctor’s decision
might lead to a denial of access to health care (McMaster 2000). Gantz (2007) for
example, argues that smokers will begin to lie about their habit if they think that they
may be denied care if they are honest and Morreim (1995) points out that the “the
patient who tells his physician the truth is a fool” in these kinds of situations.
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Moreover, once a denial of access policy was put in place doctors would soon begin
to distrust their patients because they would be well aware that many patients would
attempt to deceive them in order to avoid being judged and denied access to
healthcare (Thornton 2009). This, in turn, would lead to a further breakdown in the
relationship between health care professionals and patients and if this cycle of lies and
distrust continued the policy might entirely undermine the doctor-patient
relationship.181
The second problem is that patients might also begin to resent the “judgmental” role
that health care professionals would be playing. At the moment patients see health
care professionals as primarily concerned with their health and wellbeing, but under
this policy health care professionals’ role would change and this might well
undermine the doctor-patient relationship too.
Quite how extensive and disruptive these problems would turn out to be is hard to
quantify. It is certainly possible that the end result would be a near total destruction of
the doctor-patient relationship. However, the answer to this question very much turns
on whether patients generally agreed with the rationale behind this cost bearing
policy. If they did agree the impact might not be as damaging because patients would
realise that the new role of the health care professional was not only important but
legitimate (Brown 2005).
Having said as much, most patients – even those who largely agreed with the denial of
access policy and agreed with the idea that health care professionals should judge
181 If doctors were placed under an obligation to report any deceit to a relevant authority this would
undermine the relationship even further.
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their patients – would probably not be willing to sacrifice their own health (and
possibly their lives) by fully revealing their own “culpability”. Thus, it is rather likely
that the much vaunted doctor-patient relationship would be badly damaged if a denial
of access policy was put in place because the problem of distrust would remain.
From a practical point of view the policy might also run in to difficulties if health care
professionals refused to take part in the system. A denial of access to health care
policy would be very vulnerable to this kind of problem because it would rely so
heavily on health care professionals’ judgments about their patient’s causal and moral
responsibility and because some health care professionals would be deeply opposed to
any policy which involved denying care to patients. Technically, health care
professionals could prevent the implementation of the policy altogether if they took
industrial action. However, they could also undermine the system by refusing to judge
their patients, by colluding with their patients to change details about the likely
aetiology of a disease, or by refusing to deny access to patients even when they knew
that their patients were causally and morally responsible for their ill-health. I will call
this the “rejection by health care professionals’ objection”.
It is an open question whether health care professionals would actually try to
undermine the denial of access policy if it was put in place. It seems very likely that
many health care professionals would be profoundly opposed to the policy because
many of them feel strongly that they have a professional and moral duty to care for
anyone who requires their help regardless of why they might need that help (Resnik
2007). Indeed, health care professionals are often in the vanguard when it comes to
defending the rights of criminals, drug addicts, refugees, asylum seekers and other
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minority groups’ access to health care precisely because they think that health care
should be available to everyone. Moreover, as we saw in chapter 3, a number of
medical organisations, including the General Medical Council, are opposed to
allowing considerations of responsibility to determine people’s access to health care.
Morreim (1995) argues forcefully in this context that “denying medical care for
lifestyle vices conflicts with a deep moral conviction of medicine: compassion for the
patient as a human being in need” and he also suggests that most physicians would
refuse to practice medicine if they were required to deny treatment to patients because
this form of “medical vigilantism” would be repugnant to them. In a similar manner,
Kelley (2005) argues that denying care would “violate a valuable norm and an
equally valuable virtue central to health care” – i.e. the duty to treat those in need
without regard to the provenance of their ill-health and the virtue of treating
vulnerable people with compassion – and for this reason most health care
professionals would refuse to comply with a denial of access policy.182
However, we should remember that health care professionals are not usually prone to
civic disobedience and even when they disagree vehemently with a new policy they
tend to acquiesce in the end.183 Furthermore, we saw in chapter 3 that a relatively
182 Glantz (2007) is also quite adamant that “one of the noblest things about the profession of medicine
has been its single minded devotion to patients” and he goes on to suggest that because the health care
profession would be fatally undermined if patients were denied care on the basis of responsibility
judgments most health care professionals would refuse to co-operate with such a policy.
183 This point has recently been confirmed with the passage of the new Health and Social Care Bill
(2012) in the UK. Health care professionals were – and still are – overwhelmingly opposed to some of
the core legislative changes contained in the new Bill, but although many have voiced their
disagreement during the process leading up to the creation of the Bill there is no sign that health care
professionals will revolt now that the Bill has received Royal Assent.
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substantial number of health care professionals seem to tolerate or even advocate
denial of access to health care as a form of cost bearing for those patients who are
causally and/or morally responsible for their own ill-health (Neuberger 1998; Ubel
2001).184 Thus, although it is likely that some health care workers would refuse to co-
operate if a denial of access system was put in place there is little solid evidence to
prove that many would do so and it is quite possible that most professionals would
simply get on with their jobs without trying to undermine the policy.
Yet another practical problem with the denial of access policy is the difficulty that
health care professionals would face in trying to determining people’s degree of
causal and moral responsibility. Kelley (2005) argues that “the causal trail to illness
is so convoluted and complicated as to make causal grounds for responsibility”
extremely difficult for health care professionals to trace accurately and Harris (1995)
makes a similar point about the difficulty that doctors would face in trying to
determine people’s degree of moral responsibility. Part of the problem in the latter
case stems from the fact that it is difficult to determine whether patients are culpably
ignorant (Benjamin 1997; Olsen 1997). Determining people’s degree of freedom and
their level of mental capacity would also be very difficult in many cases.
184 The history of the formation of the NHS is salutary here because many physicians were deeply
opposed to the creation of the NHS because they feared that this would lead to the destruction of their
lucrative private. It is also worth noting that in countries where patients must pay for their care out of
pocket (or via private insurance schemes) physicians are often faced with patients who cannot afford
the health care that they need because they don’t have adequate insurance and do not have enough
resources to pay for the treatment that they need. Yet, though some physicians offer these patients free
or subsidised care, many more do not. In fact it may be argued that far from leading a revolution
against such a system physicians seem to work hard to lobby governments in order to defend the
system as it stands because the system as it stands partially protects their own financial interests.
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In this context the argument is often made that attempting to determine people’s
degree of legal responsibility is a very difficult task which often requires judges and
juries to carefully evaluate evidence for many days, weeks or months before coming
to a decision about defendants’ degrees of legal responsibility (Wikler 2002).
Moreover, judges and juries can rely on a veritable army of police officers, lawyers
and administrators to help them collect, organize and prepare the relevant evidence.
Health care professionals would not have access to anything like this much assistance
and they would have to make much quicker assessments and decisions – otherwise the
system would ground to a halt. This would inevitably mean that the number of false
positive and false negative judgments would be quite high (Aulisio 1996). I will call
this the “inaccuracy objection”.
A similar objection relates to the need to ensure procedural justice. Following
Aristotle (1984), most people agree that justice requires that like cases are treated
alike. But it will be nigh on impossible to achieve this kind of procedural justice when
thousands of health care professions are forced to make millions of “responsibility
judgements” each year with little time or resources to check that they are all making
judgments in the same way. This problem would be exacerbated because some health
care professionals would, consciously or otherwise, be biased towards – or against –
some patients. For example, some might be especially prejudiced against drug addicts
whilst others would discriminate against the obese (Sharkey and Gillam 2010).185 I
will call this the “unreliability objection”.
185 Procedural justice also requires that some kind of appeal can be made in case patients feel that an
erroneous judgment had been made (Wikler 2002). The obvious difficulty is that any appeal system
would add considerable complexity and cost to the system and might not be practically feasible.
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What can be said in response to the inaccuracy and unreliability objections? Training
would certainly help to avoid both problems and providing health care professionals
with more time to think about responsibility judgments would also help. The
publication of guidance about how to make judgments would also assist matters and it
might be possible to publish case material in journals to help physicians ensure that
their judgments are in line with their peers. An appeals process could also be created.
However, all of these interventions would be costly and, in reality, it would never be
feasible to adopt all the various apparatus used by law courts to help ensure that
justice is done. Thus, the inaccuracy and unreliability objections are both powerful
and difficult to overcome.
The main normative objection which many have raised against the denial of access to
health care approach is that the policy is cruel, harsh and inhumane (Morreim 1995;
Wikler 1996, Flerubaey 2002; Cappelen and Norheim 2005). There is, as Anderson
(1999), argues, something deeply distributing about the idea of paramedics arriving at
the scene of an accident and leaving whoever was morally responsible for the accident
to die on the side of the road.186 In other words, abandoning patients to suffer and die
just because they are causally and morally responsible is beyond the moral pale and
no society should even contemplate adopting such a policy, never mind actually put it
in to practice. I will call this the “inhumanity objection”.
186 Of course, few would argue that making snap judgments about responsibility at the scene of an
accident – or even in the emergency department – would be a sound approach and so the dramatic sight
of watching people bleed to death on the streets is unlikely to happen even if a denial of access policy
is put in place. However, chronically ill people who were responsible for their ill-health would still be
turned away from hospitals and clinics and acutely unwell would, in some cases, be required to leave
their health care facility – even if this meant certain death – and so many other dramatic examples can
be furnished to prove the point that these philosophers are trying to make.
294
This objection is especially powerful and many health care professionals, politicians
and lay people are likely to reject this policy once they have fully taken onboard the
inhumane implications of denying people access to health care. However, the
normative arguments discussed in the previous chapters do provide us with some
powerful reasons to make some people bear some of the costs of their health affecting
choices and if we accept any of these arguments then we will have at least a prima
facia reason to think that even a very harsh policy may be legitimate. Indeed, people
are often led by their principles to defend capital punishment and judicial torture even
though they also readily concede that these practises are inhumane. Thus, we cannot
simply argue that, because a policy is inhumane, it is not justified.
Nevertheless, the sheer brutality of this policy does mean that even the very strongest
of the normative arguments in favour of cost bearing (i.e. the luck egalitarian
argument) does not give us sufficient reason to conclude that the policy is worth the
suffering that it will engender. This is especially true given that there are alternative –
and less inhumane – ways of making people bear some of the costs of their health
affecting choices and given that these alternative methods are also compatible with
the normative arguments discussed in the last chapter. As such, I think we have
excellent reason to reject the denial of access policy on the basis of the inhumanity
objection.
In addition to being inhumane, the denial of access policy also runs the risk of
dehumanising health care professionals and the whole of society. The worry is that if
health care professionals are required to effectively let “irresponsible” patients suffer
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and die some of them will become inured to their patients’ suffering and will become
dehumanised as a result. Moreover, if society as a whole tolerates such policies, non-
health care professionals may also become immune to the suffering of others and if
this happens the dehumanising process will be even more problematic (Wikler 2002).
I will call this the “dehumanising objection”.
This objection, though similar to the inhumanity objection, differs from it because it
relies on an empirical claim that adopting an inhumane policy will lead health care
professionals and society at large down a slippery slope. In response, I argue that the
denial of access policy does not require health care professionals or the general public
to feel any degree of satisfaction when patients are denied care. Indeed, the denial of
access policy may be regarded as a “terrible tragedy” and a “necessary evil”. As such,
the slope may not prove to be as slippery as one might at first imagine.
There is always the risk that health care professionals and others will become immune
to the suffering of a given group and that this attitude will then spread more widely.187
However, the evidential basis for this slippery slope argument is weak and I am not
convinced that we have sufficient reason to think that this particular objection holds
much water.
The denial of access approach is also vulnerable to the charge that such a policy
would be extremely intrusive (Anderson 1999; Denier 2005). Moreover, as Dietrich
(2002) argues, such a policy might also lead to “massive breaches of citizen’s privacy
187 As we have seen in previous chapters, some health care professionals and members of the public
have already adopted a fairly intolerant attitude towards drug addicts, alcoholics, smokers and the
obese.
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rights” and would cause irreparable harm as a consequence. The degree of intrusion
into people’s private lives would be considerable. Questions would need to be asked
about people’s behaviour and personal habits and it would be entirely possible that
patients – and even their family, friends and employers – would have to be cross-
examined in order to ensure that the judgments made were accurate (Daniels 2008). I
will call this the “intrusiveness objection”.
Many philosophers regard this objection as a major stumbling block to a denial of
access policy but, as Wolff (1998) argues, governmental agencies will always have to
collect, process, and store personal information about people in order to make
judgments about what kind of resources they are owed or need. For example, in order
to determine people’s right to welfare payments governments will have to ask many
intrusive questions (and store the responses in some kind of government database) and
this is true even if the government is not trying to determine people’s degree of
responsibility in anyway.
On the other hand, the nature of the personal information that must be collected in the
case of the denial of access policy may be especially personal and because questions
will be asked about personal responsibility for health in particular these questions may
be experienced as especially intrusive. However, Wolff’s counterargument does take
some of the sting out of the intrusiveness objection. Furthermore, patients might not
regard the intrusion as particularly burdensome if they believed that the questions
were necessary to establish a just health policy. Thus, the more people who agree with
at least one of the normative defences of cost bearing the less intolerable the intrusion
will appear to be.
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The types of questions that would need to be asked to establish causal and moral
responsibility would not just be intrusive. They might also be disrespectful because
they would lead to what Wolff (1998) calls “shameful revelation”. If people are
required to reveal certain kinds of personal information they might find this process
embarrassing, disrespectful and shameful. For example, if people have to admit to
errors of judgment in relation to risky behaviour they might feel embarrassed about
having to do so (Daniels 2008). Likewise, if people have to ‘make out a convincing
case that they are a failure’ in order to receive treatment they are likely to feel
ashamed (Wolff 1998). I will call this the “disrespect objection”.
In response it may be argued that if people accept the normative rationale for cost
bearing they may not experience any shame. If people accept the underlying concept
of diminished moral responsibility they might not care about explaining that they are
not entirely responsible for their actions. A greater willingness to be open about the
forces that affect us might even prove beneficial because it would stop us from feeling
shame about things that we cannot control. It is not clear whether this would, in fact,
happen. However, shame is clearly tied to social expectations and if social
expectations changed so might the existence and pervasiveness of this emotion.
The denial of access policy is also vulnerable to what I will call the “proportionate
health care objection”. The problem is that providing strictly proportionate access to
health care (e.g. providing 50% of treatment for people are deemed to be 50% morally
responsible for their risky health affecting choices) will often not be workable because
health care often needs to be provided as a package if it is to be successful at all. For
example, if a patient is injured in a motorcycle accident and sustains a brain
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haemorrhage and a ruptured spleen, it would be a complete waste of time and
resources to treat the former injury whilst ignoring the latter.
In some cases the provision of some portion of a medical regimen will actually do
more harm than good. The treatment of Tuberculosis, for example, often necessitates
the provision of 4 different antibiotics for many months. Providing 50% of the
antibiotics will not cure the disease in the majority of patients and will make things
worse for many patients because some will develop side effects to the drugs and
others will develop a pathogen which is resistant to antibiotics.
Carrying out the letter of the denial of access policy will thus lead to an injustice in
some cases because it would be unfair to provide people with health care which is
known to be ineffective or potentially dangerous given that their lack of full moral
responsibility entails that they should receive at least some effective access to
healthcare.
In response, it is worth pointing out that some illnesses and injuries can be treated
reasonably effectively by using a “partial no-treatment” regimen. However, I accept
that this is not always the case and that in many situations denying a proportion of
treatment will often be self-defeating or dangerous. Moreover, because the adoption
of this cost bearing policy will lead to these kinds of injustices the policy faces a real
problem because it means that it cannot be fully supported by any of the normative
arguments discussed in the last chapter.
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The denial access policy would also be open to what I will call the “changing the goal
posts objection”. The point is that if a government were suddenly to deny access to
health care they would treat people unfairly because this would involve “changing the
rules after the game has begun” (Persaud 1995). If people generally understood that
healthcare would be provided to them regardless of whether they engaged in risky
behaviours it would be unjust to suddenly inform them that this was no longer true.
This would be especially true for those individuals who had paid their fair share of
taxes and for those who had taken risks on the basis that free health care would be
made available to them if the risks turned sour.
This objection is an important one. However, it can be overcome quite easily. All
governments need to do to side step the objection is to give their citizens fair warning
that such a policy was going to be imposed. This would then enable people to change
their behaviour in light of this information if they wished to do so. The only difficulty
would be that people might have to be given many years of warning and this would
prevent policy makers from implementing a denial of access policy that would have
an immediate impact. Not everyone would worry about this, but utilitarians, in
particular, would likely argue that this would be a waste of time given that they would
want to decrease the negative impact of risky behaviour as soon as possible.
The last objection to the denial of access to health care policy that I wish to discuss
relates to the problem of luck. If we adopt the denial of access to healthcare policy
then not everyone who is equally morally responsible for taking the same risk will
experience the same outcome or be treated in the same way. This is because some will
be lucky and others will be unlucky (Cappelen, Norheim and Tungoden 2008).
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For example, if two people decide to sky-dive together and one of them breaks a leg
on landing because of a sudden and unexpected gust of wind whilst the other lands
safely, the factor that determines the different outcome in these cases is not the choice
to engage in the risky behaviour but the unexpected gust of wind – and this factor is
not something that either skydiver can be morally responsible for. Likewise, if fifty
smokers smoke fifty cigarettes a day for fifty years some will develop lung cancer,
some will develop some other smoking-related disease and some will not be aversely
affected at all. Moreover, as with the sky diving case, the differences in outcome in
these cases will be explained by a number of factors that people cannot be morally
responsible for (e.g. genetic susceptibility to tobacco).188
To borrow the language of the luck egalitarians, the differences in these cases are due
to a form of brute luck (Dietrich 2002; Cappelen and Norheim 2005; Feiring 2005).
Grand (1991) finds this aspect of the denial of access policy deeply problematic
because he argues that any normatively viable health policy must ensure that people
who are equally morally responsible for taking equal risks – and not merely those who
actually incur health costs – should the bear costs of their risky health affecting
choices. Cappelen, Norheim and Tungoden (2008) agree and they argue that the
denial of access policy should be rejected for this reason. I will call this the “luck
objection”.
188 Some factors that explain differences in outcome will be factors that people can be morally
responsible for. People might, for example, engage in other protective behaviours such as regular
screening and regular exercise in order to decrease the risks that they take. However, I will ignore this
complication here.
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The first response to this objection is to point out that the denial of access policy
could be modified to take account of this problem. For example, health care
professionals could deliberately inflict injuries or illnesses on people who were
equally morally responsible for taking similar risks so that they too could be made to
bear the cost of their ill-health by being denied access to healthcare. However,
although this modification of the policy would solve the luck objection, it would also
be very problematic for a number of reasons.
Firstly, such a policy would be extremely inhumane and would almost certainly be
rejected out of hand by policy makers and health care professionals alike. Secondly,
this policy would not always work because in some cases it would be difficult to
inflict the kinds of injuries – and especially the kind of illnesses – that would need to
be inflicted in order to create equalities of outcome. For example, it is not at all clear
how type 2 diabetes could be induced artificially. Thirdly, it would be very difficult to
set the “tariff” correctly. Smoking, as we have seen, causes a myriad of different
conditions, but would this imply that all smokers would have to have all these
conditions inflicted upon them in order to equalise the outcome? This might seem
absurd, but it is hard to see how the “tariff” could be set another way. For these
reasons, adopting this particular policy modification is not viable and so the denial of
access policy cannot overcome the luck objection by adopting this kind of approach.
The second response is to argue that the luck objection is not an objection at all. The
argument in this case is that the objection is not valid because the problem of “moral
luck” – and the particular problem of “resultant moral luck” – is not really
problematic (Nagel 1979). The relevant aspect of the moral luck issue is this: we
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sometimes make people bear the full costs of their choices even though they are not
fully causally or morally responsible for the consequences of those choices and we
regularly treat different people who are equally morally responsible for taking a risk
in different ways (e.g. we only make one group pay costs) even though the outcomes
are partially determined by factors which people are not morally responsible for. 189
Many people think this is unfair, yet this is how the law (and society) often
operates.190
Of all the normative theorists who have grappled with this issue it is fair to say that it
luck egalitarians have done so most thoroughly. The standard luck egalitarian
position, as it was developed by Dworkin (1981) and Cohen (1989), is clear enough:
inequality created by bad option luck is not a matter for justice because option luck is
something for which people are morally responsible. In other words, it does not
matter if two people who are equally morally responsible for taking risks with their
health end up with different health outcomes even if the reason for the difference is
beyond the control of those who take the risks. However, a number of luck
egalitarians and other commentators have questioned this assumption (Christiano
1999; Lippert-Ramussen 2001; Otuska 2002). The reason for this is because option
luck is not, ultimately, “pure” in the sense that the original luck egalitarians seem to
have believed. This is because if two individuals voluntarily take the same risk (i.e.
189 For example, we treat murderers and attempted murderers differently even if the only reason why
the attempted murder failed to kill is because he was thwarted by a factor he could not control
(Williams 1982).
190 With regard to risky health affecting behaviour this issue matters because if we think that it is unfair
to treat people differently in these situations then we will be forced to conclude that the luck objection
is real and serious but if we deny that moral luck is problematic then the objection can simply be
ignored.
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take a risk in the option luck sense) the outcome of the risk is partly a matter of brute
luck.
No luck egalitarian denies that there is a key difference between people who suffer
pure brute luck (e.g. children who suffer from genetic conditions like Cystic Fibrosis)
and those who suffer from a mixture of option and brute luck (e.g. the unlucky
skydiver described previously). People who suffer pure brute luck are not even
marginally morally responsible for the luck that affects them whereas those who
suffer a mix of option and brute luck are morally responsible to some degree.
However, given that those who suffer option luck are also affected, in part, by brute
luck a dilemma is created – especially for luck egalitarians because these philosophers
are, prima facia, committed to regarding instances of inequality-inducing brute luck
as unjust and they are also committed to neutralising the effects of brute luck when it
creates such inequalities (Segall 2010). This raises the possibility that luck
egalitarians – and, potentially other philosophers concerned with the impacts of luck
on outcomes – are committed to neutralising the effects of brute luck even when it is
option luck that has created the potential for brute luck to intervene.
Luck egalitarians divide over this issue. Cappelen, Norheim and Tungoden (2006), for
example, argue that luck egalitarians should seek to ensure that people are held
responsible for their choices rather than the consequences of their choices because the
consequences of choices are partially determined by brute luck even when the choice
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itself is not.191 Segall (2010), on the other hand, argues that this approach
misinterprets the spirit of luck egalitarianism. He suggests that luck egalitarians
should not think of themselves as committed to neutralising the effects of all luck
which create inequalities. Instead, they should be committed to holding people
responsible for their choices. The key distinction, from the luck egalitarian point of
view, should be between people who choose to engage in risky behaviour and those
who do not. As Segall (Ibid, p 180) says, “luck is indeed arbitrary…but tempting
luck, as it were, is not…and what we owe each other, according to luck egalitarians,
extends to neutralising luck only in the cases in which it has not been tempted”.
One reason to favour the latter approach is that the former approach seems to justify
redistributing money between gamblers once the result of the gamble is known. If a
group of people place bets on a single game of roulette then the “luckist” luck
egalitarian seems committed to saying that the inequality that results is partly unjust
because brute luck partly determines the outcome. This would imply that fairness
requires some redistribution of the winner’s winnings between all the players in order
to neutralise the effects of brute luck. This, however, seems like a reductio ad
absurdum because such a reallocation of resources not only defeats the purpose of
gambling, but it also runs counter to our intuitions regarding fairness because the
difference in outcome between two gamblers does not seem prima facia unjust.192
Lippert-Ramussen (2001) responds by arguing that there is a critical difference
between “gambling proper” and “quasi gambling” – the latter being the type of
gamble one takes when one takes risks with one’s health. He points out that the thrill
191 Cappelen and Norheim (2005) suggest that “individuals who make the same choices should also
have the same outcome”.
192 Gamblers would probably react to such claims of unfairness with bemusement.
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of taking a risk is intrinsic to gambling proper, but is not to quasi gambling. When we
take risks with out health, for example, we do not do so for the sake of the risk, but
rather because we value something else (e.g. the pleasure we might derive from
tasting rich French food). Hence, we should not treat the two cases alike.
Of course, some people who engage in extreme sports do so because they want to take
risks. However, this only seems true of a limited range of risky health affecting
behaviours. In most cases, people who take risks with their health – e.g. by smoking
or eating too many calories or sunbathing excessively – would rather not take a risk at
all if this was possible.
As such, luck egalitarians ought to be committed, in almost all cases, to eliminating
the effects of brute luck wherever brute luck creates an inequality. Thus, some kind of
redistribution between people who take risks with their health for reasons other than
they want to gamble with their health is needed when bad brute luck strikes and
creates inequalities between groups of people who are equally morally responsible for
taking risks with their health. Indeed, luck egalitarians should accept that the costs of
rectifying injustice should be shared between all those who take the same health risks
since this avoids creating an unjust burden on those who did not take risks (e.g. those
suffering from pure brute luck) whilst also ensuring that everyone who is morally
responsible for taking the same risks is treated in the same way. This means that luck
egalitarians, in my opinion, should be opposed to a denial of access policy because
this policy does not treat those who are equally morally responsible for their own
risky behaviour in the same way.
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It is often not possible to create perfect equality in outcome between those who take
the same risks. We can only do this in the case of risky behaviour by inflicting
injuries and illnesses on people. However this is, as I have argued above, barbaric
and, in many cases, impossible to achieve for practical reasons. However, some forms
of cost bearing (e.g. risk taxes) would allow pooling of costs and could also be
humane and I shall explore this possibility later in this chapter.
What about those who defend an alternative approach to cost bearing? Are they more
or less likely to have a problem with the luck objection than luck egalitarians? Those
who defend a moralistic desert approach would probably find the luck objection
genuinely problematic. This is because they think that people who take certain kind of
risks commit intrinsically immoral acts that are worthy of being penalised for
retributive reasons. Given this fact, it seems likely that those who defend this
approach would not want people who are equally morally responsible for engaging in
equally immoral acts to be treated in different ways.
The expected consequences approach, meanwhile, seems to ignore the issue of moral
luck entirely. The expected consequences approach states that people should
experience the expected outcomes of their risky health affecting choices because
doing so protects the value of autonomy. On the assumption that ill-health is an
expected outcome and that denial of access to heath care is also an expected outcome
those who defend this argument have no reason object to the way that luck impacts on
people’s outcomes – at least not from “within” the expected consequences approach.
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The rights-harm argument is neutral with regard to this particular issue. The rights-
harm argument claims that people who are morally responsible for taking risks with
their health must bear some of the costs if they fall ill otherwise they will consume
resources from the common pool and violate other people’s right to healthcare.
However, whether people who defend this argument would also think that the costs
should be shared between people who are morally responsible for the same risks
entirely depends on their independent beliefs about moral luck. In other words, it is
possible to defend the rights-harm argument and defend the idea that the burden
should be shared, but it is also possible to defend the rights-harm argument and
defend the idea that the burden should not be shared.
From the utilitarian perspective questions of luck and justice are not germane unless
they impact on utility. Since many people are concerned about fairness and do worry
about the impact of luck on just allocations of resources it is possible to argue that a
utilitarian defence of cost bearing would need to take this into account. On the other
hand, many people do not seem to regard moral luck as a problem at all and would not
regard the luck objection as a valid objection. As such, it is not at all clear whether
someone who wishes to maximise utility should object to the denial of access to
healthcare policy on the basis of the luck objection. The answer ultimately depends on
how many people find the luck objection valid and how deeply affected they are by
the perceived injustice that occurs with brute luck intervenes in cases of option luck –
but we lack the data to be sure one way or another.
In summary, whether people will think that the luck objection counts as an objection
against the denial of access policy will depend on a number of factors. In particular, it
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will depend on what people think about the problem of moral luck – but it will also
depend on which normative rationale people use to defend cost bearing policies.
Personally, I think that the objection is both valid and serious. This is because I think
that the “luckist” version of luck egalitarianism argument – i.e. the version which
states that people who are equally morally responsible for the same risk should share
as much of the cost as possible – is the version of luck egalitarianism which best
captures the true meaning of distributive justice. But, for those who adopt a different
normative approach, the objection may not have much bite.
7.1.2 Denial of access to health care: summary
To summarise, the denial of access to health care policy has the following three
advantages: simplicity, sensitivity to responsibility and support from reasonably large
sections of the health care profession and the populace. It also, however, suffers from
a number of objections including the very powerful “inhumanity”, “luck” and
“damage to doctor-patient relationship” objections. Indeed, such is the range and
power of the objections that can be levelled at the denial of access to healthcare
approach that this particular form of cost bearing is not normatively viable or
practically feasible. As such, policy makers should avoid trying to make people bear
costs using this approach and individual health care professionals and health care
managers should immediately stop denying health care to patients on the grounds that
some of their patients are causally and/or morally responsible for their health.
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7.2 Payment: the policy
The next cost bearing policy option that I wish to consider is the payment policy
option. This policy requires people to bear the costs of their choices by paying the
financial costs of the healthcare that they need at the point that they need it (Wikler
2002; Cappelen and Norheim 2006). In practical terms the payment system would
work much like the denial of access to health approach. In other words, the system
would be reliant on health care professionals carefully assessing their patients – with
the help of administrative and investigative assistants – in order to determine the
diagnosis, the cause of the diagnosis and the patient’s degree of causal and moral
responsibility for their ill-health. As the with the denial of access approach the
payment approach would also, in most cases, allow patients to be receive free health
care in the first instance whilst relevant investigations were carried out.
Once the investigations were complete patients deemed fully causally and/or morally
responsible would have to pay for any further health care whilst patients deemed not
responsible would receive free health care. Patients deemed partially responsible
would receive a certain amount of health care for free and they would then have to
provide a co-payment if they wished to be provided with more care. The amount that
these latter patients would have to pay would vary and the goal would be to charge
costs which would be “proportional” to their degree of causal and/or moral
responsibility (Cappelen, Norheim and Tungoden 2008).
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7.2.1 Payment: strengths and weaknesses
The payment policy, like the denial of access policy, has the advantage that it is
simple to understand, “responsibility sensitive” and reasonably popular. Admittedly,
few of the surveys conducted thus far have asked patients, professionals or the general
public whether financial payments of this kind are their favoured cost bearing policy.
However, there is some evidence to suggest that many people would support such a
policy – even in countries like the UK where “out of pocket payments” for health
services is relatively rare.
In Germany, citizens who fail to attend screening appointments are already expected
to pay extra costs for any health services that they require if they develop diseases that
could have detected if they had attended screening (Schmidt 2009c). Extra payments
are also charged when people fail to attend appointments and people who require
treatment to deal with problems following plastic surgery and tattooing are expected
to cover the entire cost of any treatment that they might need. Importantly, these
policies do not seem to be opposed by a majority of the German population – or by a
majority of the German health care professionals – which suggests some level of tacit
agreement with such a “payment” approach.
Even British citizens and health care professionals seem to tolerate a payment system
within the NHS. For example, payments for dental care are routine within the NHS
service and many patients also pay a small fee (currently £7.65) when they purchase
prescription medications (Persaud 1995; National Association of Citizens Advice
Bureaux 2005; Department of Health 2011).
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Patients can also now “top-up” their care by purchasing medications which are not
available on the NHS either because NICE has deemed the drug not to be cost-
effective or because primary care trusts are unwilling to provide the drug for free for
other reasons. This suggests that the British public tolerate some forms of payment for
healthcare within an NHS framework, although there is less evidence that they would
tolerate these payments if they were tied to consideration of responsibility (Robinson
2002).
Prima facia, the payment policy also has a number of advantages over the denial of
access to health care approach. In the first instance, it is less vulnerable to the
“inhumanity” objection that so fatally undermines the denial of access approach. The
payment approach is less inhumane because people will be required to bear costs by
providing financial payments rather than by being denied access to health care. This
means that fewer people will be forced to suffer and die prematurely than would be
the case if the denial of access policy was put in place.
The payment policy can only avoid the inhumanity objection entirely if everyone who
has to pay for their health care can afford to do so. This, however, is unrealistic and
this lack of realism creates a dilemma for those who wish to defend this policy
because they must decide whether people who are unable to pay should be denied
access to the health care that they cannot afford or whether they should be provided
with the health care that they need free of charge.
The first of these solutions suffers from the obvious defect that it no longer fully
avoids the inhumanity objection that caused such problems for the denial of access
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approach. This is because, if this solution is adopted, plenty of people will suffer
unnecessarily. It is important to note that the total number of people who would lack
access to the health care would be much less than it would have been if a denial of
access policy had been adopted. Likewise, the fact that the goal in this case would not
be denial of access may also speak in favour of the approach. However, given that
health care is often very expensive, a great many people would continue to suffer and
die prematurely if this solution to the dilemma was chosen and thus the inhumanity
objection would still loom very large.
The second option avoids the inhumanity objection altogether, but it violates the
normative goal of requiring people to bear the costs of their choices when they are
causally and/or morally responsible for their risky choices. In other words, adopting
this approach would mean that the policy would no longer be entirely responsibility-
sensitive. It would also create two further problems.
Firstly, it would be open to claims of injustice because people who took the same
risks would be treated differently on the basis of their ability to pay. Secondly, it
would create a situation of moral hazard. This is because the adoption of this
approach would create an incentive for poorer people to take greater risks with their
health and it would provide an incentive for richer people to divest themselves of their
wealth if they fell ill as a result of their risky health affecting choices.
Obviously, if the money people owned was entirely a result of behaviours for which
they were morally responsible the first objection would not arise. However, the reality
is that differences in income and wealth are only partially the result of choices for
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which people are morally responsible (Persaud 1995). Thus, the first objection
remains a powerful one. The moral hazard objection, meanwhile, seems a little
speculative, but I think that in some cases people would respond to these perverse
incentives in exactly this kind of way.
Leaving these issues aside, I would also argue that the payment approach is less
vulnerable to the “dehumanising” objection than the denial of access policy. The
dehumanising objection, it will be remembered, claims that adopting a policy which is
itself inhumane will lead to a situation whereby society and health care professionals
adopt a more callous attitude towards suffering. The reason why the payment
approach is less vulnerable to this objection is precisely because the policy is less
inhumane than the denial of access approach. In other words, the policy is further up
the slippery slope than the denial of access policy.
Of course, it is still possible that the slope would prove to be too slippery and it could
be argued that the adoption of the payment approach would be the first step towards
the adoption of a denial of access approach which would then lead to even more
dehumanising. However, this may not happen and the fact that the goal of the
payment approach is not to make people bear costs through denial of care might well
help to prevent such an eventuality.
Since the payment policy is less inhumane it is less vulnerable to the “rejection by
health care professional’s objection” than the denial of access policy too. This is
because fewer health care professionals will be opposed to a policy which does not
overtly aim at denying health care and which does not cause as much suffering as the
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denial of access policy. Indeed, in the United States the health system which currently
operates means that many people lack access to full health care because they cannot
afford to pay for it and yet this state of play is largely tolerated by health care
professionals and the general public alike.
The payment policy is also less vulnerable to the “proportionate health care
objection”. This is because at least some patients would be able to afford to pay top-
up fees or co-payments to cover the health care that they needed but were not
provided with for free. For these patients, concerns about the provision of partial
treatment where partial treatment would be either ineffective or counter-productive
would simply not arise.193 However, because some patients would not be able to
afford the co-payment the objection still affects the payment policy.
The payment policy is also just as vulnerable as the denial of access policy to the
“resource cost objection”, the “disrespect objection”, the “intrusiveness objection”,
the “damage to doctor-patient relationship objection”, the “changing the goalposts
objection”, the “unreliability objection”, “inaccuracy objection” and the “luck”
objection. This is largely because this policy, like the denial of access policy, requires
individual health care professionals to make judgments about their individual patients.
193 In cases where partial treatment would be partially effective, partial treatment could be provided for
free (e.g. aspirin and nitrates in the coronary artery disease example discussed above) and the patient
could simply forgo the rest of the treatment rather than pay a co-payment to access other “extra”
medications. Adopting such a policy necessarily means that some people would get worse treatment
than they might otherwise get, but it also ensures that people bear some of the cost by foregoing extra
treatment.
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Thus, although the payment policy undeniably has some advantages over the denial of
access approach, it cannot be said that this policy successfully avoids any of the more
serious objections which can be levelled at the denial of access policy.
7.2.2 Payment: summary
I have argued above that the payment approach does have some advantages over the
denial of access approach, although, in many cases, the solutions on offer are only
partial ones. I have also argued that the policy is as vulnerable to many of the more
serious objections as the denial of access policy. Consequently, I suggest that policy
makers who wish to ensure that people bear costs should shy away from this form of
cost bearing because it simply does not offer enough advantages over the denial of
access approach to justify its imposition.
7.3 Reduced priority: the policy
The numerous defects that afflict the denial of access and payment policies suggest
the need for an entirely different cost-bearing approach. One such approach which has
previously been discussed by academics and put into practice by health care
professionals is what I will call the “reduced priority” policy (Wikler 1987; Moss and
Siegler 1991; Harris 1995).
This policy ensures that people bear some kind of health cost as a consequence of
their health affecting choices by varying people’s degree of priority for health care on
the basis of responsibility judgments (Peters 2007). People who are not causally
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and/or morally responsible would be given access to health care first, those fully
causally and/or morally responsible would receive health care last and those who were
partially causally and/or morally responsible would be placed somewhere in between
– with their exact position determined by their precise degree of causal and/or moral
responsibility.
In practical terms this policy would, once again, be similar to the denial of access
policy in that it would require individual health care professionals to make judgments
about their patient’s causal and moral responsibility. Initial access to health care
would also have to be provided before priority was determined because degrees of
causal and moral responsibility would need to be assessed before a priority system
was initiated.
However, this approach would differ in practical terms from the previous policies
because doctors would not only have to make judgments about their patient’s degree
of causal and moral responsibility, they would also have to make comparisons
between different individuals in order that people could be ranked against each other.
Under the denial of access and payment policies no such comparison between
individuals would be necessary; people’s degree of moral responsibility would be
judged and then people would either be denied access or costs would be imposed.
However, if we adopted a priority approach people’s degree of causal and/or moral
responsibility would need to be judged and ranked after some kind of comparison had
been made.
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7.3.1 Reduced priority: advantages and disadvantages
As with the policies discussed one of the key advantages of this policy, other than the
fact that it is simple to understand and is responsibility-sensitive, is the fact that it
seems to attract fairly widespread support. Many health care professionals and
bioethicists have defended this kind of responsibility-based cost bearing solution in
relation to the specific question of how organs which are available for transplantation
should be allocated. In particular, it is has been suggested that people who require
liver transplants because of alcohol abuse should receive lower priority than people
who require liver transplants because of a genetic or metabolic disease (McMaster
2000). It may also be recalled from chapter 3 that a number of studies have shown
that both health care professionals and the lay public tend to want to give people who
are responsible for their health needs lower priority than people who are not
responsible (Neuberger et al 1998; Ubel et al 1999).
Admittedly, the popularity of a reduced priority approach seems to be primarily
centred on organ transplants rather than any other aspect of health care. However,
waiting lists for appointments, investigations and treatment are ubiquitous in most
countries and there is no prima facia reason why people who would support a
responsibility-related reduced priority system in relation to organ transplants would
not be equally happy with a responsibility-related reduced priority system in relation
to health care more generally. In fact, it makes little sense to defend cost bearing via
reduced priority in relation to organs but not in relation to other forms of health care.
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In addition to being responsibility-sensitive and relatively popular the priority
approach also has one key advantage over both the denial of access and the payment
approaches discussed above. The advantage is that the priority approach is much less
vulnerable to the inhumanity objection than either of these policies. This is because,
although patients will have to wait longer to get the health care they need under the
reduced priority approach, they will not be denied access outright or denied access if
they cannot afford to pay.
This does not mean that the reduced priority policy is not vulnerable to the
inhumanity objection at all. Indeed, there are many reasons to think that this is not the
case. Firstly, people who are given a lower priority for accessing various forms of
health care will have to wait a certain amount of time before they get the health care
that they need. During this time they will, in many cases, continue to be symptomatic
and, as a result, they will continue to suffer when they need not otherwise have done
so. Secondly, diseases tend to progress over time. This means that patients placed
lower down a priority list would not only tend to suffer more than they otherwise
would have done but the effectiveness of the treatment that they will eventually
receive will be decreased because it is harder to treat diseases which are more
entrenched. Thirdly, some diseases, if they are not treated promptly, will render any
treatment provided later entirely ineffective.194 Delaying treatment for severe
haemorrhage by a few minutes, for example, will usually be lethal.195
194 This is not always the case: delaying knee surgery for arthritis may lead to more suffering, but it will
not adversely affect the outcome of the operation. However, in many instances a delay can be fatal.
195 Likewise, delaying treatment for bowel cancer by a few months may well render whatever treatment
is given later entirely useless – especially if the cancer metastasises in the mean time.
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This means that, in some cases, the priority approach will have similar consequences
to the denial of access and the payment approaches. However, the priority account is
still not as vulnerable to the inhumanity objection as either of these other policies. To
begin with, if resources are scarce people will be forced to wait for access to health
care even if considerations of responsibility play no part in determining the system of
priority.
This counter argument will only go so far, however, because there would be less
suffering, less development of disease and less risk of people waiting for so long that
treatment becomes ineffective if factors like need and urgency determined the order of
priority alone. As such, the priority approach is less humane than other priority
policies which do not take responsibility into account even though it is an
improvement on the denial of access and payment policies.
The priority approach is also less vulnerable to the inhumanity objection than the
denial of access approach – but not the payment approach – because there is a clear
difference in intention between these policies. The aim of the priority approach is to
make people bear some of the costs of their health care by placing them lower down a
priority list. This is very different to the denial of access approach where the intention
is to make people bear the costs of their choices by denying them access to health
care. Those who defend the priority approach can hope that everyone will, eventually,
get the health care that they need and they effectively defend a cost bearing system
which does not (in theory) exclude this possibility. In fact, their policy is designed
precisely to prevent people getting access to health care. The consequences of being
placed on a waiting list will sometimes amount to a denial of access because some
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people will wait too long to receive the treatment that they need. But this is not the
goal of the policy.
The reduced priority approach also has the advantage that it is less vulnerable to the
dehumanising objection than either the denial of access or the payment approach. The
reason for this is because the reduced priority approach is even higher up the slippery
slope than these other policies. This is because, as I have argued above, the priority
approach is more humane than either of the other policies and so the probability that
adopting this policy will lead to a situation where society and health care
professionals become desensitised to suffering is less. Indeed, the risk of this
happening if a reduced priority approach is adopted is very slim. This is partly
because the goal in the case of the reduced priority approach is to provide health
resources not to deny access, but it is also because some kind of priority approach is
inevitable if resources are scarce and many non-responsibility based priority policies
have already been put in place without any sign of doctors being dehumanised as a
consequence.
Nonetheless, the policy is not without its problems. To begin with, it is just as
vulnerable as the denial of access and payment policies to the distrust, resource-cost,
rejection by health care professional’s, inaccuracy, unreliability, intrusiveness,
changing the goal posts, disrespect and luck objections. What is more, the priority
approach is also vulnerable to another problem which does not affect either the denial
of access or the payment policies.
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The problems is that the priority approach not only requires people’s degree of causal
and moral responsibility to be assessed it also requires comparisons between people.
This is necessary because people need to be ranked if this system is to work – but this
can only be done if different people’s degree of responsibility can be compared. I will
call this the “comparison objection”.
The comparison objection is problematic because it raises two major issues. Firstly, it
adds another layer of complexity to the cost bearing policy and secondly there is a
serious ambiguity about who should be compared.
There are three main potential comparison groups: “people with the same disease”,
“people who require the same type of health care” and “every patient”. The first
option requires everyone with the same form of ill-health to be classified together and
then compared as a group. For example, every type 2 diabetic’s degree of causal
and/or moral responsibility could be determined and then every diabetic could be
placed on a waiting list, in order of responsibility, to await access to further health
care.
The second option would involve classifying and comparing people who required the
same type of health care. This is the kind of comparison which occurs when people
are currently allocated to organ transplant waiting lists. Under a responsibility
sensitive allocation, everyone requiring a specific organ (e.g. a kidney) would be
compared and ranked against everyone else who needed the same organ even if they
were suffering from very different diseases (e.g. diabetic nephropathy and polycystic
kidney disease). The same kind of process could also happen for other treatments or
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investigations – e.g. all those needing a CT scan of the head could be compared and
ranked according to their respective degrees of responsibility.
The third option would require every single patient to be compared with every other
patient. In this case, no account would be taken of disease or the actual health care
needed. Rather, everyone would be assessed and would have to wait their turn to
access whatever health care they needed on the basis of their overall degree of causal
and/or moral responsibility. For example, a patient with lung cancer would be
compared with everyone else – including patients with cardiovascular disease,
occupational injuries and syphilis – and their position on some kind of “overall”
waiting list would then be determined.
None of these options are without their difficulties. The first option is problematic
because different patients will need different types of health care. For example, some
patients with coronary artery disease need bypass operations and others need
angioplasty operations and it is hard to see how the waiting lists for each treatment
(which are always separate in practice) could be fused. However, if they were not
joined in some way this would create an inequity because people with the same
degree of causal and/or moral responsibility would wait different length of time
because they happen to need different treatments.
The second option is also vulnerable to this objection because different patients with
the same degree of causal and/or moral responsibility will end up being treated more
(or less) quickly depending on what kind of healthcare need they have. For example,
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if one patient needs a very scarce organ but another needs a relatively abundant organ
then these patients will get access to the healthcare they need at different speeds.
The third solution would side step these problems, but this option is not feasible
because it is not clear how different people with very different conditions could be
properly compared. How, for example, do we compare the causal and/or moral
responsibility of a smoker with the causal and/or moral responsibility of an obese
patient? More importantly, far too many comparisons would have to be made to make
the system workable.
7.3.2 Reduced priority: summary
In summary, the gains made over the denial of access and payment policies by the
reduced priority approach – namely the lower vulnerability to the inhumanity and
dehumanising objections – are somewhat lost by the added complexity of the lower
priority approach and the difficulty that is created by the comparison objection. Thus,
although I think the priority approach might have a role to play in some situations –
e.g. as a “tie breaker” when people with different degrees of moral responsibility need
the same scarce health care resource – I am not convinced that this is the best possible
responsibility-sensitive “cost bearing” that can be constructed.
7.4 Risk taxes and risk insurance: the policies
In this section I will discuss the “risk tax” and “risk insurance” policies together. I
will do this because the policies are very similar and because they share almost
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exactly the same strengths and weaknesses. Indeed, the policies are so alike that the
decision about which of these policies should be implemented depends on whether a
country has a strong history of funding health care through taxation (e.g. the UK) or
through social and private insurance schemes (e.g. Germany and the USA). In the
former case I would advocate the risk tax policy and in the latter cases I would
advocate the risk insurance policy.
The risk tax scheme would operate as follows. Policy makers, in conjunction with
health care professionals, would devise a list of behaviours that they deemed to be
causally associated with ill-health. They would then attempt to estimate the cost of
providing health care for people who engage in these kinds of behaviours. Once this
cost had been estimated governments would then tax the relevant behaviours. The
revenue raised would then be earmarked to pay for any health care required by those
who developed an illness after engaging in a risky behaviour (Cappelen and Norheim
2005). The tax rates would vary from behaviour to behaviour but each tax would need
to be levied at a level “sufficient to generate enough revenue to finance the extra
treatment cost” (Grand 1991). Moreover, no one would be allowed to engage in these
risky behaviours unless they paid the relevant tax.
If policy makers wanted to ensure that people’s exact degree of moral responsibility
was taken into account it would be necessary to modify the tax policy as follows.
After the tax rate had been assessed and the tax had been put into place, people who
wanted to engage in some kind of risky behaviour but who did not think that they
were fully morally responsible for their choices would have to be offered a “moral
responsibility assessment”. This assessment would be carried out by specialists – who
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need not be health care professionals – and the goal would be to determine people’s
degree of moral responsibility for their choices.
Anyone who was deemed not to be fully morally responsible would then be entitled to
a special tax discount. This could be operationalized by issuing everyone with a
special “tax card” which would state how much tax people had to pay. Under this
system, anyone deemed not morally responsible for their choices would not have to
pay any tax at all whilst anyone deemed fully morally responsible would have to pay
the full rate of tax. Those deemed partially morally responsible would have to a pay a
partial tax with the degree of tax tailored to their degree of moral responsibility.
In reality, people who wanted to take part in extreme sports or people who wanted to
sunbathe excessively or people who wanted to have unprotected sexual intercourse
would not likely avail themselves of this option because they would almost certainly
be deemed to be fully morally responsible for their risky choices. However, people
who want to smoke, drink alcohol excessively, or take drugs would be wise to ask for
a responsibility assessment because, as we have seen, their likelihood of being fully
morally responsible for these behavioural choices is not very high. As such, it is likely
that they would be eligible for some kind of tax discount.
The risk insurance scheme would operate in a similar fashion. However, in this
instance it would be social insurance companies, working under the auspices of
governments, who would draw up the list of risky health affecting behaviours and
work out the expected costs associated with these behaviours. Once these costs had
been calculated insurance companies would then offer risk insurance policies to
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anyone who wished to engage in any given risky health affecting behaviour. As with
the tax system, the insurance premium would be determined by the expected cost of
providing healthcare to those who developed an illness or injury after engaging in the
risky behaviour in question. Moreover, the insurance premiums would have to be
earmarked to cover the costs of the diseases caused by the behaviour that was being
insured against. Finally, people would be prohibited from partaking in risky health
affecting behaviours unless they had acquired the relevant health insurance cover.
Once again, if some account of people’s degree of moral responsibility needed to
taken into account the risk insurance scheme could be modified so that people would
be eligible to have their moral responsibility assessed. Those deemed fully morally
responsible would have to pay the full premium, whilst those deemed partially
responsible would receive a discount. Those not at all morally responsible would have
their premium waived entirely.
7.4.1 Risk tax and risk insurance: advantages and disadvantages
The risk tax and the risk insurance schemes are both responsibility-sensitive cost
bearing schemes and, like the other policies discussed above, there is evidence of
considerable support for some kind of risk tax or risk insurance policy amongst policy
makers, health care professionals and a number of governments (Veatch 1980;
Leichter 1981; Wikler 2002). Surveys also suggest that there is significant support for
these kinds of policies amongst the lay-public too. For example, a recent American
study found that 53% of respondents believed it would be “fair” to require people who
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engage in risky health affecting behaviours to pay higher insurance premiums
(Civanar & Arda 2008).
It is also worth reflecting on the fact that tobacco and alcohol, in particular, have been
taxed for centuries without much resistance. The rationale for taxing these products
has always been multifaceted, but part of the modern purpose is to ensure that people
who smoke and drink pay the costs of their own choices and few people seem to take
umbrage at this idea (Morreim 1995; Cappelen and Norheim 2005).
A number of policy makers and academics have also recently defended the idea that
risk taxes could be placed on products containing high levels of sugar, salt and
saturated fat and some countries have already implemented such policies. For
example, as I noted earlier, Denmark has placed taxes on products containing high
levels of saturated fat and Hungary has done the same with a whole range of
“unhealthy foods” (BBC News 2011).
Risk insurance schemes also seem to have attracted some support from governments,
academics and the lay-public. The German government already allows “social” health
insurance companies to charge higher premiums to those who engage in more risky
behaviours and in America many private insurance firms require employees to pay
higher premiums if they smoke or if they are obese. The state of Israel, meanwhile,
does not allow scuba diving companies to rent scuba equipment unless divers can
prove that they have taken out specific diving insurance (Israeli Diving Federation
2012).
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Even in countries where specific health insurance exists, the idea that governments
have the right to force people to buy insurance if they wish to take risks is still fairly
novel and it is unclear how popular such an approach would be.196 However, given the
inherent similarity between this approach and the tax policy I think that a risk policy
approach would garner a reasonable amount of support from professionals, patients
and the lay public even if the insurance was mandatory. Moreover, under the terms of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010) American citizens will
effectively be “forced” to buy general health insurance and although this new law has
divided opinion, many Americans seem to support this “mandatory” insurance policy.
In addition to being reasonably popular the risk tax and risk insurance policies also
have a large number of advantages over all the other policies that I have discussed in
this chapter. Indeed, both of these policies completely side-step the rejection by health
care professionals objection, the damage to doctor-patient relationship objection, the
inhumanity objection, the dehumanising objection and the changing the goalposts
objection.
These policies would avoid the inhumanity objection entirely because everyone will
continue to receive the health care that they need even if they are morally responsible
for taking risks with their own health. This is because people who take risks will pay
an insurance premium or a risk tax before they take the risk. Interestingly, Cappelen
and Norheim (2005) argue that “the tax burden imposed on each person ex ante (at
the point of choice) could be considered as in-humanitarian if it imposes and
196 Israel’s scuba diving policy seems to be the exception to the rule here.
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extremely high cost”. However, this is a bit of a stretch; an expensive tax or insurance
premium is many things, but “in-humanitarian” it surely is not. 197
These policies also avoid the damage to doctor patient relationship objection for the
simple reason that health care professionals would not have to assess individual
patient’s degrees of moral responsibility under these kinds of schemes (Cappelen and
Norheim 2005). This is because decisions about responsibility would be carried out
“responsibility assessors” who were not trained health care professionals. Thus,
although patients might distrust these assessors and dislike being judged by them, this
would not impact on their relationship with health care professionals and so the
doctor-patient relationship would not be aversely affected.
Since health care professionals would not have to sit in judgement over their patients
and since these policies would not be inhumane health care professionals would also
be much less likely to revolt against the imposition of these kinds of health care
policies. Thus, both the tax and insurance policies neatly avoid the rejection by health
care professional’s objection too. Indeed, many health care professionals openly
advocate stiff increases in tax on both cigarettes and alcohol and some also favour
extending “risk taxes” to other unhealthy products and behaviours. 198
197 Since these policies are not in any obvious way inhumane they also completely avoid the
dehumanising objection.
198The tax and risk policies are not vulnerable to the changing the goalposts objection either because
taxes and risk insurance payments could not realistically be applied retrospectively. They are, in other
words, inherently “forward looking”.
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These policies also partially avoid the “luck objection”. This is because the risk tax
and risk insurance schemes pool the resources of those who take similar risks and thus
ensure that everyone who takes the same risk share some of the costs when the risks
turns sour for some but not for others. Neither policy actually achieves the goal of
ensuring that people who take the same risks experience exactly the same costs. This
is because the “unlucky” risk takers will experience some form of ill-health or injury
whilst the “lucky” risk takers will not. Nonetheless, the tax and insurance policies do
ensure that some of the cost is shared and thus they help to avoid the “double
injustice” that would occur if unlucky risk takers not only had to suffer ill-health but
also pay had to pay for their health care whilst lucky risk takers avoided both costs.
However, though the tax and insurance approaches clearly have a number of
advantages over the other policies they are not without their problems either. To begin
with they are both still vulnerable to the costly-resources, intrusiveness, inaccuracy
and unreliability objection. This is because responsibility assessments would still have
to take place under this scheme and, although responsibility assessments would now
be carried out by “responsibility assessors” rather than doctors, this process would
still be expensive, it would still require assessors to ask intrusive questions and there
would still be a risk of inaccurate and unreliable judgments being made.
Nonetheless, fewer responsibility assessments would need to take place under these
schemes because many people (e.g. sky divers) would realise that there is little point
asking for a responsibility assessments – and so the costs of operating the scheme
would not be as substantial as would be the case if the other policies were put in
place. Arguably, responsibility judgments would also be more accurate and less
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unreliable because they would be carried out by “responsibility specialists” rather
than health care professionals.
The risk tax and the risk insurance policies would also be vulnerable to a number of
objections that do not affect the other policies that I have discussed above. One
difficulty relates to the fact that tax and insurance policies must calculate tax and
insurance premium rates on the basis of future health care costs. This, however, is
very hard to achieve because the amount of money needed to manage diseases is not
static. There are many reasons for this, but the primary problem is that scientific
developments are constantly occurring and it is hard to pre-judge how expensive new
products will be when they released onto the market (Wikler 2002). I will call this the
“prediction of costs objection”.
One way around this problem would be to set the tax rates or the insurance premiums
at a higher level than the current expected costs. If the costs were later found to be
less than had been predicted then rebates could be provided to those who had
overpaid. The difficulty with this solution is that many people would end up receiving
a tax or insurance rebate when they were too ill to make use of the money. Given that
neither situation is ideal I would opt to set the tax and insurance rate at a higher level
than expected and then provide rebates as soon as it becomes clear that the extra
money was not needed. This is not an especially neat solution, but given the
difficulties with predicting costs I think it is the best available option.
The tax and risk policies are also open to the objection that these policies force people
who engage in health affecting behaviour to pay the costs of the health care that they
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might one day need. There are, in other words, no “opt outs” from either the taxation
or the insurance schemes as I have described them. Thus, people would not be given
the choice to decide not to pay a risk tax or the choice not to take out risk insurance if
they wanted to take a risk with their health. This is arguably more of a problem for the
risk insurance scheme because insurance is usually optional whilst taxes are
mandatory. However, the underlying problem is the same: forcing people to take out
insurance or to pay risk taxes in an unacceptable violation of people’s liberty
(McLachlan 1995). In particular, the policies trammel people’s freedom to take risk
without paying an up-front financial cost before they do so. I will call this the
“paternalism objection”.
The obvious solution to this objection would be to institute a tax and insurance
scheme that was not mandatory health. People could simply opt of out paying the risk
tax or opt of taking risk insurance if they wished to. Those who wished to opt out
could register with the government for some kind of “opt out card” which would state
that they did not need to pay tax or purchase insurance.
Adopting an opt-out scheme would certainly be feasible. It would also have the
obvious advantage that people would be free to choose which type of cost they wished
to bear – i.e. the cost of paying an up-front fee or the (potential) cost of having to pay
for health care or doing without health care at a later date. Giving them this option
would increase their autonomy and it would do so without violating the responsibility-
sensitivity of these policies. Indeed, since governments do not usually prevent people
from engaging in health-affecting risky behaviour in the first place it might be argued
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that they ought not to prevent people from taking the “secondary” risk of not paying
tax or taking out insurance cover.199
The problem with the opt-put approach is that it would open the door to a number of
objections that the tax and insurance policies were supposed to side step – including
the inhumanity and dehumanising objections. These objections would raise their head
again because some people would almost certainly choose to opt out of the tax and
insurance schemes if this was allowed and many of these people would later require
health care that they could not afford. If these individuals were then denied access to
health care this would mean that the policies would be vulnerable to the inhumanity
objection, but if they were provided with health care free of charge the policies would
no longer be responsibility-sensitive and a moral hazard problem would be created.
Adopting an opt-out tax or insurance scheme would also introduce a number of other
problems. One of these relates to the issue of whether the opt-in/opt-out choice would
be a “once in a lifetime” choice or whether people could opt back in if they changed
their minds at a later date. Allowing people to opt back in near the end of their lives –
or after that had been diagnosed with a disorder caused by their risky behaviour –
would not be possible, but in less extreme cases it is not clear whether it would be
reasonable to prevent people from opting back in. Enabling people to do so would
allow people to make “mistakes” and would give them the chance to change their
minds. However, in order to ensure that these individuals did not free-ride on others
they would probably have to pay a “late entry” fee – or pay higher taxes or insurance
199 As McLachlan (2010) notes, it is particularly paternalistic “to force people not to take a risk which
they may well have chosen to taken namely the risk of becoming unwell and not receiving all the
treatment” which might have returned them to good health.
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premiums – if they wanted to enter the scheme after everyone else had joined. This
would not be an impossible solution but it would significantly add to the complexity
of calculating costs and operating the system.
For these reasons, I do not think that an “opt out” system is feasible. I accept that this
means that people’s autonomy will be diminished. I also accept that this particular
problem from the perspective of the “expected consequences” defence of cost bearing
because this argument was premised on the value of autonomy. However, if we allow
people to opt out of paying tax or purchasing insurance the risk tax and the risk
insurance policy will not be able to avoid the inhumanity objection and this outcome
needs to be avoided at all costs.200
The tax and insurance polices are also affected by the objection that I will dub the
“inequity in ability to take risk objection”. This objection stems from that fact that
income and wealth are distributed very unequally in all modern societies and from the
fact that risk taxes and risk insurance premiums will be high given the costs of health
care. This means that only some people will be able to afford to take certain risks on a
regular basis (Wikler 1978; Dietrich 2002). For example, skiing, scuba diving and sky
diving are already expensive but if people have to purchase risk insurance or pay risk
taxes the total cost will be prohibitive for many people. Very poor people might even
200 Policies which require people to bear costs in this way may also be less paternalistic that one might
at first imagine. As Brown (2005) argues “people often accept rules that require them to do things they
know they should do precisely because they realise…that left to their own devices they may fail to these
things through carelessness or weakness of will”. This kind of argument does not entirely undermine
the paternalism objection, but it does at least take some of the sting out of it.
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find it hard to purchase tobacco and alcohol if the tax or insurance rate was set very
high.
It might be said that the only reason why some people can afford to take certain risks
at the moment is because they partially externalise the cost of health care provision
that is needed if they get ill. It might also be argued that the regressive aspect of
commodity taxes would be beneficial because it would mean that those at most risk of
ill-health and premature death (i.e. people lower down the socio-economic gradient)
would take fewer risks. However, given that disparities in income and wealth do not
always stem from differences in moral responsibility there is a serious problem here.
One way of solving this problem would be to redistribute resources in such a way that
inequalities in income and wealth are fair. If this was done then people’s differing
ability to take risks would not be unjust. The obvious objection to this solution is that
is it never likely to be achieved and, in any case, such a task is well beyond the means
of health care professionals and health policy makers. Another option would be to try
and ensure a level playing field by providing tax or insurance discounts to people who
had less income and wealth. This would have the disadvantage of providing a
perverse incentive especially to poorer people who are already more likely to take
risks and it would also add yet another level of complexity to the tax and insurance
system. As such, I am not entirely sure that this solution would work. However,
offering some kind of discount to people who are not morally responsible for not
having sufficient money to pay insurance premiums and taxes does seem necessary.
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The risk tax and risk insurance policies are also vulnerable to the inconsistent
enforcement objection. The problem in this case is that although it is relatively easy to
enforce a tax or insurance system in relation to certain commodities (e.g. cigarettes,
alcohol and food products containing saturated fat, sugar and salt) it is not easy to
enforce such systems in relation to other risky health affecting behaviours (e.g.
unprotected sexual intercourse, excessive sun exposure and a failure to exercise
regularly). McLachlan (1995), for example, argues that although smoking can be
“monitored, quantified and taxed, other relevant behaviours (and the lack of them)
cannot”. Cappelen and Norheim (2005) similarly argue that it is easy to levy taxes on
consumable goods, but trying to do so in the case of unprotected sexual intercourse or
in the case of a failure to exercise regularly seems nigh on impossible.
In theory, tax inspectors or insurance inspectors could try and check whether people
who were sunbathing and taking part in sports had the required insurance documents
or had paid the required tax. Indeed, Veatch (1981) argues that some ingenuity could
be deployed to “tax what seems untaxable” and he gives the example of taxing
gasoline to cover injures associated with road traffic accidents and taxing mountain
climbing equipment to cover injuries associated with this activity. However, quite
apart from the fact that this would be incredibly intrusive, some activities (especially
unprotected sexual intercourse) seem utterly beyond the reach of any tax or insurance
inspector no matter how ingenious they are.
One way to deal with this objection would be to exclude certain behaviours from the
tax or insurance scheme. This would solve the enforcement objection, but at high cost
because it would open the policies to a charge of injustice because people in a
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normatively similar situation would be treated differently. In fact, McLachlan (1995),
argues that such a policy would be “unfair, unjust and inequitable”. However, there is
no obvious way around this latter difficulty and so it is necessary to bite this particular
bullet.
The final objection that I wish to raise is the “negligible risk objection”. Certain
behaviours are, as we have seen, very risky. Sky diving, for example, is risky even if
every possible precaution is taken. However, other potentially risky behaviours are
only risky if people repeat them regularly. For example, smoking one cigarette a
month or drinking one pint of beer a week will only increase people’s risk of
developing smoking and alcohol related disease by a negligible amount. But if this is
the case, why should people who smoke or drink very occasionally have to pay any
tax or special insurance premium at all?
Admittedly, people who smoke or drink occasionally won’t pay much tax if they do
not consume these products regularly, but it is not clear why they should pay any tax
– or why they should have to purchase any specific risk insurance. I am sympathetic
to this position and agree with Wikler (1978) that the ideal solution would be to
“identify persons taking risks…and charge higher insurance premiums [or taxes]”
accordingly.
However, if we try to make exceptions for those who rarely smoke or drink the risk
tax and risk insurance system would become even more complex. For example, it
would be necessary to issue “light” smokers and occasional drinkers with a card
which would make them exempt from paying taxes or insurance. But it would be
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impossible to stop these individuals from actually consuming a lot of cigarettes and
alcohol (e.g. by buying small quantities from different shops) and so it is not clear
how the system could operate. As such, I think that the bullet presented by the
negligible risk objection must also be bitten by anyone who wishes to implement
either the risk tax or the risk insurance policy.
7.4.2 Risk tax and risk insurance policies: summary
I have argued in the previous section that the risk tax and risk insurance policies avoid
many of the more serious objections which may be levelled at the denial of access,
payment and priority approaches to cost bearing. In particular, they avoid the
inhumanity objection, the dehumanising objection, the damage to doctor-patient
relationships objection and, in all probability, the rejection by health care
professional’s objection too. They also partially avoid the luck and costly-resource
objection. However, these policies are not a panacea. Indeed, they are vulnerable to
objections that do not affect the denial of access, payment and priority approaches to
cost bearing. Nonetheless, of all the policies on offer I think that these are the most
normatively reasonable and practically feasible.
7.5. Summary of policies & objections
I have discussed five different cost bearing policy options in this chapter and I have
also analysed an array of objections that may be levelled at these various policies.
Since many of these objections apply to multiple policies I have included a table
below (Figure 7.0) which lists the objections and demonstrates which policies are
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affected by them. Where a check mark (✔)is present the claim being made is that the
objection does affect the relevant cost bearing policy. Where a cross (X) is present the
claim being made is that the objection does not affect the relevant cost bearing policy.
Where a check mark and a cross are both present (✔/X) the claim being made is that
the objection partially affects the cost bearing policy in question.
Figure 7.0. Cost Bearing Policies and Objections.
Denial of
Access
Payment Lower
priority
Risk Tax Risk
Insurance
Costly
resources
✔ ✔ ✔ X X
Damage to
doctor-patient
relationship
✔ ✔ ✔ X X
Rejection by
health care
professionals’
✔ ✔ ✔ X X
Inaccuracy ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Unreliability ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Inhumanity ✔ ✔ ✔ X X
Dehumanising ✔ ✔ ✔ X X
Intrusiveness ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Disrespect ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Proportionate
health care
✔ ✔ X X X
Changing the
goalposts
✔ ✔ ✔ X X
Luck ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔/X ✔/X
Comparison X X ✔ X X
Prediction of
costs
X X X ✔ ✔
Paternalism X X X ✔ ✔
Inequity in
ability to take
risk
X X X ✔ ✔
Inconsistent
enforcement
X X X ✔ ✔
Negligible
risk
X X X ✔ ✔
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7.6 Further convergence and divergence
I noted at the beginning of this chapter that, in addition to analysing the denial of
access, payment, reduced priority, risk tax and risk insurance policies, I would also
explain which of these policies can be supported by which of the five normative
arguments discussed in the previous chapter. The following table (Figure 8.0)
summarises this information. Where a check mark (✔)is present the claim being
made is that the cost bearing policy is defensible on the basis of the relevant
normative argument. Where a cross (X) is present the claim being made is that the
cost bearing policy is not defensible on the basis of the relevant normative argument.
Where a cross and a check mark is present (✔ / X) the claim being made is that the
policy might be defensible on the basis of the relevant normative argument.
Figure 8.0. Normative Arguments and Cost Bearing Policies.
Desert Expected
Consequences
Rights
Harm
Luck
egalitarianism
Utilitarianism
Denial of
access
X ✔ / X ✔ ✔ / X ✔ / X
Payment X ✔ / X ✔ ✔ / X ✔ / X
Reduced
Priority
✔ ✔ / X X X ✔ / X
Risk Tax ✔ ✔ / X ✔ ✔ / X ✔ / X
Risk
Insurance
✔ ✔ / X ✔ ✔ / X ✔ / X
The first thing to note about this table is that the utilitarian approach could defend all
forms of cost-bearing in principle. This is because, in theory, all forms of cost bearing
policy outlined above could increase net utility. However, in reality, it is unlikely that
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the utilitarian approach would be able to defend the denial of access approach because
the harm and suffering caused by this policy would probably not outweigh the
deterrent effect that the policy will have. Indeed, of all the policies discussed above, I
think that it is the risk tax and risk insurance policies which will increase net utility
the most. This is because these policies provide a powerful and immediate (financial)
deterrent, but they are also very humane.
The expected consequences approach can also, in theory, defend all forms of cost
bearing. This is because the expected consequences argument can defend any policy
which people actually expect. For example, if people expect to bear costs by paying
risk taxes then this policy will be defensible from the expected consequences
approach. I would add, however, that since the expected consequences account is tied
very closely to the value of autonomy any policy which will destroy autonomy will be
especially frowned upon by those who take this approach. For example, denying
access to healthcare may lead to severe disability and premature death and these
outcomes will necessarily reduce autonomy (Brown 2005).
The moralistic desert argument can defend the reduced priority, risk tax and risk
insurance policies, but not the denial of access and the payment policies. The
moralistic desert argument cannot defend the latter policies because it relies on a
retributive approach to cost bearing and all retributive accounts are committed to the
idea that the cost that is to be borne must be proportionate to the nature and degree of
harm caused by the immoral act. In other words, “the punishment must fit the crime”
(Wikler 2002). The problem is that denial of access and the payment approach will
cause immense suffering and, in some cases, premature death and such penalties are
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disproportionate responses to the moral “crime” of engaging in self harming risky
behaviour. As Harris (1985) forcefully argues: “to choose to let one person rather
than another to die on the grounds of some moral defect their behaviour or character
is to take upon ourselves the right not simply to punish, but capitally to punish,
offenders against morality”.
The moralistic desert argument has a similar problem with the reduced priority
approach, but because the intention in this case is rather different and because the
degree of suffering caused will be less than would be the case with the denial of
access and payment policy it might be acceptable from the perspective of most
moralistic desert theorists. The moralistic desert argument could also be used to
defend the risk tax and risk insurance policies because the bearing of “up-front” costs
is proportional to the (alleged) intrinsic immorality of self harming behaviour.
I accept that there may be a problem with the “aptness” of these policies from the
perspective of the moralistic desert argument. We do not usually punish or sanction or
deny people a benefit by making them pay taxes or by making them purchase
insurance. The language of “sin taxes” does exist and Yoder (2002) specifically uses
this term in his analysis of responsibility policies. However, the language of “sin
insurance” is not widely used and it is not clear that anyone would regard an
insurance premium as a penalty. Nonetheless, though making people bear costs via
taxation or insurance premiums as a form of punishment, sanction or denial of benefit
is unconventional, such an approach is not implausible and because such a response is
proportionate these are exactly the kinds of penalties that those who defend the
moralistic desert argument can, in fact, support.
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The rights-harm policy can also defend all of the policies with the exception of the
reduced priority policy. The problem with the reduced priority policy is that people
would still, eventually, get access to the health care that they needed under this policy
and since resources are limited this would mean that people would use health care
resources that other people have a right to. Admittedly, in situations were resources
were less scarce this would not be a problem, but the rights-harm argument would not
apply in that situation anyway. All the other policies, meanwhile, ensure that people
bear costs in such a way that scarce resources are not used to provide people with
health care when others have need of these resources and a right to access them.
Finally, the luck egalitarian argument is able to defend all forms of policies except for
the reduced priority argument. The problem with the reduced priority policy is that
people would still get access to resources eventually and this is problematic given that
the luck egalitarian account specifies that people who are morally responsible for their
risky behaviour (i.e. people who suffer from “option luck”) should not receive
resources on the grounds of justice.
Luck egalitarian would, however, divide over the normative viability of the other
policies. Luckist luck egalitarians – i.e. those luck egalitarians committed to sharing
costs between people who are equally morally responsible for taking similar risks –
are unlikely to support either the denial of access or the payment approach because
these policies do not allow costs to be shared in this way. But they will support the
risk tax and the risk insurance system. On the other hand, non-luckist luck egalitarians
344
will take the opposite view and will defend the denial of access and the payment
approach but will oppose the risk tax and risk insurance policies.
As I have argued previously, I think that the “luckist” luck egalitarian argument is the
most sound and so, from my perspective, the best version of the luck egalitarian
argument can be relied upon to defend the policies that are, in any case, the most
normatively acceptable and practically feasible.
7.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed five health care policy measures that could be
implemented to ensure that people who are morally responsible for their risky health
affecting behaviour bear some of the costs of their choices. These policy options,
which I have dubbed the “denial of access”, “payment”, “reduced priority”, “risk tax”
and “risk insurance” schemes, would all enable governments to ensure that people
who are morally responsible bear some of the costs associated with their health
affecting choices.
However, I have argued that of the five possible policies the risk tax and risk
insurance schemes are the most practically feasible and normatively reasonable
options and that the other policy options are open to very serious objections.
Moreover, I have also demonstrated that the risk tax and the risk insurance policies
are the only policies which can be supported by all five of the normative arguments
discussed in the last chapter – including the most powerful of these arguments (i.e. the
luckist version of the luck egalitarian argument). Consequently, I think that policy
makers should create and implement risk taxes and/or risk insurance schemes, but
should eschew all other forms of cost bearing policies.
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Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks
“Use your health, even to the point of wearing it out. That is what it is for.
Spend all you have before you die; do not outlive yourself.”
– George Bernard Shaw
8.0 General conclusions
In this thesis I have argued that philosophers must analyse the concept of personal
responsibility for health and address the specific issue of cost bearing in relation to
risky health affecting behaviours as a matter of some urgency. There are four main
reasons for this: (a) there is growing evidence that human beings play a central role in
determining their own health, (b) a substantial number of citizens support cost bearing
policies, (c) the costs of health care are spiralling out of control and (d) a number of
health care professionals, policy makers and insurance companies have already started
to implement policies which force patients to bear the costs of their choices. As such,
millions of people are already being affected by responsibility-sensitive cost bearing
policies and, if trends continue, billions more will be affected by the middle of the 21st
century.
For these reasons I have concentrated my energies on the sub branch of the
responsibility for health debate which relates specifically to the question of whether
cost bearing policies are normatively acceptable and practically feasible. In the
process I have drawn a number of conclusions, the most important of which are as
346
follows: (a) many people are substantively causally responsible for their ill-health, (b)
a significant number of people are substantively morally responsible for their risky
health affecting choices, (c) there are strong normative reasons to think that some
people should be held consequentially responsible for their risky health choices and
(d) the best way to ensure that people bear costs is to require them to pay risk taxes or
to purchase risk insurance.201
I have not done enough in this thesis to settle the debate about the normative and
practical viability of cost bearing policies once and for all. Moreover, I accept that my
primary conclusion – viz. that certain forms of cost bearing policies can and should be
implemented – rest on a series of highly controversial claims. In particular, the claim
that many people are substantially morally responsible for their risky health affecting
behaviour is likely to be hotly contested. Likewise, the empirical claim about the
degree of behavioural involvement in the aetiology of disease is likely to be disputed
by some epidemiologists and many philosophers will take issue with my argument
that the “luckist” version of luck egalitarianism is sound.
However, though I have not solved this particular Gordian Knot, I hope that I have
provided a useful framework for those who wish to defend – or oppose – cost bearing
claims in relation to risky behaviours and I also hope that I provided policy makers
with solid reasons to implement certain kinds of cost bearing policies. Before drawing
this thesis to an end, however, I wish to say a few words about some further avenues
of research that need to be explored in more depth.
201 I have also argued that there is a growing democratic mandate for cost bearing policies, especially in
relation to what I have called “core cases” of risky health affecting choices.
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8.1 Further research
One crucial issue which I have not fully addressed in this thesis is how to balance the
value of responsibility with other values like need and cost-effectiveness. This is
important because even if we accept that there are good normative and practical
reasons to think that people ought to bear some of the costs associated with their risky
behaviour, the existence of these other values might give us good reasons to oppose
cost bearing. I have tried to take some account of these issues in my thesis. For
example, my use of the humanitarian, costly-resources and dehumanising objections
reflect a plural approach to the issue of cost bearing. However, I have not offered a
comprehensive and systematic analysis of how different values might converge or
conflict in relation to the issue of cost bearing.
This task needs to be completed because it is neither politically feasible nor morally
reasonable to ignore the plurality of values that the citizens of a country hold dear
when devising policies which will determine how scarce healthcare resources are
distributed within that country.
However, although there is a risk that the specific arguments for responsibility-
sensitive cost bearing policies will be weakened when we take into account all the
other relevant values, I don’t think that this process will lead us to the conclusion that
the concept of personal responsibility is unimportant or that cost bearing claims are
unsound. Indeed, it is quite possible that the risk tax and risk insurance policies will
withstand the test of “plurality” and their legitimacy may even be reinforced when we
take other values into account.
348
Further research also needs to be carried out to explore the possibility of instituting
other kinds of “responsibility for health” policies. For example, we need to determine
the normative viability and practically feasibility of heath policies based on the
concept of “collective responsibility” – such as the regulation of the food and drinks
industry and the creation of more green areas in urban centres to encourage
exercising. Moreover, further work is needed to determine how reasonable it is to
create non-cost bearing health policies based on the concept of personal responsibility
– such as bonus schemes for those who engage in behaviour which improves health.
As I noted in the earlier chapters, many governments already operate policies
designed to reward people for taking steps to look after their health and almost every
developed and developing world government has put in place policies designed to
regulate the tobacco and alcohol industry (Wikler 1978; Veatch 1980; Schmid 2007).
However, although some scholars have begun to provide a practical and normative
defence of these kind of policies, further empirical and normative research needs to be
carried out to determine whether these policies are defensible and whether they can be
properly integrated with the kinds of cost-bearing policies that I have defended in this
thesis.
Further research should also be carried out to determine whether other normative
arguments can be successfully deployed to defend cost bearing policies. In this thesis
I have limited my analysis to five such arguments, but these may represent the tip of
the ethical iceberg. In chapter 6 I briefly mentioned that cost bearing might also be
defensible on communitarian, libertarian and “common sense” concepts of justice as
349
well as non-moral forms of the concept of desert and it is possible that some of these
arguments could provide an even more powerful defence of cost bearing than I have
offered here.
In addition to these more normative kinds of research, further empirical work is
needed in relation to the issue of cost bearing. For example, much more research
needs to be carried out to better understand the exact degree to which human
behaviour causes human ill-health. Likewise, more empirical work needs to be carried
out to determine the relative popularity of different cost bearing policies amongst
health care professionals and lay people and to determine exactly which normative
arguments people actually rely upon. Moreover, it is important to conduct empirical
work into the impact that different cost bearing policies actually have on the people
who are affected by them.
Finally, further normative and empirical research needs to be carried out to address
two very specific issues about the concept of personal responsibility for health and
cost bearing. The first involves the possibility of making people bear costs by
changing the way biomedical research is conducted and the second relates to the way
in which arguments about personal responsibility will be affected by developments in
the field of genetics.
In my thesis I have concentrated overwhelmingly on the issue of personal
responsibility in relation to clinical medicine and public policy and, as a result, I have
entirely neglected the issue of biomedical research and how the concept of personal
responsibility and the notion of cost bearing might impact on the way that research is
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conducted. Elsewhere, I have started to address these questions and I have suggested
that it might be possible to make people bear costs by re-directing bio-medical
research away from diseases which people are sometimes substantively causally and
morally responsible for (e.g. obesity, primary hypertension and type 2 diabetes) and
towards diseases which people are rarely or never causally or morally responsible for
(e.g. paediatric, genetic and neurological diseases) (Hooper 2011). The idea, put
simply, is that if we adopt such a policy “fewer medical products would be produced
to treat self inflicted diseases and many more would be produced to treat non self
inflicted diseases” and this would ensure that people who took risks would bear costs
in a rather novel kind of way (Ibid, p36).
There are, as one might expect, many advantages and disadvantages of adopting such
a policy. For example, it would avoid the “damage to the doctor patient relationship”
objection entirely, but it would have the obvious disadvantage that people who were
not morally responsible for developing “self inflicted” diseases would be affected just
as much as those who were partially or fully morally responsible. However, this
policy has sufficient prima facia advantages to warrant further research and, in any
case, we need to think a little more about how the concept of personal responsibility
could impact on the world of biomedical research rather than just the world of clinical
medicine and public health policy.
The second specific issue that requires further thought is the way in which genetic
developments will soon affect what we are medically capable of achieving. This is
because many of these developments will affect the scope of claims about causal and
moral – and, therefore, consequential – responsibility.
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As things stand genetic diseases are usually cited as examples par excellence of
diseases for which the individual who is affected by them cannot be causally, let alone
morally, responsible. This is for the obvious reasons that people who suffer from
these diseases are not in any way responsible for the genes that they inherit and, for a
long time, there was little that people could do to influence their health if they had
inherited an abnormal gene. Moreover, until quite recently, prospective parents have
had very little access to genetic screening tests and were thus unable to screen
themselves or their embryos and foetuses. As such, although parents have always
been, in one sense, causally responsible for the genetic diseases that afflict their
children the notion that they were also morally responsible for these diseases has
never seemed especially fair or accurate.
However, rapid advances in genetic technologies – both in terms of screening tests
and in terms of the treatments available for people suffering from genetic diseases –
will soon change this causal and moral landscape in way that will have profound
implications for the concept of personal responsibility for health and cost bearing
policies.
To begin with, advances in the available genetic and non-genetic treatment of many
genetic diseases (such as Cystic Fibrosis) now mean that patients born with “pure”
genetic diseases are likely to live well beyond their childhood years. This is a great
boon, but it does mean that people born with genetic disease now have more scope for
determining how their diseases progresses post diagnosis. For example, if they refuse
to comply with treatment or if they choose to take extra risks (e.g. if someone with
Cystic Fibrosis decides to smoke) they may be said to be partially causally
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responsible for the development of their disease and partially morally responsible for
their choices to take “extra” risks.
It is also now possible for children and adults to be screened to find out whether they
have developed “risky” genes. For example, women can now find out whether they
have inherited the abnormal versions of the BRCA gene – which are a known risk
factor for breast cancer – and tests are also available to determine whether people
have inherited genes which make them more susceptible to diseases such as
hypertension. This is potentially revolutionary because it means that people will be
given information which will enable them to make lifestyle choices (e.g. avoiding
excessive salt if one is at an especially high risk of developing hypertension) or by
opting for early screening or preventative surgery.202
More contentiously, perhaps, parents in the developed world have increasing access to
genetic screening tests which enable them to screen themselves or their embryos or
foetuses for deleterious genetic mutations. This is already done where couples are at
high risk of creating children with “pure” genetic diseases like Thalassemia, Sickle
Cell Anaemia and Cystic Fibrosis, but this technology is increasingly likely to be
offered to prospective parents where the risk is not the creation of a child with a
“pure” genetic disease but the creation of a child who may be at risk of developing a
“mixed” genetic and environmental disease. For example, prospective parents may
soon be able to test themselves or their embryos and foetuses to see if they are at risk
202 Some women known to have BRCA genes are already offered regular screening in the UK and
elsewhere and some even have their breasts pre-emptively removed even though they may never
develop breast cancer (DeNoon 2010).
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of having children with genes that might, one day, cause them to develop type 2
diabetes.
What this all means is that claims about causal, moral and consequential
responsibility are likely to become more diverse and more common in the very near
future because a whole set of diseases that were once beyond the control human
behaviour will no longer be so. Moreover, the kinds of issues that will arise will be
very complex to deal with. For example, the question of whether parents have to bear
costs if they refused screening and then had a child with some kind of genetic
condition will create much heated debate and the further question of whether parents
have some kind of duty to abort foetuses who are only “at risk” of developing a mixed
genetic-environmental disease will be even more frenzied.
As it happens, some philosophers and bioethicists have already realised that these
genetic developments will have serious ramifications for the concept of personal
responsibility and cost bearing. For example, Cappelen, Norheim and Tungoden
(2008) have argued that “developments in genetics may relocate the responsibility cut
in an epistemic way by affecting which factors we view as being within or beyond the
control of individuals [and by] providing new technologies that may make it possible
for individuals to affect factors that were previously beyond individual control”. 203
Likewise, Kelley (2005) has raised the question of whether society will “hold parents
responsible for knowingly brining a child into the world in a harmed state”.
203 Cappelen and Norheim (2005) also argue that “as we obtain more genetic information on
susceptibility, the understanding of individual responsibility will become even more vital”.
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However, relatively little in-depth research has been carried out to determine the
precise normative significance of these genetic developments and how they will
impact on the claims we make about causal, moral and consequential responsibility.
Thus, there is an urgent need to address this issue before the technological
developments which are already upon us start proliferating even further and before
policy makers and other stakeholders steal yet another march on bioethicists in their
deployment of the concepts of responsibility in relation to genetic diseases.
8.2 Final thoughts
Personal responsibility for health is a complex business and there is much work yet to
be done to clarify the extent to which people’s health really is in their own hands and
how physicians, patients and policy makers should respond to a world where human
behaviour is causally responsible for a substantive amount of ill-health. In this thesis I
have argued that there are some strong normative reasons to think that people who are
substantively morally responsible for their risky health affecting choices ought to bear
the costs of their choices and I have argued that the tax and insurance policies are the
best way of ensuring that people pay these costs. However, I wish to end this thesis
with a warning about the general value of health and with a warning about the perils
of placing too much emphasis on risk avoidance in our lives.
I have no doubt that health matters both in an intrinsic and an instrumental sense.
However, health is not the most important thing in life and we should be careful of
over-valuing it because, it we do that, there is a real danger that we will suffer from
what Fitzgerald (1994) has called the “tyranny of health”. Indeed, as a keen scuba
355
diver, sometime skier and occasional sky diver, I firmly believe that taking risks is
part of what makes life worth living. After all, if we do not face up to our mortality
from time to time it is hard to see how we will be able to properly value the life that
we have been lucky enough to have the opportunity to live.
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